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ABSTRACT
In this Article, Professor Turley addresses the use of impeachment,
specifically the Senate trial, as a method of resolving factional disputes
about an impeached official’s legitimacy to remain in office. While the
Madisonian democracy was designed to regulate factional pressures,
academics and legislators often discuss impeachments as relatively
static events focused solely on removal. Alternatively, impeachment is
sometimes viewed as an extreme countermajoritarian measure used to
“reverse” or “nullify” the popular election of a President. This Article
advances a more dynamic view of the Senate trial as a Madisonian
device to resolve factional disputes.
This Article first discusses the history of impeachment and demon-
strates that it is largely a history of factional or partisan disputes over
legitimacy. The Article then explores how impeachment was used
historically as a check on the authority of the Crown and tended to be
used most heavily during periods of political instability. English and
colonial impeachments proved to be highly destabilizing in the ab-
sence of an integrated political system. The postcolonial impeachment
process was modified to convert it from a tool of factional dissension
to a vehicle of factional resolution. This use of Senate trials as a
Madisonian device allows for the public consideration of the full rec-
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ord as the foundation for a vote of “true consent.” In this unique fo-
rum, an impeached official is subject to a decision of the public—
through the cipher of the Senate—as to his legitimacy in carrying out
constitutional duties. As such, Professor Turley concludes that, prop-
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Alexander Hamilton once warned that charges of impeachable
conduct “will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole com-
munity, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical
to the accused.”1 Hamilton’s words have proven prophetic in the two
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 396-97 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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presidential impeachments and the majority of judicial impeachments
brought before Congress. Given this history, it is striking how little
attention has been paid to the role of impeachment in the resolution
of factional divisions over the legitimacy of judges and Presidents to
continue in office. While the Madisonian democracy2 was designed to
regulate factional pressures, the moment of greatest factional divi-
sion—impeachments (and specifically presidential impeachments)—
has largely escaped academic attention. Rather, academics and legisla-
tors often discuss impeachment as simply a process of removal and
ignore the important institutional functions beyond its corrective
conclusion.
This Article addresses the use of impeachment, and specifically
the Senate trial, as a method of resolving factional disputes over ex-
ecutive or judicial legitimacy. The Senate impeachment function is
distinct from the function of the impeachment decision in the House
of Representatives in both its structural and political characteristics.
The House of Representatives performs a critical role as a check on
presidential misconduct and deters such conduct through its detec-
tion and referral of impeachable offenses. The Senate function is
quite different.3 It is “political” in a uniquely Madisonian sense. The
2. Like many academics, I use the term Madisonian democracy with the understanding
that it is an often imprecise generality. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Pub-
lic Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 29-30 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]; see also Big
Government Lawsuits: Are Policy Driven Lawsuits in the Public Interest?: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of Prof. Jonathan Turley) (dis-
cussing Madisonian democracy and the separation of powers). As will be shown, however, the
main focus of this Article is Madison’s emphasis on factions and procedural checks and bal-
ances.
3. While both judicial and presidential impeachments will be discussed, this Article will
address presidential impeachments as the working analytical model because of the emphasis on
presidential impeachments in the constitutional debates and the heightened controversy over
such decisions by the legislative branch. The thrust of the argument in this Article was made by
the author as a witness in the House Impeachment Hearings of President William Jefferson
Clinton. See Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 250-76 (1998) [hereinafter
House Hearings] (testimony of Prof. Jonathan Turley); see also Indictment or Impeachment of
the President: Hearings Before the Comm. of the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Fed-
eralism, and Property Rights, 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of Prof. Jonathan Turley); Jona-
than Turley, Congress as Grand Jury: The Role of the House of Representatives in the Impeach-
ment of an American President, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 735 (1999) [hereinafter Turley,
Congress as Grand Jury]; Jonathan Turley, The Executive Function Theory, the Hamilton Af-
fairs, and Other Constitutional Mythologies, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1791 (1999) [hereinafter Turley,
Executive Function Theory]; Jonathan Turley, Reflections on Murder, Misdemeanors, and
Madison, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 1999) [hereinafter Turley, Murder, Misdemeanors,
and Madison]; Jonathan Turley, From Pillar to Post: The Impeachment and Indictment of a
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Senate trial serves as a unique forum for resolving highly divisive
questions over the legitimacy of a President or judge to continue to
exercise constitutional authority. As such, it performs a role central
to the maintenance of a representative system based on true consent
of the governed.
Senate trials are often presented as relatively static events solely
focused on removal.4 This Article advances a more dynamic view of
the Senate trial as a Madisonian device to resolve factional disputes.5
In crafting the American legislative process, Madison sought to ad-
dress the destabilizing effects of factional disputes within democratic
systems. Madison believed that leaving such disputes unaddressed
would create intrigue and instability within a political system.6 For
that reason, the Madisonian process does not seek to suppress, but to
transform factional interests. This emphasis on resolving factional
disputes gives the system the ability to withstand crushing pressures
during periods of enormous social, political, and economic turmoil.
Presidential impeachment cases constitute the most extreme and
the most dangerous form of factional dispute in the legislative
branch. When a President is impeached, the House certifies not only
that impeachable conduct may have occurred but that a majority of
House members question the legitimacy of the President to govern.
Sitting American President (Oct. 1, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
4. During the Clinton impeachment, this dominant view emerged from the testimony and
writings of a number of academics. These scholars rejected the notion that the House of Repre-
sentatives should impeach a President when there are clearly insufficient votes to remove in the
Senate. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3, at 782-83. This view was also preva-
lent in the Senate, where members questioned the need or value of a trial when over one-third
of the Senate was likely to oppose removal. See id. Since President Clinton’s party controlled 45
votes, it was viewed as extremely unlikely that a trial would produce a two-thirds majority for
conviction.
5. The view of the Senate trial as a Madisonian device is coherent despite the fact that
Madison initially opposed the use of the Senate in the impeachment process. Madison was con-
cerned that allowing the Senate to try a President would make him “improperly dependent.” 2
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 551 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [here-
inafter RECORDS]. Madison’s motion to remove the Senate from the process was rejected, and
he did not pursue the matter further. See infra notes 156, 545-48 and accompanying text. Madi-
son’s later view of the Senate’s role is shrouded in mystery. His letters do not indicate that he
was fundamentally opposed to the Senate during the early constitutional impeachments. Never-
theless, this Article relies upon Madison’s general theory of factions and bicameralism, as op-
posed to his specific view of the Senate in the process of impeachment. It is accepted, at the
time of the Constitutional Convention, that Madison did not view impeachment in a bicameral
model. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3, at 768-71; infra note 155 and accom-
panying text.
6. See infra notes 507-21 and accompanying text.
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Such cases will often arrive at the Senate with the support and the
opposition of large and passionate factional groups. As will be shown,
the history of impeachment is largely a history of such factional or
partisan disputes over legitimacy. This history, however, also shows
how factional interests can be transformed under the catalytic influ-
ence of a full Senate trial.
The value of the Senate trial as a Madisonian device is largely
dependent on the trial procedures. Impeachment has never been
treated as a contiguous part of the Madisonian process and, deprived
of its constitutional moorings, the rules of Senate trials have proven
fluid and case-specific. Senate trials often appear to be constitutional
dramas with central characters but no central theme. To serve a
Madisonian function in resolving factional disputes, the central obli-
gation of the Senate trial must be a faithful presentation of the allega-
tions, evidence, and witnesses in the case. The presentation of this
evidence provides the context needed for a vital political discourse
containing the underlying legitimacy issues. Such a full presentation
may not always be necessary to reach a fair judicial verdict, but it is
essential to fulfill the political function of the Senate trial.7
When such issues have been raised in past trials,8 the emphasis
has been on the outcome rather than the process of deliberation. The
Senate has debated the “need” for such evidence to arrive at a ver-
dict.9 Accordingly, the necessity of additional evidence or witnesses
turned on its value to the Senate membership rather than its value to
the political system. Yet, the Framers appeared to craft the Senate
rules specifically to address factional disputes amidst “the anticipated
passions of the whole community.”10 A mere verdict alone does not
address such passions. Rather, it is the process used to come to a ver-
dict that can be transformative for factional disputes. By allowing
House managers to present their strongest case justifying impeach-
7. Senators often use the term “political” to refer to voting the views of their constituents
or their party. This is based in part on a misconstruction of Hamilton’s writings in The Federal-
ist No. 65. See infra notes 587-96 and accompanying text.
8. This Article places impeachment in the context of the bicameral legislative process
designed by Madison. While some legislative functions like oversight investigations are more
closely analogous to aspects of the impeachment process, this is not to suggest that impeach-
ment is a form of legislative product in any technical sense. Rather, this Article suggests that
the same factional principles that define the legislative process are equally relevant in the
drafting, approval, and trial of articles of impeachment.
9. See infra notes 492-94, 603-11 and accompanying text.
10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 1, at 396.
TURLEY TO PRINTER 11/30/99 3:15 PM
6 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:1
ment and removal, the Senate forces these factional views into a pro-
cess that can be both dialogic and transformative.
As will be shown, impeachment trials have proven effective in
moderating factional views. Citizens may continue to harbor their
original convictions about the integrity or innocence of an impeached
official. However, the Senate trial provides a critical forum in which
these views are fully aired and resolved. Even when public opinion
remains polarized, the bicameral process of impeachment can fulfill
the same dialogic role as the bicameral process of legislation. In the
legislative process, no citizen can demand to prevail, but the process
of deliberation allows for vertical integration of factional views.11
Madison realized that factions are primarily destabilizing when they
are ignored in a legislative process. Even more significant than unad-
dressed factional views on legislative issues, the failure fully to ad-
dress factional views of legitimacy issues creates the dangerous al-
ienation of some citizens within the country.
This view of the Senate trial as a Madisonian device is clearly at
odds with the dominant view of impeachment. Academics have de-
nounced impeachment in cases where removal is unlikely in the Sen-
ate, defining the legitimacy of Senate trials by outcome.12 Impeach-
ment is viewed as an extreme countermajoritarian measure used to
“reverse” or “nullify” the popular election of a President.13 In this
11. As will be shown, the absence of both vertical (between constituents and the govern-
ment) and horizontal (between branches of government) channels in the English and colonial
systems led to armed conflict. See infra Part II.
12. See infra note 567 and accompanying text.
13. This argument was used extensively by both the Clinton White House and academics
testifying against impeachment. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 3, at 228 (testimony of
Prof. Laurence Tribe) (“[T]he legislative branch essentially cancels the results of the most sol-
emn collective act of which we as a constitutional democracy are capable . . . .”); id. at 235 (tes-
timony of Prof. Susan Low Bloch) (“[Impeachment] undoes a national election . . . .”); The
Consequences of Perjury and Related Crimes: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 105th Cong. 71 (1998) [hereinafter Consequences of Perjury] (prepared statement of A.
Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Partner, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison) (“[Impeachment
in the Clinton case] could result in the nullification of the will of the majority of the electorate,
not to mention the profound weakening of the institution of the presidency.”); Impeachment of
President William Jefferson Clinton, The Evidentiary Record Pursuant to S. Res. 16, S. DOC.
NO. 106-3, at 36 (1999) (statement of Abbe D. Lowell, Chief Minority Investigative Counsel)
(warning that, by impeaching President Clinton, Congress “would overturn two national elec-
tions”); 145 CONG. REC. S824 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999) (statement of Gregory Craig, Special
Counsel to the White House) (“[W]e believe, short of a declaration of war, there is nothing
more serious for our elected representatives to contemplate than, through the process of im-
peachment, to undo the results of a national election and to remove the man chosen by the
American people to be their President.”).
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way, impeachment is portrayed as inherently inimical to the demo-
cratic process. What is missing from this view of impeachment is the
concept of “true consent.”14 If impeachment concerns questions of le-
gitimacy, those questions turn on the concept of government by con-
sent. The thrust of an impeachment trial is that the individual stand-
ing before the Senate is not the individual who secured an office by
election or appointment. Rather, the later disclosure of misconduct
revealed critical information about the individual’s virtue or ability to
hold public office. When a President secures the consent of the vot-
ers, he promises not simply that he will pursue certain policies, but
that he will meet certain minimal standards. When a President is im-
peached, the consent given in the previous election is thrown into
question, just as it is in cases of consent by fraud or misrepresenta-
tion: it is neither legally nor constitutionally recognized. Impeach-
ment allows a renewed vote to determine whether a President, in
light of his conduct, can regain the consent of the public. If a Presi-
dent retains his office, he regains legitimacy through a democratic
decision of renewal. Regardless of any negative factional views of his
conduct, he undeniably has the consent to complete his term. In all of
the criticisms of impeachment as an inherent threat to presidential
power, little attention is given to the value of resolving such questions
of legitimacy or to the countervailing danger of leaving such ques-
tions unresolved. It is to these questions that this Article is ultimately
directed.
In Part I, this Article will address the historical use of impeach-
ment in the English system and the American colonial system. Im-
peachment was used historically as a check on the authority of the
Crown and tended to be used most heavily during periods of political
instability. English and colonial impeachments proved to be highly
destabilizing in the absence of an integrated political system. The ef-
ficacy and use of the English impeachment model declined with the
corresponding rise of more representative forms of government. In
the colonies, political alienation and factionalism continued under
the unrepresentative conditions of the royal charters and proprietary
grants. Impeachment became a weapon of factional struggle and
served to destabilize the political system further.
14. By “true consent,” I am referring to the combination of informed consent and the rep-
resentative authority to act. Informed consent sometimes requires the presentation of evidence
despite the inclination of the public, who may want a speedy conviction or acquittal. As will be
shown, however, the legitimacy of any outcome is dependent on the full disclosure of evidence
before a final resolution is reached. See infra notes 599-613 and accompanying text.
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In Part II, the Article will address the incorporation of im-
peachment into the Constitution. This review of the Constitutional
Convention and subsequent ratification debates indicates significant
changes in the view of impeachment from the colonial period to the
postcolonial period. Impeachment took on a unique character and
function under the new representative system. Specifically, the post-
colonial impeachment process was modified to convert it from a tool
of factional dissension to a vehicle of factional resolution.
Part III will then address the actual Senate trials and the Ameri-
can postcolonial period. This historical review includes a division of
American impeachments into three groups: Presidents, judges, and
“other civil officers.” All three categories evidence factional divisions
and the use of impeachment to address issues beyond removal of the
individual officeholder.
Part IV will then turn to impeachment as a Madisonian device to
resolve factional disputes. Senate trials will be examined as a forum
in which the most divisive and dangerous factional disputes can be re-
solved in a representative system. This use of Senate trials as a
Madisonian device allows for the public consideration of the full rec-
ord and evidence as the foundation for a vote of true consent. It is in
this unique forum that an impeached official is subject to a decision
of the public, through the cipher of the Senate, as to his legitimacy in
carrying out constitutional duties. As will be shown, it is perhaps the
most transcendent political moment for a Madisonian democracy.
I. THE HISTORICAL USE OF IMPEACHMENT TRIALS DURING THE
EARLY ENGLISH AND COLONIAL PERIODS
Any consideration of the modern role of impeachment trials in
the United States must naturally begin with a review of its historical
antecedents. While the historical record is sparse, it is clear that im-
peachment trials have varied considerably in both their purposes and
procedures. Many trials were directed not at the accused but at the
government, while other trials appeared to have served a more sym-
bolic purpose. Still other trials were raw political exercises involving
personal animus and opportunistic conduct.15 These trials often re-
flected the role of impeachment as a broad check on executive power
15. There are certainly more able treatments of this historical record, and this brief review
is merely offered as a modest foundation for the analysis of the standards and procedures of
impeachment. Throughout the Article, more comprehensive treatments will be cited for the
respective periods of impeachment trials.
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with important functions beyond the mere removal of a perceived
wrongdoer. The Framers were clearly influenced by the English and
colonial trials, including trials in which Framers played active roles.
When it came time to draft the impeachment provisions of the Con-
stitution, the Framers opted to make notable changes in the process
to avoid the destabilizing aspects of impeachments under the English
model. Like other forms of factional disputes addressed in the legisla-
tive system, the American impeachment process was crafted to direct
the pressures into a process of deliberation and settlement. As will be
shown, where prior impeachments tended to explode in the English
system, impeachments were structured to implode within the
Madisonian system.
A. English Impeachment Trials
American impeachments stand on English feet.16 The Framers
expressly relied on English precedent and standards in fashioning the
impeachment process, including the use of the “high crimes and mis-
demeanors” standard.17 Nevertheless, any review of the English im-
peachment model reveals striking differences between it and its
American offshoot.18 Unlike American impeachments, English im-
peachments extended to any citizen (excluding only members of the
royal family) rather than to “civil officers.”19 Thus, unlike American
legislative officials, who are excluded from impeachment, members
of Parliament were subject to impeachment.20 The penalty of im-
16. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 1, at 397 (explaining that the English experi-
ence was “[t]he model from which the idea of this institution has been borrowed”).
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
18. The Senate trial of President Andrew Johnson would highlight these differences. John-
son’s defenders insisted that impeachment was confined to indictable crimes. They used Eng-
lish history to show that this was the standard for the House of Lords, particularly in the case of
Viscount Melville, in which the House of Lords appeared to acquit after learning that the un-
derlying conduct was not criminally indictable. See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE
IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 28 (1973). Nevertheless, the Senate con-
cluded correctly that “‘[t]he power of Parliament over the subject is far greater than that
which . . . Congress can exercise over the citizen.’” Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 40-7, at 68
(1867)).
19. Private citizens were impeached, including two religious figures—Dr. Mainwaring in
1628 and Dr. Sacheverell in 1709—for “preaching seditious libel from their pulpits.” PETER C.
HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA 1635-1805, at 4 (1984); see also id. at 5-8
(discussing other cases of private citizens impeached under the English system.).
20. Such was the case of John Thornborough, Bishop of Bristol, who was impeached in
1604 for writing a book discussing the controversial union with Scotland. See COLIN G.C. TITE,
IMPEACHMENT AND PARLIAMENTARY JUDICATURE IN EARLY STUART ENGLAND 57 (1974).
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peachment was also extended beyond removal to include fines, for-
feiture, incarceration, and, in rare cases, death.21 In this sense, im-
peachment authority was related to the authority of Parliament to
order bills of attainder.22 As will be shown, however, Parliament pre-
ferred impeachment to attainder as a political tool to use in its strug-
gle with Crown authority.23 Otherwise, the difference between an at-
tainder and an impeachment could be slight for the accused. In both
circumstances, Parliament exercised aspects of legislative, judicial
and executive authority to try citizens and then to carry out punish-
ments upon verdict.
While the two systems shared terminology and bicameralism, the
English system was the antithesis of the Madisonian model. It is pre-
cisely the differences in the two systems that makes a review of Eng-
lish cases so valuable in understanding the American process. In
some ways, reviewing the English cases offers a negative image of the
picture that would emerge after the Constitutional Convention. The
English system lacked critical procedures and limitations to channel
factional disputes. Impeachment trials, therefore, were factional
Thornborough was a member of the House of Lords, and his impeachment proved one of the
many divisive issues between the two houses that ended in a draw. The Lords would ultimately
rebuke the Bishop, but the House of Commons failed to secure a conviction. See id. at 58.
21. These punishments could at times take bizarre form. Edward Floyde, a lawyer and a
justice of the peace, was impeached for speaking of the daughter of King James, Elizabeth, and
her husband, Prince Palatine Frederick, “in most despiteful and scornful manner with a fleering
and scoffing countenance.” William Renwisk Riddell, Impeachment in England and English
Colonies, 7 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 702, 704 (1930) (internal quotation marks omitted). Floyde, who
was at the time a prisoner “in the Fleet,” was tried, convicted, and ordered “to stand in the pil-
lory and to ride from Westminister to the Exchange, then to the Fleet, then to Cheapside on a
horse with his face to the tail, holding the tail in his hand.” Id. at 704-05. If this were not
enough, he was further sentenced to be whipped during his passage from Westminister to
Cheapside, to pay a fine of £5,000, to be imprisoned for life in Newgate, to be stripped of the
right to bear arms as a gentleman, to be proclaimed to be infamous, to be stripped of the right
to be a witness in any proceeding, and to be branded with the letter K in the forehead. Re-
markably, this punishment was more moderate than the rejected demands of some of the Lords
that Floyde’s ears also be nailed to the pillory. See id.
22. The Framers appeared to link impeachment and attainder authority in their delibera-
tions for this reason. See infra note 137 and accompanying text. Although rare, in at least one
case in the 17th century, and six cases in the 18th century, the penalty for conviction upon im-
peachment was death. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 3.
23. Attainder was the preferred option for the simple removal of opponents on a non-
political basis. See Riddell, supra note 21, at 705.
The practice of impeachment, while firmly established by the reign of Richard II,
gave way during the Wars of the Roses to acts of attainder, which were and effective
means for getting rid of a political opponent; and during the times of the Tudors the
act of attainder continued in favor . . . .
Id.
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without being dialogic or transformative. The result was a process
that served as a check on Crown authority, but at a highly destabiliz-
ing cost for the system.
For much of English history, the procedure for impeachment was
highly fluid and varied. Depending on the period, an impeached indi-
vidual could be tried by the Crown, designated officials, the House of
Lords, or a combination thereof.24 It was not until 1399 and the reign
of Henry IV that impeachment was subjected to a set of procedures
and precedents.25
The operative standard for determining guilt or innocence was as
varied as the procedures. Before the adoption of the “high crimes
and misdemeanors” standard, individuals were tried under standards
ranging from “‘treasons, felonies, and mischiefs done to our Lord,
The King’” to “‘divers deceits.’”26 The phrase “high crimes and mis-
demeanors” was first clearly applied in the 1386 trial of Michael de la
Pole, Earl of Suffolk, who stood accused of a host of impeachable of-
fenses, including the appointment of incompetent officers27 and “‘ad-
vising the King to grant liberties and privileges to certain persons to
the hindrance of the due execution of the laws.’”28 The trial of Suffolk
was a striking example of impeachment authority used by the Parlia-
ment as a method of exercising some control over executive officers
in a monarchy.29 Rather than addressing criminal conduct exclusively,
these English impeachment trials allowed Parliament not only to
punish abusive officials but also to respond to Crown policies in the
absence of more representative devices.
After the trial of Suffolk, impeachment on the basis of high
crimes and misdemeanors covered a range of conduct traditionally
considered noncriminal, including the impeachment of Peter Pett,
Commissioner of the Navy, for “loss of a ship through neglect to
24. See John D. Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional Provi-
sions, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5 n.20 (1970).
25. See id. at 5.
26. Leon R. Yankwich, Impeachment of Civil Officers Under the Federal Constitution, 26
GEO. L.J. 849, 853 (1938).
27. A precise date for the first English impeachment is a matter of academic debate. See
generally Alexander Simpson, Jr., Federal Impeachments, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 651, 651 (1916)
(observing that some academics trace impeachment to “David, brother of Llewellyn” in 1283).
28. House Hearings, supra note 3, at 38 (testimony of Prof. Gary McDowell) (footnote
omitted).
29. It should go without saying that the public reason for these impeachments may be de-
ceptive, particularly during periods of political or religious upheaval.
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bring it to mooring.”30 Richard Lyons, a merchant and customs offi-
cer, was impeached in 1376 for, among other acts, the offense of re-
moving a staple of wool from the port of Calais.31 In 1388, Robert
Belknap32 and five other judges were impeached for the offense of
answering “‘certain questions submitted to them as judges, wrong-
fully.’”33 Likewise, the Earl of Oxford was tried for the “high crime
and misdemeanor” of “giving pernicious advice to the Crown.”34
Others, like the Bishop of Ely, were impeached over religious
dogma.35 Under this standard:
[P]ersons have been impeached for giving bad counsel to the king;
advising a prejudicial peace; enticing the king to act against the act
of parliament; purchasing offices; giving medicine to the king with-
out advice of physicians; preventing other persons from giving coun-
sel to the king, except in their presence; . . . . [O]thers . . . were
founded in . . . malversations and neglects in office; for encouraging
pirates; for official oppression, extortions, and deceits; and especially
for putting good magistrates out of office, and advancing bad.36
During the 1600s, Parliament repeatedly used impeachment to
exercise control over Crown officials in the absence of alternative
constitutional means. Between 1620 and 1649, over one hundred im-
30. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL
IMPEACHMENT 10 (1974) (quoting 4 COBB PARL. HIST. ENG. 408 (1668), reprinted in 6 STATE
TRIALS 866-67 (T. B. Howell ed., London, R. Bagshaw 1810). Grounds for impeachment in
other cases included “depriving the Crown of revenue and improper use of tax funds,” “acting
without authority,” “bribery and corruption,” “formulating a seditious petition,” “circulating
illegal proclamation,” “speeches against the government,” “sale of judicial offices,” “circula-
tion of a seditious petition,” “enforcement of the illegal ship money tax and preventing the fil-
ing of lawful petitions,” “inciting an unlawful assembly,” “illegally confin[ing] and refus[ing] to
accept bail [of a member of Parliament to prevent his voting],” “drawing and passing an illegal
petition,” “sale of his official influence,” “unlawfully affixing the Great Seal to treaties and
commissions,” and “maladministration.” Id.
31. See Feerick, supra note 24, at 5 n.18 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
233-34 (Joseph Chitty ed., London, W.E. Dean 1851) (1765)).
32. The Belknaps appear a highly impeachable line. See infra notes 223-47.
33. Feerick, supra note 24, at 6 (quoting ALEXANDER SIMPSON, A TREATISE ON
FEDERAL IMPEACHMENTS 88 (1916)).
34. RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 70 (1973).
35. Bishop Wren of Ely was impeached in 1640 for “unlawful innovations and restrictions
on religious practices.” Feerick, supra note 24, at 8 n.38. Bishop Wren, who spent 18 years in
the Tower of London, was the uncle of Sir Christopher Wren, the architect of St. Paul’s Cathe-
dral. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
36. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
798, at 269 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. rev. ed. 1991) (1883).
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peachments were passed by the House of Commons.37 These im-
peachment proceedings included charges against abusive judicial of-
ficers for such conduct as incarcerating juries that had decided cases
against the views of the court.38 During this period, many of the spe-
cific impeachment procedures were systematized and put into regular
use.39 Under the English system, the House of Commons was ex-
pected to hold a trial, though without a requirement to hear the ac-
cused’s defense. Thus, the transmittal of a case to the House of Lords
was to be accompanied by evidence and testimony. The action taken
by the House of Lords bore obvious resemblance to the current Sen-
ate proceeding. Once in the House of Lords, the members “granted
the accused counsel in matters of law, allowed a full hearing of his de-
fense, and permitted him to summon his own witnesses.”40 There is
evidence that the House of Lords would at times rely on committees
to hear evidence of impeachable offenses.41 These proceedings, how-
ever, closely followed trial procedures since the penalties included
penal sentences.42 The upper house repeatedly acted to counter im-
pulses of the lower house in its independent proceedings.43
During the period between 1626 and 1715, the House of Lords
permitted only five of fifty-seven impeached officials to be tried to
verdict.44 The upper house openly disagreed with the lower house of-
ten, to the point where they would periodically refuse to hold trials or
to try accused parties on the specific charges from the lower house.45
37. See 3 LEWIS DESCHLER, DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES 707 (1974).
38. Such was the case of Lord Chief Justice John Keeling, who managed to escape a final
vote of impeachment in the House of Commons despite his abusive conduct. See Feerick, supra
note 24, at 7.
39. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 3.
40. Id. at 5.
41. This was a precursor to the Senate Rule XI committee procedures. See infra notes 331-
34 and accompanying text.
42. One significant difference between the House of Lords and the Senate was that the
former held trials with the participation and advice of judges. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note
19, at 60.
43. The House of Lords historically asserted its effective veto in impeachment cases even
when it agreed with the need for impeachment. For example, in the case of Peter Floyde, the
House of Commons attempted to impose punishment without the agreement of the House of
Lords. The latter house objected, but ultimately increased the penalty for Floyde. See Riddell,
supra note 21, at 705.
44. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 6.
45. The House of Lords would occasionally not consider an impeachment from the House
of Commons. In the case of Sir Francis North, Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, the
Commons impeached North for his role in the drafting of a controversial proclamation. The
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English impeachments were often politics by another means.
Hoffer and Hull noted in their exceptional study that
“[i]mpeachments and trials invariably were surrounded by political
questions . . . [and the] struggle for control of national impeachment
cases, particularly when the defendants were the King’s ministers or
advisors.”46 Professor Colin G. C. Tite observed that “[f]rom the be-
ginning, impeachment was associated with moments of political crisis
and was often enough used as a weapon in factional rivalry.”47 Such
accounts appear to be borne out by a review of the grounds for Eng-
lish impeachments.
Some impeachments were clearly tied to civil unrest and offered
a political vehicle to oppose the Crown that stopped short of civil
war.48 For example, nine lords were impeached in 1642 for their “sup-
port of the King in his determination to wage war on Parliament.”49
Likewise, many of the impeachments were tied to “illegal” or “sedi-
tious” proclamations or petitions.50 Other impeachments were clearly
linked to the religious upheavals that preceded and followed the
Protestant Revolution, such as “unlawful innovations and restrictions
upon religious practices.”51
English impeachments tended to ebb and flow with the political
currents of the realm. The seventeenth century witnessed the sharp-
est increase during a time of tremendous upheavals. In the 1620s,
Parliament was on a collision course with the Stuarts that would ul-
timately lead to the beheading of Charles I. Similarly, ravages of the
Black Death in the summer of 1348 added social discord to existing
political discord. Parliament became increasingly active in govern-
ance, and impeachment was the preferred method for checking the
authority of the king. Parliament could and did use attainders against
individuals as well. However, impeachments appeared to be pre-
ferred as the legislative check with a clear political message.
Lords simply failed to address the charges. Likewise, Lord Chief Justice Scroggs and other
judges were impeached for interfering with a grand jury and other misconduct on the bench. No
trial was ever held on the charges. See Feerick, supra note 24, at 7.
46. HOFFER & Hull, supra note 19, at 5.
47. TITE, supra note 20, at 7.
48. See GOLDWIN SMITH, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 348
(1955) (“Parliament could bring royal advisers to account by the ancient device of impeach-
ment, a valuable tool because it enabled Parliament to attack royal policy without starting re-
bellion or war.”).
49. Feerick, supra note 24, at 8 n.38.
50. See supra note 36.
51. Feerick, supra note 24, at 8 n.38.
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Aside from control over the Crown, impeachment could also op-
erate as a vital release in a largely unrepresentative system. As such,
it was a dangerous release valve to shut. This lesson was learned by
Charles I when Parliament sought to impeach George Villiers, the
first Duke of Buckingham, for corruption and maladministration.
Charles I dissolved Parliament to end such assertions of authority.
Charles I instructed Parliament to “[r]emember . . . that Parliaments
are altogether in my power for their calling, sitting, and dissolution;
and therefore, as I find the fruits of them to be good or evil they are
to continue or not to be.”52 With impeachment blocked, a more direct
method of removal was selected: Buckingham was assassinated53 by
John Felton, who attributed his act in part to “a Remonstrance in
Parliament.”54 Ultimately, the beheading of Charles I can be seen as
the ultimate expression of the failure of a political system to develop
alternative means of political expression, or (to borrow a term from
Hart and Sacks) as methods of “institutional settlement.”55 After the
victory over the Crown in 1647, impeachments declined with the as-
cendancy of Parliament.
English impeachments increased briefly with the restoration of
the Stuarts in 1660 and the resumption of institutional tension. Par-
liament continued to exercise considerable authority, but the Stuarts
resisted parliamentary meddling in foreign and military affairs. In
these areas, impeachment continued to be a viable method for ex-
pressing political opposition to Crown policies and officials. For ex-
52. SMITH, supra note 48, at 318 (footnote omitted in original).
53. See Riddell, supra note 21, at 706. This is precisely the circumstance that Benjamin
Franklin sought to avoid with the impeachment provisions in the American system. See infra
notes 175, 635-38 and accompanying text.
54. JAMES HEATH, TORTURE AND ENGLISH LAW: AN ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL
HISTORY FROM THE PLANTAGENETS TO THE STUARTS 161 (1982). A record of Felton’s inter-
rogation includes an intriguing exchange with the Bishop of London, who pressed Felton for
the names of his co-conspirators. Felton stated that “he was induced to this partly for private
displeasure, and partly by reason of a Remonstrance in Parliament, having also read some
books which he said defended that it was lawful to kill an enemy of the republic.” Id. (footnote
omitted). When the Bishop stated that he would be racked for names, Felton responded that “if
it must be so, he could not tell whom he might nominate in the extremity of torture.” Id. (foot-
note omitted). The record states that “[a]fter this he was asked no more questions, but sent
back to prison.” Id. (footnote omitted).
55. HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 4 (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
The Parliament actually attempted various means to remove Buckingham as alternatives to
impeachment, including a simple declaration that the king should remove him. See TITE, supra
note 20, at 202 (“On the 14th the Commons asked Charles to receive them with the declara-
tion; on the 15th he replied with a dissolution.”).
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ample, Pett’s impeachment in 1668 appeared to be a response to the
poor preparation for the Dutch invasion.56 Parliament’s use of im-
peachment as a tool in the institutional struggle with the Crown cul-
minated with the attempted impeachment of Thomas Osborne, the
Earl of Danby and the Lord High Treasurer of England.57 Parliament
had passed an appropriation act to support a war against France. A
few days later, Danby wrote a letter to the King of France offering
neutrality for 600,000 livres.58 Parliament used the impeachment in-
quiry to call Charles II personally to account for his actions in a pub-
lic session of the House of Lords. Charles II admitted that the letter
had been written at his request, but “[b]ecause the King was beyond
reach, Parliament settled for [Danby]” to settle the matter and to
preserve “constitutional balance” with the Crown.59
The Crown also recognized the political value of impeachment,
albeit with mixed results.60 For example, the 1709 impeachment of
Dr. Henry Sacheverell, an Anglican minister, was initiated by Queen
Anne’s government in preference to a criminal trial.61 From the out-
set, the government sought a political decision from Parliament. Sa-
cheverell had used the annual sermon on Gunpowder Day at St.
Paul’s Cathedral to question the legitimacy of the Glorious Revolu-
tion (including the legitimacy of nonhereditary succession) and to
56. See supra note 30 and accompanying text
57. See William F. Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18
WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 487-95 (1977) (discussing the Osborne impeachment).
58. The calls for impeachment reflected not only a highly protective view of recently won
parliamentary prerogatives, but an intense hatred for the French. Parliament viewed the Crown
as Francophilic as well as pro-papist. See id. at 488.
59. Id. This effort was frustrated when Charles II used his pardoning power to remove
Danby from danger of impeachment. Even then, however, the House of Commons attempted
to circumvent the pardon and to try Danby, albeit unsuccessfully. See id. at 490.
60. The government also sought impeachments of judicial officers, despite the fact that
they served at the pleasure of the king and could be removed by the simple act of withdrawing
their “patent.” Nevertheless, judges were often subject to this procedure, as was the case of
Chief Justice Scroggs in 1680, whose abusive conduct was so severe that it was described as
“the highest scandal on the public justice of the kingdom.” Nevertheless, judges were often
subject to this procedure. The government attempted to impeach Chief Justice Scroggs in 1680
because his abusive conduct was so severe that it was described as “the highest scandal on the
public justice of the kingdom.” 3 DESCHLER, supra note 37, at 707 n.15 (citing 8 STATE TRIALS
200 (T.B. Howell ed., London, R. Bagshaw 1810)). Scroggs’s offenses included “browbeating
witnesses and commenting on their credibility, and with cursing and drinking to excess.” Id.
61. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 7. Although Queen Anne disfavored the
Whigs, Sacheverell’s criticism of the results of the Glorious Revolution and of the validity of
nonhereditary succession was no doubt viewed as seditious by the queen.
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lambaste the ruling Whig government.62 The government demanded
impeachment to allow for a public trial on these lingering factional
issues. The government’s belief that it could quell such unrest over
the course of the trial ultimately turned out to be wrong. The trial
lasted twenty-five days and was held before both houses of Parlia-
ment.63 Public opinion shifted toward Sacheverell, and the govern-
ment was barely able to secure a conviction. The trial only hastened
the calls for a new Tory government, and the Whigs ultimately lost
control of the government.64 More importantly, the impeachment
process did not defuse violent factional interests. To the contrary, af-
ter the conviction, the public rioted.
The English impeachment process proved unstable politically
because it lacked certain limiting procedures and principles. Used
against citizens as an anti-sedition measure, the impeachment trial
was a judgment on a political viewpoint as opposed to a political fig-
ure. As such, for the Tory factional members, the verdict was an act
of exclusion as opposed to inclusion. While the trial did prompt the
Tory party to change its rigid view of hereditary succession,65 it served
only to polarize and to alienate citizens.
The English system already lacked meaningful aspects of con-
sent for average citizens. When the Parliament ruled in the Sa-
cheverell case, it ruled on a political view held by a large factional
group in a largely unrepresentative system. As such, it was the an-
tithesis of the Madisonian concept of a bicameral system. The trial
created a unique forum, but one that was jurispathic rather than dia-
logic for factional group members.
62. See generally John Louis Lucaites, Constitutional Argument in a National Theater: The
Impeachment Trial of Dr. Henry Sacheverell, in POPULAR TRIALS: RHETORIC, MASS MEDIA,
AND THE LAW 31-54 (Robert Hariman ed., 1990) (discussing the events surrounding Sa-
cheverell’s impeachment trial).
63. See id. at 32 (“The [Sacheverell] trial itself was a public spectacle unlike any other im-
peachment trial in England’s history.”). The famous Surveyor of the Queen, Sir Christopher
Wren, was commissioned to create the trial setting at Westminister with over two thousand
people in attendance. See id. There was some irony in this assignment since the Wren family
was intimately familiar with impeachment trials. The famous architect of St. Paul’s was given
his first commission by his uncle, the Bishop of Ely, who was impeached in 1640. See supra note
35. Bishop Wren gave his nephew the commission in thanksgiving for his release from the
Tower of London. See Christopher S. Wren, Making the Oxbridge Connection, N.Y. TIMES,
May 9, 1982, § 10, at 16 (providing an account of a descendent of the Bishop Wren and Sir
Christopher Wren).
64. See Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control
of the Press, 37 STAN. L. REV. 661, 747 (1985).
65. See Lucaites, supra note 62, at 53.
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The Sacheverell trial revealed the instability of impeachment as
a political device in a system without meaningful vertical and hori-
zontal structures for dialogue and settlement. While reforms were
under way, including the Act of Settlement of 1701,66 the English sys-
tem was still struggling with guarantees of due process, parliamentary
governance, and separation of powers.67 Without these elements es-
tablished, English impeachments were often little more than raw
power plays by either the Crown or Parliament. Some impeachments
over the abuses of Crown officials in office were proper subjects for
impeachment. However, the overall system lacked legitimacy for citi-
zens, particularly the exercise of judicial powers in attainder cases
and impeachments of average citizens for such acts as sedition. Since
the system lacked both vertical and horizontal forms of political ex-
pression and inclusion, impeachments only served to polarize and to
deepen divisions in the absence of dialogic elements. Since the Crown
before the Restoration rejected the concepts of shared authority with
Parliament in executive policy, impeachments were monologic—a
conversation of Parliament with itself.
The increase of English impeachments to criticize Crown poli-
cies was a sign of systemic collapse. When individuals are pursued in
order to create an ad hoc forum for political discourse, a political sys-
tem is in an advanced anaerobic stage of self-consumption. Im-
peachment trials like Sacheverell’s exploded outwardly into the
streets rather than inwardly in intragovernmental debate because,
even after the Restoration, the English system lacked the essential
structural elements for impeachment. It remained a verdict-driven
exercise detached from any integrated role in the political system.
The role of the trial in the House of Lords also contributed to
the instability of English impeachments. The extensive use of im-
peachments against the Stuarts contributed to a further widening of
political factions and eventually to civil war. The trials themselves of-
66. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
67. During the earlier impeachments, the separation of powers deficiencies were reflected
by: (1) the absence of a court system truly independent from both the executive and legislative
authority; (2) the failure to commit trials of citizens to the judiciary as opposed to the political
branches; and (3) the absence of a supremacy rule on issues of constitutional interpretations.
These deficiencies were most evident in 1388, during the reign of King Richard II, when the
king solicited opinions from the courts as to the authority of Parliament to impeach Crown offi-
cials with the king’s consent. When the judges endorsed the king’s theory, the jurists were
promptly impeached, tried, and convicted by Parliament. See BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR., THE
FIRST IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTION’S FRAMERS AND THE CASE OF SENATOR WILLIAM
BLOUNT 28 (1998).
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fered little to change this course. Trials in the Commons tended to be
predictably factional and conclusory. The House of Lords often exer-
cised its effective bicameral veto by choosing not to hold trials, which
would have forced them to deal with these issues in an open and de-
liberative fashion.
As noted earlier, most impeachments were not tried to verdict.
The House of Lords was poorly suited to play a meaningful political
role. Socially and politically, the members of the House of Lords es-
chewed notions regarding their representation of ordinary citizens
and were not especially concerned with factions outside of the ruling
class. What the system lacked was shared values in the process of de-
liberation and institutional settlement. Such values can mollify fac-
tional divisions by satisfying citizens that their views have been fully
and fairly addressed. Even if the English Parliament had excluded
impeachments over policy disputes and limited trials to public offi-
cials, it is doubtful that the system would have been completely stable
without such process values.
Many of the destabilizing elements of the English system would
be eliminated in the United States by the new Constitution. One as-
pect of the English impeachments, however, may have been adopted
by some Framers (and certainly assumed by later legislators)68 in im-
peachment cases: English impeachment trials addressed issues be-
yond mere removal of the accused official. This was most evident in
the English impeachment case discussed by the Framers in the Con-
stitutional Convention: the trial of Governor General Warren Hast-
ings of the East India Company.69 The articles of impeachment
against Hastings were approved in 1787 and included “maladminis-
tration” and other noncriminal acts.70 These charges included “cru-
elty” and a variety of conduct incompatible with representation of
the Crown.71 As will be discussed later,72 the Hastings impeachment
could not have served the purpose of removal since Hastings had al-
ready left office under controversy. Rather, Hastings’s chief antago-
nist, Edmund Burke, wanted to use the case to reaffirm his views of
representative government and legitimacy:
68. See infra Part IV.A.
69. Watching this trial was at least one future legislator, John Rutledge, Jr., who would
play a role in the first impeachments under the new American system. See infra notes 86, 247.
70. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 113.
71. See id.
72. See infra notes 248, 592, and accompanying text; see also Turley, Congress as Grand
Jury, supra note 3, at 790.
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Most of the facts, upon which we proceed, are confessed; some of
them are boasted of. The labour will be on the criminality of the
facts, where proof, as I apprehend, will not be contested. Guilt re-
sides in the intention. But as we are before a tribunal, which having
conceived a favourable opinion of Hastings (or what is of more mo-
ment, very favourable wishes for him) they will not judge of his in-
tentions by the acts, but they will qualify his Acts by his presumed
intentions. It is on this preposterous mode of judging that he had
built all the Apologies for his conduct, which I have seen. Excuses,
which in any criminal court would be considered with pity as the
Straws, at which poor wretches drowning will catch, and which are
such as no prosecutor thinks is worth his while to reply to, will be
admitted in such a House of Commons as ours as a solid defence. . . .
We know that we bring before a bribed tribunal a prejudged cause.
In that situation all that we have to do is make a case strong in proof
and in importance, and to draw inferences from it justifiable in
logick, policy and criminal justice. As to all the rest, it is vain and
idle.73
Burke pursued the impeachment of a former official despite the
fact that removal was not sought and the House of Commons was in
control of the party favoring the accused.74 Burke’s prediction of ac-
quittal would come true. However, the matter was submitted to the
House of Lords.75 Burke’s argument strongly demonstrates the use of
impeachment as a method of addressing legitimacy questions and
serving a function beyond mere corrective action.76
English impeachments offered stark examples of impeachment
used both as a check on executive authority as well as an instrument
in factional disputes. While impeachment proved a useful tool to
73. Letter from Edmund Burke to Philip Frances, in 5 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF
EDMUND BURKE 241 (Holden Furber ed., 1965), cited in HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at
114.
74. Burke was resolute to the point of taunting in his commitment to proceed despite the
majority view. Burke promised that “neither hope, nor fear, nor anger, nor weariness, nor dis-
couragement of any kind, shall move me from this trust.” ISAAC KRAMNICK, THE RAGE OF
EDMUND BURKE 127 (1977).
75. Burke himself was ultimately censured for his comments in the course of the im-
peachment. See id. Burke was never one to suffer fools gladly, and he often went out of his way
to confront the chauvinism of the English Parliament by referring to its comparative “insect
origins” as compared to the people abused by Hastings. See 6 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
OF EDMUND BURKE 304 (P.J. Marshall ed., 1991) (“My Lords . . . [these Hindu people are] the
original people of Hindostan. . . . God forbid we should go to pass judgment upon people who
formed their Laws and Institutions prior to our insect origins of yesterday.”) .
76. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3, at 790.
TURLEY TO PRINTER 11/30/99 3:15 PM
1999] IMPEACHMENT AS A MADISONIAN DEVICE 21
check the Crown “during the factional contests,” “parliamentary fas-
cination with impeachment flagged [once] [o]ther political forms
emerged to allow a quieter and more efficient test of ministerial
popularity and influence.”77 Ultimately, the advent of the cabinet
government78 and the ability of Parliament to force new elections
were the chosen methods of addressing legitimacy issues. Such was
not the case with the colonial governments in the New World. In the
colonies, impeachment continued to play a unique political and struc-
tural role.
B. Colonial Impeachment Trials
The colonists had more than a passing interest in impeachment.79
The conditions of political alienation and unrepresentative govern-
ment that led to the rise of impeachments in England were even
more acute in the colonies. By the late 1600s, the English Parliament
had achieved considerable authority over Crown policy, with the ex-
ception of foreign and military matters. Despite continued conflicts
with the Stuarts after Restoration, Parliament was able to force
through such critical reforms as the Act of Settlement of 1701,80 which
removed Crown controls over judges in England.81 With such reforms
and the advent of the cabinet system, impeachments declined as ave-
nues for institutional settlement developed. Conversely, in the colo-
nies, these political changes in England had little effect.
Colonialists were not represented in Parliament, and they re-
mained alienated, in a manner reminiscent of English parliamentari-
ans of the early 1600s. The colonies were exempted from reforms
such as the Act of Settlement, a point of considerable contention for
77. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 8.
78. See 1 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 384 (4th ed. 1922)
(“[U]ntil the growth of . . . Cabinet government, impeachment was the only remedy open to
[Parliament]. The king chose his ministers; and, unless they could be convicted of crimes, there
was no way of getting rid of them.”), cited in Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Interaction Between Im-
peachment and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2193, 2205 n.48 (1998).
79. The word “impeachment” was first used in a colonial action by the lower house of
Rhode Island in 1657. This occurred in the trial of William Harris for heresy and treason. See
HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 17.
80. An Act for preventing any Inconvenience that may Happen by Priviledge of Parlia-
ment (The Act of Settlement), 12 & 13 Will. III, ch. 3 (Eng. 1701).
81. The Act of Settlement established, among other things, that judges would serve during
good behavior as opposed to service at the pleasure of the king. See id. (directing that judges’
commissions shall be made quamdiu se bene geserint—“as long as he shall behave himself
well”).
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colonists. The colonies were in a more extreme position than the pre-
Revolution Parliament owing to the governing structure derived from
the original charters and propriety grants. Colonial governors were
expected to govern with the “assent” of the colonists, but the royal
charters and grants offered little opportunity for a participatory
role.82
The most defined factional groups in the colonial impeachment
cases centered their on the question of representative government
and participatory values. The “assembly” advocates asserted the right
not just of “assent,” but of active governing authority over the colo-
nies as English citizens.83 This group was opposed not only by the
Crown but by other colonists who supported the “proprietary” cause
over the assembly movement.84 Proprietary advocates viewed proper
authority as running from the Crown through the governor and char-
ter to the citizens. Under this arrangement, political grievances were
properly resolved by petitions and consultation rather than direct as-
sembly authority. Assembly advocates attempted by various means,
particularly petitions, to achieve a degree of self-governance; how-
ever, the colonial system simply did not have integrated vertical pro-
cedures that would allow colonists to have a meaningful or active role
in governance. Governed under charter rather than constitutional
conditions, the colonists had no effective outlet for airing assembly
grievances or for reconciliation with proprietary factions. The result
was steadily growing hostility between the factions that would even-
tually lead to open conflict.
Impeachments became a method of creating ad hoc forums for
colonial grievances; however, unlike Parliament, there was a compel-
ling argument that colonies did not possess such authority. The
Framers were obviously aware of the use of this tool as a check on
Crown officials in England and viewed the assertion of impeachment
authority as fundamental to self-governance. Despite the consistent
argument by Crown officials that only the House of Commons pos-
sessed impeachment authority, colonists quickly seized upon im-
82. The government structures of the colonies reflected their origins as corporate units.
See David S. Bogen, The Individual Liberties Within the Body of the Constitution: The Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 794, 804 (1987) (“Each
colony’s legislative authority was vested in the King’s representative or grantee. The corporate
charters gave lawmaking power to the corporation.”).
83. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 35 (discussing the conflict between assembly
advocates and crown loyalists).
84. See id. at 42.
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peachment as a method of asserting assembly authority. As English
citizens, colonial leaders emphasized impeachment as an inherent
right of legislators—even colonial legislators.85
Influential figures such as John Adams86 were involved in these
early assertions of impeachment authority and were personally fa-
miliar with impeachment procedures.87 Not only did impeachments
symbolize assembly authority, but they also created public tribunals
with obvious interest and resonance with an increasingly alienated
populace. Impeachments were utilized by the colonies as early as
1635, and continued until the final colonial impeachment in 1774.
During the 139-year period of colonial impeachments, impeachments
were highly political and often utilized trials to contest policies or to
advance republican or self-rule values. Even early colonial impeach-
ments focused on individual misdeeds or corruption of officials, while
reflecting factional disputes over assembly authority.88 Impeachments
became increasingly direct in their intended challenge to Crown
authority as the Revolution neared.
Owing to the unrepresentative form of government in the colo-
nies, however, these impeachments were not a vehicle for resolving
factional disputes, but only a tool of factional groups. The impeach-
ments achieved little in terms of dialogue and reconciliation. Instead,
the impeachments reflected the conditions of a political system in
failure. The impeachments proved crude and unstable. Most impor-
tantly, during the most critical political period of discord, the im-
peachments primarily deepened divisions and further polarized the
factional groups. Like the English cases of the early 1600s, colonial
impeachments were the prelude to open armed conflict and a tool of
an alienated majority faction. It was only following the Revolution
that this factional tool was converted into a process that would re-
solve questions of legitimacy in a bicameral system.
85. See id. at 42-44.
86. Adams was directly involved in the Oliver impeachment case. See infra notes 115-20
and accompanying text. Benjamin Franklin was also familiar with these procedures through the
impeachment of William Moore, the protégé of his nemesis, Reverend William Smith, in Penn-
sylvania. See Leonard W. Levy, Historical Perspectives on the Free Press: The Legacy Reexam-
ined, 37 STAN. L. REV. 767, 786 (1985). John Rutledge and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina
were also familiar with the near impeachment of Chief Justice Charles Skinner in 1766 over his
insistence on complying with the unpopular Stamp Act. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at
46.
87. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 51.
88. See id. at 25.
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The first colonial impeachment, which occurred in 1635, was the
impeachment of Governor John Harvey of Virginia for misfeasance
in office.89 Beginning with the Harvey case, colonial impeachments
were used as a political vehicle to oppose either colonial officials or
policies in the absence of alternative methods of political expression.
While not called an impeachment at the time, the accusation of Har-
vey reflected a nascent frustration with the colonial system.90 Not
only did Harvey act in a “tyrannical” fashion in overruling objections,
but he disregarded demands for petitions to be sent to England, as
well as objections to trade policies with other colonies.91 Harvey’s ac-
cusers persisted with their case despite the objection that there was
“‘no provision in the Virginia Charter for such authority.’”92 Unlike
later impeachments by assembly advocates, however, this early asser-
tion of authority did not claim the right to try Harvey, who was in-
stead sent to England for trial under an abuse of power charge. In the
first of many such communications, the Crown instructed the colony
that it had no authority over the Crown officer and returned Harvey
to power.93 The Harvey case was an early signal that the colonial sys-
tem lacked vertical political channels to resolve factional disputes, ul-
timately a fatal flaw in the system and a strong incentive for colonial
impeachments.
Colonial impeachments were generally less lethal than their
English counterparts. Colonial impeachments often sought only re-
moval, on the ground that an official’s conduct was inconsistent with
his office. One example was the impeachment of Charles James,
sheriff of Cecil County, Maryland. In 1676, James was impeached for
battery and perjury. James was accused of “falsely swearing before a
justice of the peace, inducing two other witnesses to follow his lead,
and then assaulting another settler.”94 The perjury charge was par-
ticularly disabling for this office since the county sheriff was central
to resolving land disputes.95 The Harvey and James impeachments re-
89. See id.
90. For example, one of the central complaints concerned Harvey’s failure to send letters
from tobacco planters asking for renegotiation of their contracts with the Crown. See id. at 16.
91. See id. at 15-17.
92. Id. at 15 (footnote omitted).
93. See id. at 17.
94. Id. at 19.
95. See id. This disabling effect of perjury allegations was raised by the author with regard
to the impeachment of President Clinton. See House Hearings, supra note 3, at 253-54, 274-75
(testimony of Prof. Jonathan Turley); Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3, at 756-59.
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flected a growing assembly faction that would become more evident
at the beginning of the eighteenth century, when the colonies had
grown into significant economic units.
The impeachments in the early 1700s revealed that assembly and
proprietary factions were supported by large groups in a highly fluid
political environment. Both factions would denounce the other as a
“junto.”96 This environment was evident in 1706 when James Logan,
Pennsylvania provincial agent and secretary of the Pennsylvania
council, was impeached. Among the thirteen articles of impeachment
were allegations of various controversial policy decisions, conceal-
ment, and “’a wicked intent to create Divisions and Misunderstand-
ings between him and the people.’”97 In the course of these proceed-
ings, however, public opinion shifted in favor of the accused, and he
remained in office. Like the Whig accusers in the Sacheverell case,
the public then denied Logan’s accuser, David Lloyd, his seat in the
assembly.98
The Logan trial was illustrative of the use of impeachment as a
colonial forum for factional disputes. The case was actively framed by
colonists against proprietary authority, particularly over the courts.
Logan had been given governing responsibilities by William Penn
during his absence in England.99 He clashed with assembly advocates
opposed to proprietary authority, including Lloyd. Logan had op-
posed assembly demands that “several Things . . . be granted away
from the Proprietary and Governor,”100 including controls over the
judiciary. The legislature then enacted a bill claiming impeachment
authority in resolving the dispute. As a result, the colonialists inten-
tionally created a circumstance to impeach the acting governor as
part of their antiproprietary efforts. The trial, however, only hard-
ened factional hatred for the same reasons as the early English im-
peachments. Since the upper house had been abolished in 1701, the
assembly attempted to try Logan with Lieutenant Governor John
Evans as presiding judge. While Evans would allow the trial to begin,
96. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 152 (1967) (quoting Massachusetts Tories as describing assembly advocates as “a
junto to serve particular designs and purposes of their own . . . tending directly to sedition, civil
war, and rebellion”).
97. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 34 (quoting the 12th article of impeachment
against James Logan).
98. See id. at 35.
99. See id. at 32.
100. Id.
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he later stated that the charter did not allow for such an impeach-
ment and that any complaints should be made to the Crown through
his office—a pure proprietary position.101 Thus, there was no trial to
verdict, and the factional disputes would continue to harden in Penn-
sylvania until the Revolution.
Since colonial impeachments were used as a check on executive
authority, articles of impeachment often included such allegations as
the “loss of public trust,” as in the 1774 attempted impeachment of
Stephen Skinner, treasurer of the eastern district of New Jersey.102
The Skinner case showed that, in a polarized political environment,
the subjects of impeachment were often secondary to the political
need for impeachment trials. Skinner had the misfortune of being in
office when £6000 was stolen. However, it was not until a year later
that Skinner was impeached. There was no question as to his inno-
cence, but the New Jersey assembly considered his negligence with
treasury funds sufficient for removal. Behind the impeachment were
assembly advocates who wanted control over colonial funds and the
office of the treasurer. While Governor William Franklin103 contested
the authority of the assembly to remove an official, Skinner resigned
before he could be formally impeached. The jurisdictional issues re-
mained unresolved. In the absence of any dialogue or settlement in
these confrontations, cases like Skinner’s deepened the factional an-
ger of the respective parties. A staunch advocate of the proprietary
cause, Governor Franklin, to his personal detriment, would continue
his assertion of Crown authority well into the Revolution.104
Many of the Framers were active participants or supporters of
the colonial impeachments as a method of asserting assembly
authority and later as raw challenges to Crown authority. Benjamin
101. See id. at 34-35.
102. See id. at 47.
103. What happened to William Franklin, the illegitimate son of Benjamin Franklin, may
be the best example of how deep and bitter the factional divisions became over proprietary and
assembly supporters.
104. Franklin was taken into custody at the beginning of the Revolution. He was allowed to
sign a “parole” in exchange for his agreement that he would not take any actions in support of
the Crown during his captivity. For this agreement, he was allowed to travel freely within the
area of Middletown. He used his freedom to engage in intelligence-gathering for the Crown
and to assist Loyalists in taking amnesty oaths offered by the king. Franklin became the target
of a “sting” operation by colonialists who procured one of the oaths and Crown pardons with
his signature. He was then forced into a dungeon cell in solitary confinement for eight months.
See generally SHEILA L. SKEMP, WILLIAM FRANKLIN: SON OF A PATRIOT, SERVANT OF A KING
192-266 (1990).
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Franklin supported the use of impeachment against proprietary sup-
porters such as William Moore and William Smith.105 In 1757, the
Pennsylvania assembly contested Crown authority and the growing
factional disputes led to the impeachment of Moore, a justice of the
peace.106 When Moore attempted to defend himself, he was arrested
for libel by the assembly faction.107 After Smith, a leading proprietary
figure and provost of the College of Pennsylvania, wrote in support
of his ally, Smith was convicted of contempt of the assembly.108 The
colonists used the trial as a cause célèbre and produced direct conflict
with the Privy Council, which once again insisted that the colonists
had no impeachment authority.109 Moore’s later reinstatement by the
Crown exemplified the absence of any ability of the system to deal
with factional disputes except through forced verdicts and zero-sum
conclusions. The case served to worsen the factional disputes and was
later described as “a straw in the wind, tossed by proprietary politics
[and] notice of conflict to come . . . .”110
By the time of the final colonial impeachment, this device had
become an overt political challenge to British rule and a reaffirma-
tion of republican values. The Oliver impeachment strongly resem-
bled the institutional conflict and outcome of the Buckingham case
before the Protestant Revolution. In 1774, Massachusetts Chief Jus-
tice Peter Oliver111 was impeached over a dispute regarding the con-
trol of the colonial courts.112 Colonists protested Crown control over
colonial judges and their exception from the guarantees of the Act of
Settlement of 1701. Colonists condemned Crown judges as “men who
depended upon the smiles of the crown for their daily bread” and
thereby ruled “at the will of the crown.”113 Massachusetts colonial
105. Professor Levy described Franklin’s role as “actively support[ing] the prosecution of
William Smith and William Moore in 1758 by championing their ‘kangaroo’ trial—by assem-
bly—for breach of parliamentary privilege in the form of seditious libel.” Levy, supra note 86,
at 786.
106. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 42.
107. See id. at 43.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 43-44.
110. Id. at 46.
111. While Oliver may have been motivated simply by financial need in accepting the
Crown funds, he was a die-hard Tory, as evidenced by his “vilification” of the opposing factions
before and after the Revolution. See BAILYN, supra note 96, at 152. Oliver’s post–Revolution-
ary War book, Origins & Progress of the American Rebellion (1781), has been described by one
modern reader as “scurrilous” and “extreme.” Id. at 152, 157.
112. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 54.
113.  BAILYN, supra note 96, at 106-07.
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leaders, having been frustrated in every effort to petition for change,
forced a confrontation with impeachment as their final weapon. The
assembly ordered judges to accept only a colonial, as opposed to a
Crown, salary. While four of the justices refused the Crown salary,
Oliver accepted it and triggered the impeachment trap.114
At the head of this factional effort was John Adams. Defending
the authority to impeach, Adams argued that “the power of im-
peachment was essential to a free government.”115 Adams described
the moment in which impeachment was embraced as the only action
in the face of political and legal alienation:
I believed there was one constitutional Resource. . . . Several Voices
at once cryed out, a constitutional Resource! what can it be? I said it
was nothing more nor less than an Impeachment of the Judges by
the House of Representatives before the Council. An Impeachment!
Why such a thing is without Precedent. I believed it was, in this
Province: but there had been precedents enough, and by much too
many in England.116
There was great outcry for a trial, and the General Court pro-
ceeded with the impeachment. As in the Buckingham case, however,
the Crown governor chose to prorogue the body to avoid a trial.117
The result was disastrous for the Crown, as the Oliver case proved an
accelerant for the Revolution: “While the majority of the patriot fac-
tion was not yet ready for violent resistance, impeachment of the
chief justice was an effective weapon against royal government.”118
The action by Governor Thomas Hutchinson to terminate the trial
only further alienated the public from Crown authority and faith in
the governing system. As for Oliver, the terminated trial deprived
him of perceived legitimacy in carrying out his duties. Unlike Logan,
who weathered a trial and won public support to continue in office,119
114. See Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 595 (1993).
115. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 51.
116.  Id. (quoting 3 JOHN ADAMS, DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY 299-300 (Lyman H. But-
terfield ed., 1961) (1804)).
117. See id. at 55.
118. Id.
119. In fairness to Oliver, the degree of political alienation from the government had dete-
riorated significantly from 1706 to 1774. As such, it is doubtful that he would have been acquit-
ted in either the General Court or the public view. However, the termination of the proceeding
made his case more notorious and symbolic for assembly advocates teetering on the edge of
revolution.
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Oliver returned to his duties under a cloud. Colonial jurors refused to
sit in trials in which he presided or even to take an oath before him.120
All that remained of Crown authority in Massachusetts was coercive
authority, a final stage in the progress toward revolution.
While colonists had learned the value of impeachment as a po-
litical tool, they could not use impeachment as a component of a rep-
resentative system until after the Revolution. Perhaps for this reason,
colonial impeachments often proved clumsy and incomplete. Some
colonies still referred such matters to the executive branch for resolu-
tion in the fashion of a certified or collective grievance.121 Given the
strides of Parliament in forcing reforms with the Crown, colonists
hoped to secure similar concessions. The Crown’s refusal to make
these concessions reflected the fact that, after the Restoration, the
Stuarts had steadfastly reserved their concentrated authority over
foreign and military affairs. The Crown viewed the Colonies as part
of its reduced area of near-absolute monarchical authority. The gov-
ernance concessions sought by the colonists threatened an area of
jealously guarded Crown authority and met with a glacial response.
This absence of vertical participation in governance magnified the
importance of colonial impeachment as a factional device. In re-
viewing this colonial history, Hoffer and Hull note the significance of
the use of impeachment as “an effective weapon against royal gov-
ernment” and stress:
Behind the partisan effort to check and balance royal government
stood a larger constitutional achievement. Consensus among the
legislators and their constituents upon the appropriateness and the
120. This is precisely what John Adams had hoped would occur. Adams attended Oliver’s
return to the bench and described the refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the court as a type
of coming of age for the citizens:
[Adams] said afterwards the scene “filled his eyes and heart,” and that he wept as he
stood by the lawyers’ table and watched his countrymen, “those honest freeholders,
in the moment of their fiery trial.” Chief Justice Oliver, sitting in his robes, called
Grand and Petit Jurors to approach the bench and take the oath. One by one they
refused. “What is the matter?” Oliver demanded as the men came forward to the bar
and stood stubbornly, lips closed. “Are all of you Quakers that you cannot take an
oath?” “No sir,” they answered. “The Chief Justice of this court stands impeached of
high crimes and misdemeanors, and of a conspiracy against our rights written in our
charter. We cannot serve under him. We will not take the oath.”
CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, JOHN ADAMS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 438-39
(1950) (footnote omitted); see also Landsman, supra note 114, at 595 (recounting jurors’ refusal
to participate in cases heard before Judge Oliver).
121. See Bogen, supra note 82, at 804 (discussing the extensive legislative authority vested
in colonial executives as the king’s representatives).
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force for the impeachment of a public official for violation of a pub-
lic trust bespoke commitment to certain constitutional assumptions.
Bound to an ideology of the supremacy of representative legisla-
tures, impeachment moved from an expeditious tactic toward be-
coming a fixture of American government.122
Impeachment was primarily used in the colonies as a tool for po-
litical expression rather than reconciliation or settlement. While im-
peachment procedures varied widely among the colonies, impeach-
ment was well known to critical figures like Adams and Franklin.123 It
was not until the Constitutional Convention that impeachment was
made a formal part of the representative system.124 It was then that
the Framers adapted impeachment from its use as a tool of public
dissension to a vehicle of public resolution. A review of the record of
the Constitutional Convention and later sources reveals highly varied
and at times contradictory statements by the Framers. As the fol-
lowing part demonstrates, however, the Framers were quite clear on
static procedural issues while incorporating a highly evolutionary
standard for impeachment.
II. THE ROLE OF THE SENATE TRIAL IN THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES
Both the British and colonial history of impeachment saw the
use of impeachment rise with social or political discord. In the ab-
sence of participatory elements in government, impeachment was of-
ten used as a valve to release public pressure during chaotic periods
122. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 56. This point has been noted by other historians:
In light of the continuing power struggles between the Commons and the councilors
of William and Mary, Anne, and George I, the colonists became increasingly aware
of impeachment’s potential as a political weapon, and they finally began to use it as
such. While in the 1600s colonial assemblies aimed impeachments at individual
wrongdoers in response to corruption or mismanagement, in the 1700s they often did
so in order to attack the power of other branches of government. This trend culmi-
nated in the Revolutionary era as Whig assemblies began to use the process to attack
royal officials, and through them the very concept of English rule.
MELTON, supra note 67, at 32-33.
123. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. While Franklin would participate in the
later Constitutional Convention, Adams (like Jefferson) would not. This has created some con-
troversy over referring to people like Adams as “Framers” as opposed to “Founding Fathers.”
See, e.g., Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1559, 1583 (1989). The author will happily leave this debate to others.
124. See Jonathan Turley, High Crimes and Misdemeanors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1998, at
A23 [hereinafter Turley, High Crimes and Misdemeanors]; see also Jonathan Turley, The New
Originalists, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at 27.
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or to express public discontentment with the Crown. With the Revo-
lution, the Framers of the Constitution were well versed in the use of
impeachment as a factional device. The former Revolutionaries were
practitioners of factional politics. The destabilizing effect of im-
peachment cases like Oliver’s had a positive Revolutionary value, but
the Framers, as creators of a new government, sought ways to stabi-
lize a system governing one of the most pluralistic nations on Earth.
One element of the impeachment history that would have appealed
to some Framers was its use as a check on executive power. The
Framers were also aware of impeachment as the great leveler of
power between an executive and his people.
Impeachment, while unstable, was long recognized as lending
credibility to representational claims of English and colonial govern-
ments. During the trial of Warren Hastings, Edmund Burke empha-
sized this importance of impeachment to the integrity of the system
and the danger if “this form of trial should . . . vanish out of the con-
stitution.” Burke declared:
[W]e must not deceive ourselves; whatever does not stand with
credit cannot stand long. And if the constitution should be de-
prived . . . of this resource, it is virtually deprived of everything else,
that is valuable in it. For this process is the cement which binds the
whole together . . . here it is that we provide for that, which is the
substantial excellence of our constitution . . . by which . . . no man, in
no circumstance, can escape the account, which he owes to the laws
of his country.125
The Framers would ultimately embrace the same view of im-
peachment as a critical part of a new constitutional system. When the
division of authority in the tripartite system was debated, impeach-
ment became a familiar guarantee for delegates uncomfortable with
the unitary executive.126 Whereas impeachment authority was once
125. Raoul Berger, The President, Congress, and the Courts, 83 YALE L.J. 1111, 1137 (1974)
(quoting Edmund Burke).
126. Impeachment would become more personally familiar to some of the delegates than to
others. John Pickering of New Hampshire and William Blount of North Carolina would be im-
peached. (Pickering was selected but did not actually attend the Constitutional Convention.)
Jared Ingersall of Pennsylvania would defend Blount in the Senate. Abraham Baldwin of
Georgia would sit as a juror in the trial of Pickering and Chase. Baldwin would actually attest
that the most incriminating letter against Blount in his trial was written by his hand, and he
would serve as one of the House managers seeking Blount’s conviction. See MELTON, supra
note 67, at 161. Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey would serve in the House during the im-
peachment of Blount. Luther Martin of Maryland would defend Chase in his trial. See John C.
Yoo, The First Claim: The Burr Trial, United States v. Nixon, and Presidential Power, 38 MINN.
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denied to the colonies, the Framers would expressly affirm impeach-
ment as part of a system of self-governance.
During the Constitutional Convention, impeachment was first
introduced exclusively with regard to presidential trials. In the words
of William Davie of North Carolina, impeachment was presented as
the “essential security for the good behaviour of the Executive.”127
Since that time, impeachments have remained works-in-progress with
evolving rules and standards, often reflecting the contemporary pe-
riod. From the first impeachment of Judge John Pickering to the re-
cent impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton, legislators
have repeatedly revisited the records of the Constitutional Conven-
tion for hints of original intent in carrying out their constitutional
duty. As a result, different theories and standards have emerged un-
der the claim of original intent, despite the fact that the Framers ap-
peared intentionally to leave these questions for each generation to
answer within a provided static structural system.128
A textual analysis of the constitutional provisions relating to im-
peachment yields little insight into the intended function of a Senate
trial. There are five provisions dealing with the impeachment proc-
ess.129 Only one pertains to the Senate trial. Article I, Section 3, es-
tablishes the Senate’s jurisdictional and procedural foundation for
impeachment trials:
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When
sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When
the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall
preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence
of two thirds of the Members present.130
L. REV. 1435, 1443 (1999).
127. 2 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 64.
128. See Turley, High Crimes and Misdemeanors, supra note 124, at A23 (discussing the
purpose of an evolutionary standard for impeachment).
129. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 2 (establishing that the House “shall have the sole Power
of Impeachment”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (directing that “the Senate shall have the sole Power to
try all impeachments,” that trials will proceed under “Oath or Affirmation,” and that the Chief
Justice shall preside and a two-thirds vote is required for conviction); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (pro-
viding that impeachments “shall not extend further than to removal from Office and disqualifi-
cation to hold and enjoy any Office” and that removed officials shall still be liable for indict-
ment and trial); id. art. I, § 4 (establishing that “[t]he President, Vice President and all civil
Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Convic-
tion of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors”); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (bar-
ring the use of presidential pardons in cases of impeachment).
130. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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In comparison with other areas of constitutional interpretation,
the Senate Impeachment Clause is one of the most clear and concrete
provisions in the Constitution. The entirety of the Senate Impeach-
ment Clause is static, establishing structural guidelines for the trial
without evolutionary standards such as “high crimes and misdemean-
ors” from Article II, Section 4. To put these procedures in context, it
is necessary to look at the Constitutional Convention and later ratifi-
cation debates.
While impeachment was not a central focus of the Constitutional
Convention, it was an issue of modest controversy. Delegates came to
the Constitutional Convention with preconceived notions of im-
peachment procedures and standards, largely derived from their state
constitutions. The debate centered on the purpose of impeachment,
the standard for impeachment, and, most controversial, the proper
court to render a verdict.
As a threshold matter, Madison and other Federalists had to
overcome the opposition of such delegates as Charles Pinckney of
South Carolina,131 Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, and Rufus
King of Massachusetts to the very notion of impeaching the chief ex-
ecutive.132 This resistance may have been due as much to the famili-
arity with the English impeachments as to any qualification of repub-
lican values. As noted above, while high officials were subject to
impeachment in England, members of the royal family (and certainly
the monarch) were excluded from such a trial.133 Moreover, the Presi-
dent’s limited tenure in office lowered the perceived need for such
extreme intervention. Nevertheless, these objections easily gave way
to the arguments of Madison and others that impeachment was a vital
guarantee of good behavior in the chief executive.134
131. In a decision that bordered on the malicious for later historians, South Carolina sent to
the Convention a Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and a Charles Pinckney, second cousins. This
leaves the source of some comments in question since the record often refers to simply “Mr.
Pinkney” [sic] or “Mr. P.” Usually, references to General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney were
designated as “C.C. Pinckney” or “Gen. Pinckney.” Mr. C. Pinckney is, therefore, often taken
as denoting the younger Charles Pinckney. General Pinckney had a particular insight into Eng-
lish precedent as a former student of Sir William Blackstone at Oxford. See Akhil Reed Amar,
The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
457, 467 (1994). To make matters more difficult, South Carolina’s ratification convention se-
lected Thomas Pinckney as its president. See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 318 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES].
132. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 64-69.
133. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
134. See House Hearings, supra note 3, at 257-61 (testimony of Prof. Jonathan Turley).
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There has been considerable academic attention given to the en-
suing debate at the Constitutional Convention over the specific stan-
dard for impeachment. This debate is relevant to this Article in two
important respects. First, the originalist or intentionalist claims over
the meaning of “high crimes and misdemeanors” often limit the sug-
gested use of Senate trials by confining the subject of impeachment
to official acts or abuses of power.135 These arguments tend to elevate
removal as the primary purpose of impeachment in a narrow band of
cases. Such arguments, if accepted, would radically reduce the role of
impeachment in addressing the factional disputes and legitimacy
questions discussed in this Article. Second, these debates indicate the
view of the Framers as to the role of the Senate trial within the bi-
cameral impeachment process. If impeachment has a broader value
as a Madisonian device, it is necessary to address the questions raised
over the intended scope of offenses subject to Senate trials. While the
Framers did debate the scope of impeachable offenses, this debate
has been radically overstated. The most concentrated debate on
standards occurred on a single day and constitutes a couple of pages
of record.136 Consider the exchange between the main protagonists,
containing some of the most-repeated quotations:
The clause referring to the Senate, the trial of impeachments agst.
the President, for Treason & bribery, was taken up.
Col. Mason. Why is the provision restrained to Treason & bribery
only? Treason as defined in the Constitution will not reach many
great and dangerous offense. Hastings is not guilty of Treason. At-
tempts to subvert the Constitution may not be Treason as above de-
fined—As bills of attainder which have saved the British Constitu-
tion are forbidden, it is the more necessary to extend: the power of
impeachments.
He movd. to add after “bribery” “or maladministration.”137
135. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3, at 745-49; Turley, Executive Func-
tion Theory, supra note 3, at 1802-17.
136. This point was made most strongly by Professor Jack Rakove in the Clinton hearing.
See House Hearings, supra note 3, at 242 (testimony of Prof. Jack Rakove) (emphasizing that
“there is, in fact, no debate on [the meaning of the impeachment standard] . . . at least no de-
bate that testifies directly as to what the framers exactly thought, precisely thought, they were
doing”).
137. Mason’s discussion of the Hastings incident and his suggested use of “maladministra-
tion” may suggest more than a passing knowledge of the case since one of the impeachable of-
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Mr. Gerry seconded him—
Mr. Madison[.] So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during
pleasure of the Senate.
Mr. Govr Morris[.] [I]t will not be put in force & can do no harm—
An election of every four years will prevent maladministration.
Col. Mason withdrew “maladministration” & substitutes “other high
crimes & misdemeanors” (“agst. the State”).138
On the question thus altered [Ayes—8; Noes —3]139
There is no evidence that the debates over the standard of im-
peachment were particularly divisive or significant in the view of the
delegates. Among the changes made during the debates was the
elimination of the words “against the State.” While this distinction of
impeachable offenses being tied to official misconduct would be re-
peatedly raised in later trials (including in the Clinton trial),140 the
elimination of the language was made in committee without a men-
tion or objection in the Committee of the Whole.141 The different
proposed standards, however, did indicate sharply differing views on
the expected use of impeachment procedures.142 Delegates like Roger
Sherman of Connecticut “contended that the National Legislature
fenses alleged by Burke against Hastings was “maladministration.” See supra note 70 and ac-
companying text.
138. After this language was added, Mason moved to change the words “against the State”
to “against the United States.” This was done “in order to remove ambiguity” and was ap-
proved unanimously. Then, the Committee of Style dropped “against the United States,” pro-
ducing our current language. For a discussion of these changes, see Turley, Executive Function
Theory, supra note 3, at 1812-15.
139. 2 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 550. The specific vote of 11 delegations was: New Hamp-
shire (in favor); Massachusetts (in favor); Connecticut (in favor); New Jersey (against); Penn-
sylvania (against); Delaware (against); Maryland (in favor); Virginia (in favor); North Carolina
(in favor); South Carolina (in favor); Georgia (in favor).
140. See House Hearings, supra note 3, at 257-66 (testimony of Prof. Jonathan Turley); see
also Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3, at 747-59.
141. This debate is less relevant to this Article than to prior academic works. See articles
cited supra note 3.
142. Once again, some of these standards came from state constitutions. Other delegates
were probably influenced by their legal experiences under the English and colonial experi-
ences. When John Adams was arguing for colonial impeachments, he claimed that the “grand
inquest” of impeachment should be used in cases of “misbehaviour.” HOFFER & HULL, supra
note 19, at 65.
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should have power to remove the Executive at pleasure.”143 Notably
this standard would have created a unique type of parliamentary re-
moval, where the legislature could replace the chief executive, but
not the government, at will.144
Beyond rejecting such a low “at will” standard, little can be es-
tablished with certainty from the debates, despite academic claims to
the contrary.145 For example, it is often noted that, when George Ma-
son offered the standard of “maladministration,”146 Madison objected
to the standard and ultimately favored the English standard of “high
crimes and misdemeanors.”147 What is rarely noted, however, is that
Madison later interpreted the impeachment standard to include
“maladministration.”148 Indeed, maladministration would be repeat-
edly cited in impeachment cases extending into the twentieth cen-
tury.149 Likewise, Madison described impeachment as a way of ad-
143. 1 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 85; see also id. at 78 (citing a proposal by Dickenson that
the President is “removable by the national legislature upon request by a majority of legisla-
tures of the individual States”). In the English system, the Parliament had the authority to im-
peach “by address,” which allowed the members to remove judges at pleasure. See 3 ASHER C.
HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 2013, at 334-35 (1907),
cited in Brendan C. Fox, Justiciability of Challenges to the Senate Rules of Procedure for Im-
peachment Trials, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1275, 1279 (1992); see also 2 RECORDS, supra note
5, at 428-29.
144. One interesting question is the likely result of this vote if the Framers knew of the
eventual creation of a party system in which the Vice President would be a member of the
President’s party and a supporter of his policies. This dynamic factor could well have changed
some of the opposition to Sherman’s proposal.
145. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3, at 763-69 (discussing contrary theo-
ries); Turley, The Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1802-17 (same).
146. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 550.
147. See id. According to Blackstone, who was a highly influential authority for the Fram-
ers, “maladministration” was a “high misdemeanor.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *121.
148. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 498 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789); see also Turley, Executive Function
Theory, supra note 3, at 1804-07. This oversight is evident in the testimony and public state-
ments of many law professors opposing the Clinton impeachment. For example, Professor
Laurence Tribe has stated to members of Congress that “Madison, clearly one of the towering
figures of our history, or of the world’s history, recognized that the power to remove a presi-
dent for something as nebulous as maladministration could lead to something to[o] awfully
close to Roger Sherman’s idea that you could remove a president at will.” Democratic Round-
table on the Impeachment Process, Federal Document Clearing House Political Transcripts,
Oct. 15, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, POLTRN File. In fact, while maladministra-
tion was not expressly put into the standard, at Madison’s insistence, Madison did believe that a
President could be removed for maladministration under the standard of “high crimes and mis-
demeanors.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 498 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
149. This standard appears repeatedly in the House records of impeachment and was used
by House managers in the 1905 Senate trial of Judge Swayne. See infra notes 294-301 and ac-
companying text.
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dressing “the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magis-
trate.”150 Alexander Hamilton referred to impeachable offenses as
“those offences which proceed from the misconduct of public men,
or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public
trust.”151
The records from the Constitutional Convention and state ratifi-
cation debates are simply too sparse and varied to sustain any clear
interpretation of the adoption of the English standard. Three conclu-
sions about this standard, however, appear well established and gen-
erally accepted. First, the impeachment standard was clearly intended
to extend beyond criminal acts to include some noncriminal acts.
Second, the impeachment standard was not intended to address po-
litical disputes or mere unpopularity.152 Finally, whatever the Con-
gress determined to be impeachable conduct was not to be review-
able by the judiciary.153
The relatively scant attention paid to the impeachment standard
reflected a pronounced tendency of Madison and other Federalists to
look to structural solutions to deal with potential substantive prob-
lems.154 Consistent with this procedural inclination, the most debated
issue of impeachment concerned the proper court and process for
impeachment. Once again, the rivaling proposals were closely related
to procedures employed in the various state constitutions.155 The
150. 2 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 65. While not participating in the debate, John Adams
described impeachment as allowing for trial in cases of “misbehaviour” or official misdeeds.
HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 65.
151. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 1, at 396.
152. James Iredell stressed this commonly held point when he noted in the North Carolina
debates:
God forbid that a man, in any country in the world, should be liable to be punished
for want of judgment. . . . Whatever mistake a man may make, he ought not to be
punished for it, nor his posterity rendered infamous. But if a man be a villain, and
wilfully abuse his trust, he is to be held up as a public offender, and ignominiously
punished.
3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 131, at 26.
153. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237-38 (1993) (observing that the pro-
cedures of impeachment were to be decided by the Senate and that this decision was not re-
viewable by the courts because of the political question doctrine).
154. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3, at 740-43, 769-77.
155. A variety of alternative systems existed or were proposed in the various states. The
most complex proposed system actually came from Thomas Jefferson outside of the constitu-
tional debate. In Virginia, Jefferson argued for the following system:
There shall moreover be a court of IMPEACHMENTS to consist of three members
of the Council of state, one of each of the Superior courts of Chancery, Common law,
and Admiralty, two members of the House of Delegates and one of the Senate, to be
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“Virginia Plan,” advocated by Edmund Randolph and James Madi-
son, called for the federal courts to try impeachments.156 An alterna-
tive “New Jersey Plan,” put forward by William Paterson, would
have established that the federal courts “shall have authority to hear
& determine in the first instance on all impeachments of federal offi-
cers” and would have created a jury of true peers for the chief execu-
tive—the governors of the various states.157 John Dickenson of Dela-
ware recommended a third option that would have made the chief
executive “removable by the national legislature upon request by a
majority of the legislatures of the individual States.”158 The “New
York Plan,” advanced by Alexander Hamilton, allowed for “all im-
peachments to be tried by a Court to consist of the Chief or Judge of
the Superior Court of Law of each State.”159 Ultimately, with the
Pennsylvania and Virginia delegates in continued opposition, the
delegates agreed on leaving the impeachment decision to Congress.160
Once the delegates resolved on leaving impeachments exclu-
sively to the legislative branch, the bicameral process was adopted
with limited debate. This was the English model, “which assigned the
role of prosecutor to the Commons while the Lords sat in judg-
chosen by the body respectively of which they are. Before this court any member of
the three branches of government, that is to say, the Governor, any member of the
Council, of the two houses of legislature or of the Superior courts may be impeached
by the Governor the Council or either of the said houses or courts for such misbe-
havior in office as would be sufficient to remove him therefrom: and the only sen-
tence they shall have authority to pass shall be that of deprivation and future inca-
pacity of office. Seven members shall be requisite to make a court and two thirds of
those present must concur in the sentence.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Proposal for Revision of the Virginia Constitution, reprinted in 6 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 301 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1952).
156. See 1 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 22. The resolution calling for the federal courts to be
given authority over “impeachments of any National officers” was written in Madison’s hand.
Id. at 22-23.
Notably, Madison was uncomfortable with the role of the Senate as the jury and voted
against the Senate as the court of impeachment. Madison favored a role—but not an exclusive
one—for the judiciary in the final decision of removal. Madison indicated that he was willing to
have removal decided by legislative officials in association with judicial officials. Madison sug-
gested the Supreme Court as one possibility, “or rather a tribunal of which that should form a
part.” 2 id. at 551. Presumably, such a tribunal would have been composed of both legislative
and judicial officers. Yet, after his view failed to receive general support in the Convention,
Madison did not object to the bicameral impeachment model in later years. See infra note 165
and accompanying text.
157. 1 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 244.
158. Id. at 78.
159. Id. at 292-93.
160. See 2 id. at 551.
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ment.”161 Notably, the delegates made few references to English im-
peachment cases or standards in the debate. Nevertheless, the dele-
gates modified the English model to fit the demands of the new con-
stitutional structure, including the imposition of a two-thirds vote in
the Senate for conviction,162 the requirement of acting upon oath or
affirmation,163 and the limitation of what persons would be subject to
impeachment.164
The divisions on impeachment and its standards often reflected
the growing divide between Federalists and anti-Federalists. While
Federalists like Madison believed in the need for representative de-
mocracy, the anti-Federalists were generally suspicious of any depar-
tures from direct democracy.165 Consistent with these views, anti-
Federalists like Elbridge Gerry preferred a more readily available
means for replacing the chief executive.166 George Mason stressed
that impeachment was needed as a democratic process to guarantee
the people a chief executive who would continue to meet the minimal
requirements of office: “Some mode of displacing an unfit magistrate
161. BERGER, supra note 34, at 54.
162. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
163. See id.
164. See id. art. II, § 4. This point was eloquently made by Senator Frederick T. Frelinghuy-
sen in the Senate trial of President Andrew Johnson:
The procedure of impeachment was imported into our Constitution from the com-
mon parliamentary law of England, but it was placed there clipped and pruned of
very many of its baneful incidents. Impeachment, associated with bills of attainder
and of pains and penalties and ex post facto laws, was made in Great Britain an in-
strument of political persecution and partisan aggrandizement. It was through those
agencies that the grossest injustice was perpetrated in the name of law, that men of
political power were destroyed, that families of influence were blotted out, and that
their estates were confiscated to become a reward to those who persecuted those
who owned them.
IRVING BRANT, IMPEACHMENT TRIALS AND ERRORS 157 (1972) (citation omitted).
165. For a discussion of anti-Federalist views, see Symposium: Roads Not Taken: Undercur-
rents of Republican Thinking in Modern Constitutional Theory, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1990); see
also Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Anti-Federalists, Representation, and Party, 84 NW. U. L.
REV. 12, 12 (1990) (“Both Anti-Federalists and Federalists claimed to champion representa-
tion, but . . . . Anti-Federalists regarded representation as a second-best substitute for local self-
government—a potentially dangerous attenuation of personal responsibility and assent.”).
While the anti-Federalists did not advocate direct democracy, they viewed government ideally
as local rather than an “extended” republic in the Madisonian image. Thomas L. Pangle, The
Classical Challenge to the American Constitution, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 145, 156 n.20 (1990)
(“The Anti-Federalists largely rested their hopes . . . on libertarian state and local governments
that would be simpler, more restricted, smaller scaled, and closer to a more rural, homogenous,
and virtuous populace than the national government proposed and the society envisioned by
the Federalists.”).
166. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 66.
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is rendered indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as
well as by the corruptibility of the man chosen.”167 The debates indi-
cate that even the Federalists viewed the Senate trial as a political de-
termination of the viability of an officer remaining in office. Madison
stated that he was concerned about any system that would prevent
the minority from “remov[ing] . . . an officer who had rendered him-
self justly criminal in the eyes of a majority.”168 For the Federalists,
the Senate trial served the prototypical representative function: guar-
anteeing the public the authority to remove a chief executive while
protecting the chief executive from the direct factional pressures of
public sentiment. Madison noted that the Senate would at times be
expected to serve the public interests by ignoring the public will.169
This is certainly the case with impeachment trials and, as will be
shown, was at the heart of the acquittal of President Andrew John-
son.170
Owing to the limited textual and historical sources, both aca-
demics and legislators have tended to conflate the functions of both
houses. In particular, some academics hold the view that the House
of Representatives votes on the same question of the Senate,171 as
well as the related view that impeachment was inappropriate where
removal was not likely to result. In a prior article, I offered an alter-
native view of the role of the House of Representatives as distinct
from the Senate role.172 Under this view, the impeachment authority
is best understood as a check on the chief executive and a deterrent
to presidential misconduct.173 Specifically, impeachment functions as a
167. 1 id. at 86.
168. Id.
169. See infra note 538 and accompanying text. In the debates, and most of the contempo-
rary writings, the discussion of impeachment almost exclusively focused on the Senate. While
the House of Representatives was given the sole authority to impeach, the delegates were
largely silent on the process or substance of House deliberations. Conversely, the Senate was
given guidelines for its trial in the Constitution and considerable guidance in the constitutional
debates. See House Hearings, supra note 3, at 257-66 (testimony of Prof. Jonathan Turley).
170. See infra notes 430-36 and accompanying text.
171. This view was expressly adopted by former Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman be-
fore the House Judiciary Committee. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3, at 781
n.248.
172. See id.
173. James Iredell emphasized the role of deterrence in his remarks to the North Carolina
Convention:
Mr. Chairman, I was going to observe that this clause, vesting the power of im-
peachment in the House of Representatives, is one of the greatest securities for a due
execution of all public offices. Every government requires it. Every man ought to be
amenable for his conduct, and there are no persons so proper to complain of the
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deterrent to presidential misconduct in the detection and referral of
impeachable offenses.
Impeachment has a second purpose beyond a check on or deter-
rent to presidential misconduct. In the Senate, impeachment takes on
a more political role by addressing legitimacy questions raised with
respect to presidential and judicial misconduct. The Framers were al-
ready familiar with this political dimension from their own experi-
ences with such trials as the impeachment of Warren Hastings. This
political role in impeachment decisions was directly linked by Hamil-
ton to the Senate, not the House, determination:
The subjects [of the Senate’s] jurisdiction [in an impeachment trial]
are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public
men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public
trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be de-
nominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done im-
mediately to the society itself.174
The question presented at a Senate trial is not simply removal
but redemption. This point was made by Benjamin Franklin, who
noted that a President’s conduct can be sufficiently “obnoxious” to
require a public decision on his continuation as chief executive. The
impeachment process, he concluded, is “the best way . . . to provide
in the Constitution for the regular punishment of the Executive when
his misconduct should deserve it, and for his honorable acquittal
when he should be unjustly accused.”175 Franklin’s statement reflects
the need for a President to address legitimacy concerns in order to
continue with the full authority of his office. Without such “honor-
able acquittal,” a President can continue in a political condition akin
to partial impeachment, possessing the office but not the perceived
legitimacy to hold it. The Framers were well aware that the President
cannot lead a free nation by coercion or threat. Rather a chief execu-
tive can only demand the greatest sacrifice from citizens based on the
general acceptance of his moral and legal authority. A President who
public officers as the representatives of the people at large. . . . It will be not only the
means of punishing misconduct, but it will prevent misconduct. A man in public of-
fice who knows that there is no tribunal to punish him, may be ready to deviate from
his duty; but if he know there is a tribunal for that purpose, although he may be a
man of no principle, the very terror of punishment will perhaps deter him.
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 131, at 32.
174. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 1, at 396.
175. 2 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 65.
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is widely viewed as a law-breaker carries a dangerous disability as the
leader of a nation of laws.
As previously noted, the use of the Senate trial as a method of
dealing with legitimacy concerns about a chief executive was a pre-
dictable resolution for the Framers.176 If a President is to be subjected
to a second political decision on his tenure, the Federalists viewed the
Senate as the proper body not only to register but to regulate such
public sentiment. Hamilton expressed this view when he asked,
“[W]hat other body would be likely to feel confidence enough in its
own situation to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary
impartiality between an individual accused and the representatives of
the people, his accusers?”177 The delegates clearly did not consider
the impeachment trial to be a real trial in any criminal sense, since
they excluded criminal punishments and reserved the right to prose-
cute impeached officials. Rather, they saw impeachment trials as a
continuation of the political process when a public decision of reten-
tion (rather than election) is required. This may be one of the reasons
that the procedures of the Senate trial were largely left to Senate
members to determine within their own contemporary context and
preferences.178
Much has been made of the debate over the evolutionary stan-
dard of “high crimes and misdemeanors.” The constitutional standard
does play a vital role in restricting Senate trials to the most serious
questions of legitimacy, and it has restrained factional impulse over
policy differences or political disputes. It is the Senate trial, however,
that yields the most significant and potentially transformative effect
on factional preferences in impeachment.
As will be shown below, the political role of the Senate trial is
unique in the American constitutional system.179 The factional dis-
putes raised by allegations of misconduct by a President or judge de-
mand resolution in a public forum. The Senate trial supplies a forum
176. See supra notes 154-68 and accompanying text; see also BERGER, supra note 34, at 98
(noting that the separation of powers doctrine “left no room for removal by a vote of no confi-
dence” and that, therefore, “impeachment was adopted as a safety valve, a security against an
oppressive or corrupt President and his sheltered ministers”).
177. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 1, at 398. For further discussion of Hamilton’s
views, see supra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
178. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993) (“‘[T]he Constitution speaks in
general terms, leaving Congress to deal with subsidiary matters of detail as the public interests
and changing conditions may require.’” (quoting Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921))).
179. See infra notes 580-95 and accompanying text.
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that would not be possible in any other branch. In the Senate trial of
a President, representatives of all three branches are present in a
proceeding in which all factional views can be openly expressed and
debated. This is vitally important to the integrity of the system, as it
has often changed the views of both senators and the public regarding
the basis of impeachment allegations.
III. FACTIONAL DISPUTES AND SENATE TRIALS IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD
A review of the constitutional period is obviously limited to the
thirteen judicial impeachments, two nonjudicial impeachments, and
two presidential impeachments. This record also includes rarely dis-
cussed terminated impeachment cases in which judicial officers re-
signed shortly before or during impeachment inquiries.180 A review of
these cases yields some interesting patterns. First, non-presidential
impeachments can be divided into two basic periods: partisan and bi-
partisan impeachments. Most of the early judicial impeachments
were openly partisan and factional. This factionalism was most ap-
parent in the Senate trials, in which the primary presentation of evi-
dence occurred. After the 1930s, a trend toward more bipartisan in-
quiries, impeachments, and trials developed. Second, in the two
presidential trials, factional interests were on open display. These two
trials proceeded along different procedural courses and left different
political and constitutional legacies. Third, in both judicial and presi-
dential trials, the Senate trials produced notable defections. Under
the bicameral system, there appeared greater pressure for compro-
mise and consensus than under the English system. While early im-
peachment trials like the Lloyd case showed how trials could vindi-
cate an accused (and vanquish his accusers), there is more evidence
of defections and compromise under the constitutional system.
Fourth, even in the most factional periods, impeachment and removal
authority was not used widely as a political tool. To the contrary,
most of the impeachments are highly defensible regardless of the par-
tisan rhetoric. While almost sixty judges have faced House inquiries,
only seventeen covered officials have been impeached. Of these im-
peachments, the vast majority appear to have had legitimate basis. In
the one case lacking credible allegations of high crimes or misde-
180. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1819-55.
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meanors, the accused was acquitted in the Senate trial.181 Finally,
most of the impeachments and Senate trials expressly touched on
questions of legitimacy in office. From the case of Judge Pickering to
that of President Clinton, the Senate faced factional disputes over the
authority of the accused individuals to carry out constitutional duties
in light of their conduct. Congress repeatedly rejected the view that
impeachable conduct was limited to official acts or abuses of author-
ity.182
Impeachable conduct often included acts that were incompatible
with continuing to hold an office of authority, including crimes or
misconduct outside the official realm.183 In each of these cases, it was
clear that the officeholder faced lingering and lasting questions of
authority. Some officials were impeached at the request of state leg-
islators, the Justice Department, or bar associations. It is difficult to
imagine most of these officials’ continuing with the disability of unre-
solved allegations of misconduct. Whether the allegations turned on
official misconduct or crimes related to private affairs, these cases re-
flect the danger of the state of “partial impeachment,” in which an of-
ficial holds the title, but not the perceived authority to use it.
These past impeachments fall into three categories based on
status: impeachments of Presidents, judges, and “other civil officers.”
It is also possible to divide impeachment cases by periods because, as
noted above, the tenor and regularity of impeachment proceedings
changed over time. Senate trials gradually became less partisan over
the course of this history, with the exception of the Clinton trial.
However, the office or status of impeached officials is more relevant
to a review of factional disputes over legitimacy questions.
A. Early Federal Impeachments of “Other Civil Officers”
Only two Senate trials concerned impeached officials other than
judges or Presidents. Ironically, both of these anomalous cases—the
cases of William Blount and William Belknap—created significant
precedent for later cases on the scope of impeachment and the role of
Senate trials. Moreover, both of these cases reveal the interplay of
political controversy and Senate trials. In both of these trials, notable
181. This was the case of President Andrew Johnson. See infra Part IV.C.1. Another case,
that of Judge Halsted Ritter, see infra notes 306-14 and accompanying text, has been criticized
(with some basis) as questionable both procedurally and substantively.
182. See infra notes 351-60 and accompanying text.
183. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1819-55.
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defections occurred over the course of the proceedings at times of ex-
treme polarization. Finally, in both of these trials, removal was not at
issue. Rather, the Senate became a forum in which the conduct of
former officials was subjected to political judgment. As a result, fac-
tional concerns that could have been destabilizing were given expres-
sion in the Senate in the type of vertical integration that was missing
in both the English and colonial systems.
1. The Blount Case. The most fascinating test for impeachment
within a Madisonian system occurred soon after the Constitution was
ratified. In the late 1700s and early 1800s, the country was riddled
with divisions, conspiracies, and sporadic violence. Regional and
political factions came with real threats of civil war and secession.184
The two largest factional groups during this period were the
Federalists, associated with John Adams, and the Republicans,
associated with Thomas Jefferson.185 These two factions created
dangerous political conditions that would forge the Madisonian
democracy under intense political heat. These were precisely the
types of factions that had proven unstable and ultimately violent in
the colonial impeachment era.
One of the greatest factional issues of the time concerned for-
eign relations and the status of the territories. After the Revolution-
ary War and Jay’s Treaty, a vacuum had formed in the territories,
with British and Spanish troops facing an ever-expanding population
of American settlers. The Revolution and the Constitutional Conven-
tion could not resolve a host of fundamental questions over policies
ranging from western expansion to a national bank, policies which
were debated in an atmosphere of mutual distrust and loathing. Pro-
fessor Presser aptly describes this period:
This was the era of the two rebellions in Pennsylvania, of the Jay
Treaty, of the X, Y, Z affair, and of the undeclared war with France,
and the era when our national political schizophrenia began to mani-
fest itself. Spurred on by the world’s first largely unshackled periodi-
cal press, Americans in the late eighteenth century began to divide
profoundly along regional, class, and economic lines, as the emerg-
ing Jeffersonian party (which preferred France to England, localism
184. Secession threats continued in the early 1800s with one threat associated with Aaron
Burr and his companions in New York. See NOEMIE EMERY, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: AN
INTIMATE PORTRAIT 226-27 (1982).
185. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1819-22.
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to cosmopolitanism, and agrarian pursuits to high finance) cam-
paigned to wrest control of the legislative and executive branches
from the Federalists.186
Even on issues of committing troops in war, the factions re-
mained divided.187 At the same time, the French Revolution had cre-
ated deep divisions within the country. Anglophile Federalists de-
tested the abuses and killings of the French Revolution.188 Federalists
believed that Francophile Republicans would bring about an Ameri-
can terror and seize property.189 The Republicans feared that Feder-
alists sought monarchy and, with justification, sought sedition prose-
cutions of Republican members.190 Factional divisions based on
distrust and fear of retribution constituted the greatest test of a sys-
tem designed for factional dialogue and settlement.191
The first impeachment involved Senator William Blount.192 The
impeachment triggered extreme factional responses and confirmed
public rumors of conspiracies over control of the territories.193 Blount
186. Stephen B. Presser, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of
John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 213, 214 (1996) (book review).
187. See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Under-
standing of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 293 (1996) (commenting that “[i]n the Indian
War, President Washington pursued a limited war that rejected the hopes of both New England
Federalists, who opposed the war because of its costs, and Southern Republicans, who sought
an aggressive war to secure territorial gain”).
188. See Presser, supra note 186, at 214.
189. See Stephen B. Presser & Becky Bair Hurley, Saving God’s Republic: The Jurispru-
dence of Samuel Chase, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 771, 814-15; see also H. Jefferson Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 924 (1985) (describing the
Federalist-controlled Congress’s enactment of the Alien and Sedition Acts as stemming from
their fear of subversion by Francophile Republicans).
190. See Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE
L.J. 229, 230 (1990).
191. Professor Wedgwood describes the unrest of the period:
 a decade’s dissidence—citizen Genêt appealing to the people to resist Washington’s
declaration of neutrality, western Pennsylvania farmer-soldiers marching in resistance to
federal taxation in the Whisky Rebellion, eastern Pennsylvania farmers violently dis-
puting taxes in Fries Rebellion, the blandishment of Republican voices seeking alliance
with revolutionary France in war against the European powers, High Federalists seeking
alliance with England in war against the French.
Id.
192. In addition to the excellent account by Professors Hoffer and Hull, see HOFFER &
HULL, supra note 19, at 151-63, a full treatment of this case can be found in a comprehensive
account by Buckner Melton, see MELTON, supra note 67, at 441-57.
193. See ELEANORE BUSHNELL, CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES: THE FEDERAL
IMPEACHMENT TRIALS 26 (1992) (describing the “partisan hostility” of the Blount impeach-
ment proceedings).
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was a Republican194 from Tennessee when he was accused of conspir-
acy with the British to invade the Southwest.195 His conspiracy with
British operatives was discovered in a letter196 that found its way to
194. Early federal impeachment inquiries included members of Congress. These inquiries
often addressed issues of character and virtue. Such was the case in a dispute between Ken-
tucky Senator Humphrey Marshall and two state judges who had accused him of perjury. The
Kentucky legislature submitted the matter directly to the United States Senate, since issues of
legitimacy were raised in the allegations:
Our duty under these circumstances strongly and unequivocally requires that we
should request your serious attention to the considerations which this case suggests—
important indeed it is to society, that those intrusted with the exercise of the powers
of government should be men of unshaken virtue and integrity. . . . But it is further to
be observed that they should not only be virtuous, but free even from the imputa-
tions of crime; more especially of those infamous crimes, the perpetration of which
destroys the bonds of society, prostrates the obligations of truth . . . and falsehood—
the sole support of well-grounded confidence . . . .
HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 148 (footnote omitted).
195. Behind this intrigue was Blount’s large land holdings in the area. It was alleged that
Blount was facing dire economic circumstances owing to heavy investments in land under
Spanish control. While the land remained under Spanish authority, the value of the property
would remain low. Should the property become part of the English empire, however, Blount
would have received a windfall from the expansion of settlers. Under considerable financial
strain owing to his fixed holdings, Blount went to extraordinary lengths to engineer independ-
ence from Spain, including a private army. See id. at 148.
196. Various letters were recovered, but the roughly two-page letter from Blount to James
Carey, an Indian interpreter, proved his downfall. See MELTON, supra note 67, at 99-101. In this
letter, Blount notes some of the conspirators in the incitement of the Creeks and Cherokees in
the alliance with England against Spain. He then stated:
I believe, but am not quite sure, that the plan then talked of will be attempted this
fall; and if it is attempted, it will be in a much larger way than then talked of; and if
the Indians act their part, I have no doubt but it will succeed. . . . you must take care,
in whatever you say to Rogers, or any body else, not to let the plan be discovered by
Hawkins, Dinsmore, Byers, or any other person in the interest of the United States
or Spain.
. . . .
. . . I have advised you, in whatever you do, to take care of yourself. I have now to
tell you to take care of me too; for a discovery of the plan would prevent the success
and much injure all the parties concerned.
. . . .
 . . . When you have read this letter over three times, then burn it.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Not only did the letter reveal knowledge of the conspiracy and the
need to conceal it from “any other person in the interest of the United States,” but the letter
also included instructions for Carey to shift blame for an earlier treaty away from Blount to
President Washington. Id. at 99. “This sort of talk,” Blount advised, “will be throwing all the
blame off me upon the late President, and as he is now out of office, it will be of no conse-
quence how much the Indians blame him.” Id. at 100 (footnote omitted). Unfortunately for
Blount, Carey was a bad candidate for conspiracies and promptly showed the letter to one of
the very men listed by Blount as untrustworthy, James Byers, a government trader. See id. at
102.
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John Adams.197 Enraged, Adams demanded an investigation by the
Senate.198 Before such investigation, however, the Senate expelled
Senator Blount on the basis of the letters.199 The expulsion, on July 8,
1797, was carried out under the Senate’s inherent authority to disci-
pline its members and was officially based on “a high misdemeanor,
entirely inconsistent with his public trust and duty as a Senator.”200
The vote was virtually unanimous, with both Federalists and Repub-
licans voting 25-1 to expel the senator.201 Professors Hoffer and Hull
note in their review of this case that the use of “high misdemeanor” is
somewhat curious because “Blount was not accused of any recog-
nized crime or any violation of the law. His misdemeanor was to mis-
demean himself; to misuse his office for his own speculative ends.”202
The articles of impeachment against Senator Blount referred to am-
biguous violations of international and domestic laws in this con-
duct.203
The Blount impeachment began with the Senate, but the House
of Representatives initiated its own inquiry. The House debated an
issue that would reappear in later impeachments, including the im-
197. See WILLIAM H. MASTERSON, WILLIAM BLOUNT 298 (1954).
198. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 152.
199. In one of the most dramatic moments of any impeachment, Blount actually was wholly
unaware of the discovery of his conspiracy and actually ran into Adams’s secretary, Samuel B.
Malcolm, as he was bringing the incriminating letter to the Senate floor to be disclosed. See
BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 29; MELTON, supra note 67, at 107-08. Blount asked about the
content of the President’s message, but “Malcolm only replied that the message was secret and
confidential.” MELTON, supra note 67, at 107. When Blount returned to the Senate floor, he
was confronted with the letter, which was read to him. “Blount turned visibly pale as Thomas
Jefferson, the presiding officer, asked him whether he was in fact the letter’s author.” Id. Blount
admitted to being the author. See id.
200. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 152-53.
201. See MELTON, supra note 67, at 125.
202. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 153. This point, however, is debatable since Blount
may have been in violation of the Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381, which made it a crime
to organize a military expedition with a foreign power with which the United States was at
peace, see id. § 5, 1 Stat. at 384; see also Act of March 2, 1797, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 497 (extending the
Act of June 5, 1794, for two years). The articles repeatedly accuse Blount of acting “in violation
of the obligation of neutrality, and against the laws of the United States.” HOUSE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 93d CONG., IMPEACHMENT: SELECTED MATERIALS 126-28 (Comm. Print
1973) [hereinafter SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS]. The Neutrality Act itself was ex-
pressly raised by Attorney General Charles Lee as a possible criminal violation, though no
such charge was ever brought. See MELTON, supra note 67, at 126. This Act remains in effect
and was invoked in the calls for impeachment of President Reagan roughly two hundred years
later. See infra note 378.
203. The actual articles, however, speak of conduct “against the laws of the United States.”
SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 202, at 126.
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peachment of President Clinton. While Blount had few friends in ei-
ther House, members were concerned about the basis for impeaching
an official for conduct undertaken as a private citizen rather than as a
public official.204 This controversy, however, was ultimately resolved
against Blount. In its first impeachment, the House established that it
did not view the public/private distinction to be determinative.
Rather, the articles of impeachment repeatedly stressed that Blount’s
conduct was inappropriate given his position as a Senator of the
United States. The House then voted to impeach an official for the
first time in the history of the United States.205 This was done with ex-
tremely limited factfinding and without a committee investigation.
All of the House managers at the Senate trial were Federalists,
though one Republican had been elected.206 The first formal referral
to the Senate began with the following statement of Representative
Samuel Sitgreaves in the well of the Senate:
Mr. President: I am commanded, in the name of the House of Rep-
resentatives, and of all the people of the United States, to impeach
William Blount, a Senator of the United States, of high crimes and
misdemeanors; and to acquaint the Senate that the House of Repre-
sentatives will, in due time, exhibit particular articles against him,
and make good the same. I am further commanded to demand that
the said William Blount be sequestered from his seat in the Senate;
and that the Senate do take order for his appearance to answer the
said impeachment.207
The Senate was quick to respond to the referral. In fact, adopt-
ing a technique that would be repeated by House managers,208 the
Federalists pushed for a quick trial against the more proceduralist
Republicans.209 The Senate promulgated the first set of rules for Sen-
204. See MELTON, supra note 67, at 115.
205. See BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 30.
206. One House manager, Abraham Baldwin, was a Republican but opted out of the duty
with the acquiescence of the House. See MELTON, supra note 67, at 161.
207. Id. at 119-20.
208. In Senate trials of officials like Andrew Johnson, House managers pushed unsuccess-
fully for quick trials to secure conviction and to limit any attrition of Senate votes. See infra
notes 417-20 and accompanying text.
209. See MELTON, supra note 67, at 165. The Federalists pushed for a broad interpretation
of impeachment authority in anticipation of the trial. Jefferson and the Republicans objected in
favor of a strict construction of the language. Jefferson expected the Federalists to declare:
[N]ot only officers of the State governments, but every private citizen of the United
States are impeachable. Whether they will think this the time to make the declara-
tion, I know not; but if they bring it on, I think there will be not more than two votes
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ate investigations and trials. Blount was formally called to appear
(despite the fact that he was known to be in Knoxville, Tennessee), a
tradition that would be followed in later trials, such as President An-
drew Johnson’s.210
One of the issues that was resolved in this first impeachment
trial was whether, under the Sixth Amendment, impeached officials
were entitled to a jury.211 The Republicans were particularly con-
cerned about this point, and Thomas Jefferson viewed the issue as of
paramount importance.212 Jefferson was generally uncomfortable with
impeachment procedures, and he viewed the jury issue as a possible
limit on partisan cases.213 Interestingly, this jury debate was the last
effort to impose aspects of the Virginia impeachment process, which
failed in the Constitutional Convention, on the federal system.214 The
Senate, however, correctly rejected this argument and created lasting
precedent for Senate juries.
north of the Potomac against the universality of the impeaching power.
BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 30 (footnote omitted).
210. See infra notes 421-23 and accompanying text.
211. Blount’s defense attorney, Alexander Dallas, also argued that impeachment was re-
stricted to presidential candidates and was designed exclusively “to check executive abuses of
power.” MELTON, supra note 67, at 216. Dallas was described as “‘the most violent Republican
of all lawyers at the Bar.’” BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 330 n.8 (quoting 1 CHARLES
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 298 (2d ed. 1926).
212. The case of Blount was advanced in the Senate by Jefferson’s close friend, Virginia
Senator Henry Tazewell. Tazewell argued the jury issue at Jefferson’s strong urging. See Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Tazewell, in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 195
(Paul L. Ford ed., 1896). Jefferson wrote to Madison on the issue, but Madison responded that
he was not persuaded that there was a need for the added procedural protection. Madison sim-
ply responded that “[m]y impression has always been that impeachments were somewhat sui
generis, and excluded the use of Juries.” Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, in 17
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 88 (David B. Mattern et al. eds., 1991). For a discussion of
this trial, see MELTON, supra note 67; see also Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Federal Impeachment
and Criminal Procedure: The Framers’ Intent, 52 MD. L. REV. 437, 441-57 (1993) (discussing
the Jefferson and Madison letters).
213. The irony of Jefferson’s discomfort cannot be ignored given his support for highly par-
tisan uses of impeachment during his own term in office to rid the courts of Federalist judges.
See infra notes 255-57, 265 and accompanying text.
Jefferson’s role is interesting in another respect. In accounts of the Blount conspiracy,
Jefferson appears in one of the critical meetings with Blount and two other conspirators for in-
vasion, General James Wilkinson and John Chisholm. See MELTON, supra note 67, at 96. Jef-
ferson was a strong advocate of expansion, particularly expansion to assume control of New
Orleans. See id. Federalists suspected that Jefferson was involved in the conspiracy. See id. at
117 n.31 (citing newspaper accounts speculating about Jefferson’s involvement).
214. This was not lost on the Senate, which reviewed the various state systems and discov-
ered that only Virginia followed a judicial rather than a political approach to the process. See
id. at 177.
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Predictably, one of Blount’s main defenses was that he was not a
civil officer. While, as noted above, English impeachments included
members of the House of Lords, the American variation had nar-
rowed the scope of subject individuals. Now, the Senate faced a for-
mer official from the legislative branch. The prosecutors insisted that
“civil officers” excluded only military officers.215 After a full debate,
the Senate voted against this argument and affirmed the principle
that legislative officials are not civil officers subject to impeach-
ment.216 It is noteworthy that this final vote included seven Federalists
who joined every Republican in defeating the impeachment.217 The
final words of the drama must have pleased Jefferson, given his op-
position to the impeachment:
The Court, after having given the most mature and serious consid-
eration to the question, and to the full and able arguments urged on
both sides, has come to the decision which I am now about to de-
liver.
The Court is of the opinion that the matter alleged in the plea of the
defendant is sufficient in law to show that this Court ought not to
hold jurisdiction of the said impeachment, and that the impeachment
is dismissed.218
The Blount verdict was a critical victory for the Madisonian sys-
tem. At a time of the most extreme political conditions, the Senate
trial proved its ability to fashion compromise and settlement among
factional groups. Almost half of the Federalists would join the Re-
publicans in terminating the case. A simple partisan vote could have
secured a conviction that would have had the appearance of the Re-
publicans’ attempting to protect a foreign intriguer and conspirator.
Nothing inflamed public opinion more in the early 1800s than con-
spiracy with the British respecting an invasion. Since Blount was a
fallen-away Federalist turned Republican, it is astonishing that the
Federalists could resist such impulses.
The Senate trial proved transformative for the members who
had received the case amid intense factional conditions. The House
was intent on impeachment and dissatisfied with the initial action of
the Senate. These factional passions were so high that, during the
215. See id. at 209-21.
216. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2318 (1799).
217. All of the 11 votes to proceed, therefore, were cast by Federalist senators.
218. MELTON, supra note 67, at 232 (footnote omitted).
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House proceedings, repeated physical confrontations occurred on the
floor.219 Following formal impeachment, however, the Senate exer-
cised a degree of discretion and restraint that was at odds with the
public sentiment. The impeachment of Blount would have mirrored
the English model in scope and threatened the integrity of the tripar-
tite system. Over the course of the debates and testimony, the Senate
trial performed as Hamilton and others had hoped in the Constitu-
tional Convention.220
The Blount decision was as important legally as it was politically;
a conviction would have made all legislative figures subject to im-
peachment, as under the English model. More importantly, it would
have inaugurated impeachment as a raw political tool.221 Whereas the
last colonial impeachment in the Oliver case was used as a factional
weapon, the first constitutional impeachment in the Blount case was
used to reach factional settlement. Unlike Oliver, no backlash or
public outcry ensued. Although factional turmoil would continue, the
Blount conspiracy and controversy gradually faded with the Senate
vote.222
219. These confrontations occurred between Federalist Roger Griswold of Connecticut and
Republican Matthew Lyon of Vermont. Lyon commented in Griswold’s presence that he could
easily prompt revolution in Connecticut, to which Griswold suggested that he “had better wear
[his] wooden sword.” MELTON, supra note 67, at 160. This was a reference to the story that
General Horatio Gates had forced Lyon to wear a wooden sword as a mark of cowardice dur-
ing the war. Lyon responded by spitting in Griswold’s face, creating an outburst. Later, when
Republicans voted down a motion to expel Lyon, Griswold beat Lyon with a stick. Lyon re-
sponded by grabbing the chamber fire tongs and attacking Griswold. See id. at 160-61.
220. The Federalists actually considered impeachment of legislative officials and rejected
the need for such a check in the Constitution. Madison noted that this makes the President
more dangerous than legislative officers with the same failings:
The case of the Executive Magistracy was very distinguishable, from that of the Leg-
islative or of any other public body, holding offices of limited duration. It could not
be presumed that all or even a majority of the members of an Assembly would either
lose their capacity for discharging, or be bribed to betray, their trust. Besides the re-
straints of their personal integrity & honor, the difficulty of acting in concert for pur-
poses of corruption was a security to the public. And if one or few members only
should be seduced, the soundness of the remaining members, would maintain the in-
tegrity and fidelity of the body. In the case of the Executive Magistracy which was to
be administrated by a single man, loss of capacity or corruption was more within the
compass of probable events, and either of them might be fatal to the Republic.
1 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 66.
221. Notably, the Senate did not question that impeachment could be used against a civil
officer after leaving office (to disqualify him from future officeholding).
222. Blount himself was not ostracized in Tennessee and is described as popular upon his
return. However, the trial appeared to have taken its toll, since he became ill soon after his re-
turn and died a year later. See MELTON, supra note 67, at 235-36.
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2. The Belknap Case. The Blount decision established the
exclusion of legislative members from the jurisdiction of Senate
trials. The Senate, however, would deal with a second defining case in
the impeachment of the Secretary of War, General William Belknap,
the only subordinate executive officer ever impeached.223 Belknap
was accused of accepting bribes at a time when corruption was a
national scandal.
Belknap was tried in the aftermath of the Civil War. The Grant
administration was riddled with corruption and scandals ranging from
the St. Louis Whiskey Ring scandal to the Credit Mobilier scandal.224
In 1870, the Democrats opposing Grant had blocked his nominations
on a partisan basis and had called hearings on the various bribery
scandals.225 The Belknap trial would occur at the apex of a period of
intense factional politics: “The period of 1828 until Grant left office
in 1877 was one of bitter partisanship, marked by the grosser forms of
political patronage and spoils. Appointments were influenced greatly
by political consideration, and the action of the Senate was fully as
political as that of the President.”226
The Belknap scandal would unleash the growing public outrage
over corruption, including suggestions that Grant’s brother Orvil was
involved in the Belknap corruption.227 When an investigation of cor-
ruption in military contracts uncovered Belknap’s kickbacks,
Belknap moved quickly to avoid the inevitable public outcry resulting
from his conviction. Just two hours before his impeachment, Belknap
resigned. On March 2, 1876, the House went ahead and impeached
the former cabinet member, just as it had impeached former Senator
Blount.228 With Belknap, however, there was no question that, as a
cabinet member, he was subject to impeachment as a civil officer.
223. See Michael J. Broyde & Robert A. Schapiro, Impeachment and Accountability: The
Case of the First Lady, 15 CONST. COMMENTARY 479, 488 (1998).
224. See Richard T. Cooper, Second Term a Rare and Risky Task, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14,
1996, at A1.
225. See Orrin G. Hatch, Save This Court from What?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1347, 1351
(1986).
226. David J. Danelski, Ideology as a Ground for the Rejection of the Bork Nomination, 84
NW. U. L. REV. 900, 907 (1990) (citing JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE
SENATE 303 (1953)).
227. See Michael Farquhar, And Now for Some More Sibling Revelry: A Brief History of
Crime, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1993, at F1.
228. See BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 169.
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The only question was whether a former cabinet member remained a
“civil officer” for the purposes of impeachment.229
When Belknap’s case was exhibited to the Senate by the House
managers, it was framed as articles of impeachment against “William
W. Belknap, late Secretary of War.”230 That first sentence would
prove the entirety of the issue for a minority, but a determinative
number, of senators. The managers, however, presented five articles
of impeachment detailing alleged bribes231 largely related to a trading
post at Fort Sill which supported the cavalry companies in the Indian
territory.232 After such figures as General George Armstrong Custer
testified against Belknap,233 the House managers demanded that
Belknap be called so that he “[could] be put to answer the high
crimes and misdemeanors in office . . . and that such proceedings, ex-
aminations, trials, and judgments may be thereupon had and given as
may be agreeable to law and justice.”234
The case of the House managers against Belknap was already
quite detailed when it arrived at the Senate owing to an investigation
by the House Ways and Means Committee.235 Nevertheless, the trial
lasted five months.236 The Senate responded to the public outcry with
a full trial that included witnesses who detailed the evidence of cor-
ruption.
The ensuing debate eventually turned to the purpose of im-
peachment when removal no longer remains a possible remedy upon
conviction. This point was addressed by the Chair of the House Judi-
ciary Committee, Representative J. Proctor Knott:
Was the only purpose of this disqualification simply to preserve the
Government from the danger to be apprehended from the single
convicted criminal? Very far from it, sir! That in reality constituted
but a very small part of the design. The great object, after all, was
that his infamy might be rendered conspicuous, historic, eternal, in
order to prevent the occurrence of like offenses in the future. The
purpose was not simply to harass, to persecute, to wantonly degrade,
229. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1828.
230. SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 202, at 143.
231. These bribes included a $6000 per year payment and $1500 for other appointments.
See id. at 145-48; see also BRANT, supra note 164, at 155.
232. See SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 202, at 145-48.
233. See Farquhar, supra note 227, at F1.
234. SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 202, at 148.
235. See Broyde & Schapiro, supra note 223, at 489; Feerick, supra note 24, at 36.
236. See BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 188.
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or take vengeance upon a single individual; but it was that other of-
ficials through all time might profit by his punishment, might be
warned by his political ostracism, by the ever-lasting stigma fixed
upon his name by the most august tribunal on earth, to avoid the
dangers upon which he wrecked, and withstand the temptations un-
der which he fell; to teach them that it they should fall under like
temptations they will fall, like Lucifer, never to rise again.237
Belknap’s lawyers challenged the impeachment before the Sen-
ate on jurisdictional grounds, hoping for a result like the Blount deci-
sion. If Belknap could be impeached, they argued, so could any citi-
zen.238 While many members argued that impeachment did not extend
to former officers,239 the majority ruled by a vote of 37-29240 that the
Senate had jurisdiction in such a case.241 After losing this vote,
Belknap was asked to answer the articles of impeachment, which he
refused to do.242 Ultimately, only two senators believed Belknap was
innocent, but roughly two dozen had doubts about the jurisdictional
decision.243 The final vote was 37-25 on the closest article.244 This was
237. PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE SITTING FOR THE TRIAL OF WILLIAM W. BELKNAP 203
(1876) (statement of Rep. Knott) [hereinafter BELKNAP PROCEEDINGS]; see also Broyde &
Schapiro, supra note 223, at 489 (noting that the House managers believed that “impeachment
branded the wrongdoers with a permanent mark of shame and provided an important deterrent
to others who might yield to the temptations of tyranny or corruption”).
238. See 3 HINDS, supra note 143, §2007, at 313.
239. The senators exchanged extremely thoughtful written statements on the dangers and
purpose of impeachment. See BRANT, supra note 164, at 160 (noting that 24 senators submitted
written opinions on the underlying constitutional questions). This debate repeatedly touched
on the English model and the need to avoid the factional abuses of impeachment and attainder.
For example, Republican Senator Frederick T. Frelinghuysen of New Jersey warned:
The procedure of impeachment was imported into our Constitution from the com-
mon parliamentary law of England, but it was placed there clipped and pruned of
very many of its baneful incidents. Impeachment, associated with bills of attainder
and of pains and penalties and ex post facto laws, was made in Great Britain an in-
strument of political persecution and partisan aggrandizement. It was through those
agencies that the grossest injustice was perpetuated in the name of law, that men of
political power were destroyed, that families of influence were blotted out, and that
their estates were confiscated to become a reward to those who persecuted those
who owned them.
Id. at 157 (quoting Sen. Frederick T. Frelinghuysen).
240. It is interesting that Belknap’s counsel would later object that this vote should have
ended the trial because a two-thirds rule should apply to such a jurisdictional issue. Since less
than two-thirds voted in favor of jurisdiction, it was claimed that the continuation to verdict was
unconstitutional. See 3 HINDS, supra note 143, §2461, at 936-37; Feerick, supra note 24, at 36-37
(1970). The Senate wisely rejected this argument.
241. See 3 HINDS, supra note 143, §§ 2459-60, at 934-35.
242. See Feerick, supra note 24, at 37.
243. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A
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only four votes short of conviction. Accordingly, Belknap was saved
by two senators who believed that jurisdictional barriers prevented
conviction.245 Fourteen Republicans defected to vote for conviction.246
The most important aspect of the Belknap case was not his nar-
row escape but the trial itself. Members of both parties ultimately
concluded that a trial of Belknap was needed as a corrective political
measure. If impeachment was simply a matter of removal, the argu-
ment for jurisdiction in the Belknap case would be easily resolved
against hearing the matter. The Senate majority, however, was cor-
rect in its view that impeachments historically had extended to for-
mer officials, such as Warren Hastings.247
Impeachment, as demonstrated by Edmund Burke,248 serves a
public value in addressing conduct at odds with core values in a soci-
ety.249 At a time of lost confidence in the integrity of the government,
the conduct of a former official can demand a political response. This
response in the form of an impeachment may be more important than
a legal response in the form of a prosecution. Regardless of the out-
come, the Belknap trial addressed the underlying conduct and af-
firmed core principles at a time of diminishing faith in government.
Absent such a trial, Belknap’s rush to resign would have succeeded in
barring any corrective political action to counter the damage to the
system caused by his conduct. Even if the only penalty is disqualifica-
tion from future office, the open presentation of the evidence and
witnesses represents the very element that was missing in colonial
impeachments. Such a trial has a political value that runs vertically as
a response to the public and horizontally as a deterrent to the execu-
tive branch.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 52 (1996). Only one senator failed to give his
reason for voting against conviction. See BRANT, supra note 164, at 160.
244. There were majority votes in favor of conviction on all five articles ranging from 35 to
37. See 3 HINDS, supra note 143, §2467, at 945.
245. The 22 Senate votes for acquittal on jurisdictional grounds were just slightly above the
one-third vote needed.
246. See BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 186.
247. One representative, John Rutledge, Jr., actually had attended part of the Hastings trial
as a young man. See MELTON, supra note 67, at 114-15.
248. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3, at 790; supra notes 73-76 and ac-
companying text.
249. Moreover, the disqualification of officials from holding later offices serves a clear con-
tinuing interest in an impeachment trial. The legitimacy questions underlying impeachment
trials are directed at the officeholder and not the office. If a former officeholder has proven to
be a disgrace or lawbreaker, the public has an interest in resolving the legitimacy questions
and, when appropriate, barring the individual from further positions of public trust.
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B. Impeachments of Judicial Officers
Factionalism in the impeachment process was most evident in
the judicial cases.250 These judicial cases reflected a trend toward
more bipartisan trials, though factional interests continued to be evi-
dent in modern cases. The partisan judicial trials are interesting for
the purposes of this Article precisely because they were so partisan.
These trials served the same function as presidential controversies in
funneling factional disputes into a political adjudicatory process.
These cases were often the result of considerable local debate over a
judge’s legitimacy to carry out his constitutional duties.
The Senate trials allowed for the most serious cases to be heard
in a responsive political process. This was central for the legitimacy of
the system as a representative government. Even in the most political
and factionalized trials, a dialogic element was often present either in
its verdict or its aftermath. If agreement on a verdict was not always
politically attainable, the Senate trials periodically forged consensus
on correcting the underlying conduct in future cases. These Senate
trials served to review judicial conduct, rather than the judges them-
selves. Despite acquittals or convictions along partisan lines, there
was often agreement on strengthening emerging values such as judi-
cial neutrality. Some cases led to new laws and ethical canons to ad-
dress ambiguous issues. These cases also reflect the importance of le-
gitimacy questions in impeachment by the House and in the
deliberations of the Senate.
Judicial officers were impeached on a variety of crimes and mis-
deeds. Notably, some of these offenses were neither criminal nor of-
ficial acts. Judges often came to the Senate in the midst of raging con-
troversy with highly diminished authority in carrying out their duties.
Most importantly, these cases show that, even in the most raw and vi-
cious political periods, impeachment and removal authority was not
abused as a standard political tool, despite the ability of dominant
parties to do so.
Almost immediately after the ratification of the Constitution,
impeachment procedures were used against various judicial offi-
cers.251 This was accelerated after the Federalists were replaced in
250. For an individual review of the judicial impeachments and terminated impeachment
cases, see Turley, The Executive Function Theory, supra note 3.
251. Thirteen judges have been impeached in history. These judges are: (1) John Pickering
(1804), District of New Hampshire; (2) Justice Samuel Chase (1805), U.S. Supreme Court; (3)
James H. Peck (1830), District of Missouri; (4) West H. Humphreys (1862), Eastern, Middle,
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power by the Republicans. Eager to rid the bench of Federalist
judges, President Jefferson and his allies looked to the impeachment
process. The first judicial officer selected for impeachment, however,
offered considerable nonpolitical basis for removal.
John Pickering was actually placed on the federal bench while a
state impeachment was pending to remove him from his position as
Chief Justice of the New Hampshire courts.252 The grounds for the
state impeachment were virtually identical to the later federal im-
peachment and quite simple: Pickering was rather obviously de-
ranged.253 Even Pickering’s good friend, Federalist Senator William
Plumer of New Hampshire, described Pickering as possessing an
“abnormal mentality” that would lead him “to seek seclusion at peri-
odic intervals” and as having such open phobias as travelling over wa-
ter.254 Nevertheless, Federalists put Pickering on the federal bench,
where his conduct grew more extreme. At the urging of President
Jefferson,255 Pickering was impeached on the grounds that he ignored
legal precedents and failed to exhibit the necessary virtues for hold-
ing the office of a judicial officer.256 Article Four of the articles of im-
peachment addressed this legitimacy concern:
That whereas for the due, faithful, and impartial administration of
justice, temperance and sobriety are essential qualities in the charac-
ter of a judge; and the said John Pickering, being a man of loose
morals and intemperate habits, on the 11th and 12th days of No-
vember, in the year 1802, being then judge of the district court, in
and Western Districts of Tennessee; (5) Mark H. Delahay (1872), District of Kansas; (6) Char-
les H. Swayne (1905), Northern District of Florida; (7) Robert W. Archbald (1913), U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit (and judge by designation for the U.S. Commerce Court); (8)
George W. English (1925), Eastern District of Illinois; (9) Harold Louderback (1932), North-
ern District of California; (10) Halsted L. Ritter (1936), Southern District of Florida; (11)
Harry Claiborne (1986), District of Nevada; (12) Alcee L. Hastings (1989), Southern District of
Florida; and (13) Walter L. Nixon, Jr. (1989), District of Mississippi.
Of this number, only seven were actually removed by Congress from the bench.  They
were John Pickering in 1804, West Humphreys in 1862, Robert Archbald in 1913, Halsted Rit-
ter in 1936, Harry Claiborne in 1986, Alcee Hastings in 1989, and Walter Nixon in 1989. Four
impeached judges were acquitted by the Senate. They were James Peck in 1830; Samuel Chase
in 1805; Charles Swayne in 1905; and Harold Louderback in 1932. Two impeached judges re-
signed before the completion of any Senate trial. They were Mark Delahay in 1872 and George
English in 1925. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1821-37.
252. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 207.
253. See id.
254. Id..
255. See BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 45.
256. In his madness, Pickering’s response was to demand the right of “trial by battle” and to
challenge Jefferson to a duel. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 212.
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and for the district of New Hampshire, did appear on the bench of
said court, for the administration of justice, in a state of total intoxi-
cation, produced by the free and intemperate use of intoxicating liq-
uors; and did then and there frequently, in a most profane and inde-
cent manner, invoke the name of the Supreme Being, to the evil
example of all good citizens of the United States; and was then and
there guilty of other high misdemeanors, disgraceful to his own
character as a judge, and degrading to the honor of the United
States.257
After a two-month delay following impeachment, Pickering’s
trial lasted eight days. At trial, John Quincy Adams and other Feder-
alists insisted that Pickering was insane and that any Senate trial
should be delayed until he possessed the mental capacity to appear
before the Senate.258 Even Pickering’s own son, in arguing against re-
moval, acknowledged that his father, who did not appear at the trial,
was deranged. Pickering’s son Jacob actually raised insanity as a de-
fense, arguing that, at the time of the specific instances of miscon-
duct,259 his father was “altogether incapable of transacting any kind of
business which requires the exercise of judgment, or the faculties of
reason; and, therefore . . . is incapable of corruption of judgement, no
subject of impeachment, or amenable to any tribunal for his ac-
tions.”260 In a trial with Vice President Aaron Burr presiding and John
Quincy Adams serving as defense counsel, the Senate tried the judge
in an atmosphere of sharp political division between the Federalists
and Republicans. Despite his insanity, Pickering was seen by Feder-
alists as part of a wider conspiracy encompassing their now-bitter
Republican enemies. Plumer insisted that “[t]he removal of the
Judges, and the destruction of the independence of the judicial de-
partment, has been an object on which Mr. Jefferson had long been
resolved, at least even since he has been in office.”261
The Senate trial brought these factional disputes into the open.262
The defense’s argument was based almost entirely on the Senate’s
257. Id. at 209 (quoting 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 353 (1803)).
258. See BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 48.
259. The most specific instance involved the case of United States v. Brig Eliza, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 113 (1812), a confiscation case. In this case, Pickering simply refused to apply the Cus-
tom Duty Act of 1789 in favor of the United States.
260. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 214 (footnote and internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
261. BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 44 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
262. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1821-22.
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discretionary authority to suspend a trial in order to allow for the ac-
cused to appear when legally capable. Nevertheless, while charges
like the handling of a confiscation case raised issues best addressed
by the testimony of the accused, the thrust of the impeachment ap-
peared to be a question of competence and legitimacy. Pickering’s
conduct rendered the authority of his court a mockery and a public
scandal. No crime was alleged, only conduct sufficiently outrageous
to demand a second public determination on the legitimacy of his
continuation in office.263 Thus, if Pickering was selected by the Re-
publicans as an initial case to open the door for judicial impeach-
ments of Federalist judges, they chose wisely. Pickering was con-
victed by a vote of 19-7, with one Federalist defecting to vote for
conviction.264
While the Republicans were pursuing Pickering in the Senate,
they were preparing for a far more significant Federalist impeach-
ment in the House. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase was de-
spised by Republicans and was on the top of all Republican lists for
removal.265 Like Pickering, Chase supplied grounds for his impeach-
ment through clearly intemperate and political conduct as a judge.
Chase appeared biased and abusive in court sessions, and he pursued
critics of the Federalists by various means, including the abusive use
of grand juries to go after Republican publishers266 and other citi-
zens.267 These incidents were far more than simply acts of an irascible
iconoclast. They were serious abuses made even worse by Chase’s
open contempt for the suggestion that his power was limited in such
matters.268 The articles of impeachment included allegations of an ar-
ray of individuals pursued by Chase, allegations of Chase’s abuse of
the grand jury, and allegations that his conduct was “highly disgrace-
263. Ironically, Pickering could have argued that his Senate appointment was based on full
disclosure and consent, since he had already been subject to state impeachment proceedings for
similar conduct before his appointment.
264. See BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 52.
265. See generally Presser & Hurley, supra note 189.
266. The focus of Chase’s greatest anger was James Callender, who was a muckraking jour-
nalist with a deep dislike for Federalists. Callender often made modern tabloids appear tame in
comparison. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1858-60. Callender would
repeatedly earn the ire of the Framers. It was Callender who would later publish the details of
Hamilton’s affair with Maria Reynolds and the alleged impeachable offenses during his term as
Secretary of the Treasury. See id. (discussing the Hamilton affair and contesting the suggestion
of criminal acts by Hamilton).
267. See SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 202, at 133.
268. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1823.
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ful to the character of a judge.”269 The articles of impeachment were
given to the Senate on December 7, 1804. With Vice President Aaron
Burr again presiding,270 the Senate trial began on February 4, 1805.
Many of the same threshold issues raised in earlier cases like Blount
and Pickering were repeated in the Chase trial, including the need for
an impeachable act to be criminal.271 After a spirited defense and two
weeks of presentations, the final vote largely followed party lines, al-
though a sufficient number of Republicans defected to allow Chase
to escape removal.272 Chase’s trial often followed a “dangerous ten-
dency” argument as the basis for impeachment, along with the corre-
sponding suggestion that the public desired removal.273 The basis for
the defections can only remain a point of speculation. However,
given how recently the Pickering case had been decided, it is unlikely
that there was a change in the definition of impeachable offenses by
the Senate. If these senators viewed the question as one of “danger-
ous tendency,” Chase had already indicated an intention to modify
his conduct while contesting the technical grounds for impeach-
ments.274 Certainly, Pickering’s mental instability eliminated any
meaningful modification of his conduct on the bench. For whatever
reason, the Senate process proved sufficient to alter the powerful fac-
tional views of these members. The Chase trial allowed for a full
presentation of evidence and argument. The seven articles of im-
peachment were presented to the Senate on December 7, 1804, and
Chase’s personal answer to the charges on the Senate floor began on
January 4, 1805. The trial lasted until March 1, 1805. Over the course
of the trial, factional pressures had receded to the point where only
three of the articles received majorities and not even the most ardent
Republican voted for one of the articles.275 It was the greatest test of
the bicameral impeachment process in the most factional period of
269. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 236.
270. Burr’s presence added a rather bizarre element to the trial, since he was a fugitive at
the time after killing Alexander Hamilton in a duel at Weehawken, New Jersey, in the preced-
ing summer. At the time, there were two state indictments outstanding against Burr. Burr’s per-
formance as presiding judge at the trial was criticized by Chase’s defenders, who accused Burr
of harassing Chase when the Justice addressed the Senate. See id. at 238.
271. See BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 87.
272. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 253.
273. This dangerous tendency was evident in early English impeachments, in which judges
abused their authority over litigants or jurors. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
274. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19, at 241.
275. The fifth article, dealing with Chase’s actions in the Callender affair, did not receive a
single vote. See id. at 253.
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the Senate’s history. Faced with credible charges against a highly
visible and despised Federalist, the Senate trial produced a limited
but determinative change in factional interests.
The early judicial cases demonstrate the value of Senate trials in
dealing with intense factional pressures. Such conditions were at their
apex during the trial of Judge James Peck of the District Court of
Missouri in 1831.276 Peck was impeached at a time when the federal
courts were unpopular with both the public and with Congress.277
Peck faced a Congress overwhelmingly controlled by Jacksonian
Democrats, who were highly antagonistic to Peck’s decisions on land
policies and who demanded greater removal authority over all fed-
eral judges. Professor Bushnell suggests in her study that Peck was
the chosen target of this intense hostility.278 Peck was impeached for
ordering the arrest, incarceration, and suspension of an attorney who
simply criticized one of his decisions in a local newspaper.279 The
House managers included the entire letter with the article of im-
peachment, which accused Peck of actions “to the great disparage-
ment of public justice, the abuse of judicial authority, and to the sub-
version of the liberties of the people of the United States.”280 The trial
lasted from May 4, 1830, until January 31, 1831. Once again, despite a
highly charged factional environment, the Jacksonians allowed for a
full presentation of evidence on both sides. The result was transfor-
mative. The Senate soon faced the problem that common law con-
tempt was highly uncertain in its scope and use. Peck insisted that
Luke Lawless, the attorney whom he had incarcerated, was properly
held in contempt and was trying to influence cases awaiting jury deci-
sions.281 While the Democrats voted overwhelmingly for impeach-
ment in the House, Democratic senators gradually defected over the
course of the long trial. Peck was acquitted, with fifteen Democrats
defecting (roughly half of the majority party).282 The vote, however,
276. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1824-26.
277. See BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 91.
278. See id.
279. Judge Peck’s defense counsel was none other than Daniel Webster. See WALTER
EHRLICH, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 55 (1974).
280. SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 202, at 137-38.
281. The article by Lawless does appear to have been a highly inaccurate account. For a
discussion of his case, see Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1824-25.
282. Professor Daniel Pollitt concludes that the acquittal was due to the fact that “judicial
abuse alone was not an impeachable offense.” Daniel H. Pollitt, Sex in the Oval Office and
Cover-up Under Oath: Impeachable Offense?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 259, 272 (1999). This conclusion,
however, is itself subject to debate. See generally Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note
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did not necessarily reflect a decision that Peck’s conduct did not war-
rant removal.283 Peck’s “tyrannous” treatment of counsel legitimately
raised questions about abuse of an office to pursue personal critics.284
Rather, both senators and House managers agreed that the contempt
authority of federal courts was dangerously undefined.285 Accord-
ingly, after the acquittal, a federal contempt law was enacted with bi-
partisan support to establish clear lines for future cases.286 The Peck
case also demonstrated the ability of a Senate trial to partially re-
deem a challenged judge. Peck’s acquittal was later described as suf-
ficient to “‘end[] the great humiliation which had hung over Judge
Peck for almost five years . . . .’”287 While a stigma certainly lingered
to some degree, the case was viewed as “a vindication” of the judge,
who returned to his duties.288
Past judicial trials often addressed intense factional interests in
the state or territory of a judge. These factional disputes reflected
questions of legitimacy that had disabling effects for local communi-
ties. One of the most partisan cases was the Senate trial of Judge
Charles Swayne in 1905.289 Swayne’s impeachment was initiated out-
side of Congress, as a result of a resolution sent by the Florida legisla-
ture. Florida legislators objected to a wide range of misconduct, in-
cluding incompetence, residency violations, and corruption.290 The
impeachment also reflected deep political tensions in Florida and the
view of Swayne as carrying out partisan policies of the Republican
administration of President Benjamin Harrison.291 The Swayne case
took one of the longest and most convoluted impeachment paths in
history, over the course of a year and a half. After the initial im-
peachment by the House of Representative, the House again took up
3.
283. This was also analogous to early English cases involving abusive conduct on the bench
by judges. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
284. See JOSEPH BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE: AN INQUIRY INTO BRIBERY AND OTHER
HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 240 (1962).
285. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1825-26.
286. The contempt statute prohibited the use of judicial authority at issue in the Peck case.
See Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487. The statute was enacted at the behest of Chief
House manager and Judiciary Committee Chairman James Buchanan, the future President.
287. BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 112 (quoting the account of Judge Charles B. Davis, a
successor of Peck in what became the Eastern District of Missouri).
288. See id.
289. See 3 HINDS, supra note 143, §§ 2469-85, at 948-80.
290. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1828-29.
291. See BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 192.
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the case and held a post-impeachment debate. Ironically, after this
second debate, the second vote of impeachment was closer than the
first.292 Professor Eleanore Bushnell notes in her impressive historical
account that “[p]arty affiliation emerged as the dominant factor in
this ‘second’ impeachment . . . . The Democrats’ commitment to im-
peaching Swayne, although shared by a few Republicans, became
nearly extinguished by strong, if recently activated, Republican oppo-
sition.”293 Yet, after a long process of debate, a Republican-controlled
House voted to impeach the Republican judge by a 207-178 margin;
four of the seven House managers came from that party. In the Sen-
ate, the Republicans also controlled the majority with fifty-one of the
eighty-two seats. Twelve articles of impeachment were presented,
alleging (with a fair degree of support) a pattern of misconduct by
Swayne.294 Swayne was described as “[a] weak, vain, vicious judge; a
cruel, vengeful, unrelenting judge.”295 It is important to note that,
from the outset, a conviction was viewed as extremely unlikely. Nev-
ertheless, the Senate allowed the managers to present their full case
against Swayne, with twenty-nine witnesses for the prosecution.296
The thirty-four-day Senate trial remained partisan to the end, al-
though defections did occur, with six Republicans voting to convict
the judge.297 Despite the outcome, the Swayne case represented a full
presentation of the allegations of Democrats against Swayne, despite
the control of both houses by the Republicans. The factional pres-
sures in Florida and in Washington were clearly evident, but in both
Houses procedural bipartisanship gave the process legitimacy.
Swayne’s case represented the high-water mark of strong party
identification in judicial impeachments. Unfortunately for Judge
Robert Archbald of the United States Commerce Court, the impor-
tance of party identification had declined by the time he faced similar
292. See id. at 193:
A month earlier it had impeached Charles Swayne by a vote of 198 to 61. This time it
voted 165 yes and 160 no on the charge of filing false expense accounts; yes 162, no
138 for improperly using a private railroad car; yes 159, no 136 for not living in his
district; and agreed, without voting, to impeach Swayne for imposing unlawful sen-
tences for contempt of court.
293. Id.
294. House managers argued that Swayne lacked any continued authority in his community
and further cited “maladministration” as a basis for his removal. See id. at 211.
295. Id.
296. See id. at 200. The majority even supported the managers in critical procedural votes.
See id. at 204.
297. See id. at 212.
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charges in 1913. Although Archbald’s case occurred only ten years
later, it followed the modern model of a largely nonpartisan im-
peachment. Archbald was charged with using his official position to
secure coal leases, accepting loans from litigants, and accepting ques-
tionable gifts.298 The evidence of corruption was strong, but the House
Judiciary Committee emphasized removal as a method of restoring
the integrity of the court system.299 Henry D. Clayton, the Chairman
of the House Judiciary Committee, informed the full House that
Archbald’s “overweening desire to make gainful bargains with par-
ties having cases before him . . . has degraded his high office and has
destroyed the confidence of the public in his judicial integrity.”300
Archbald’s conviction was almost unanimous, with sixty-eight votes
to convict (including almost equal numbers of Democrats and Re-
publicans) and only five votes to acquit.
Archbald’s case reflected the nonpartisan pattern of later im-
peachment decisions. In 1933, the Senate tried and acquitted Judge
Louderback of the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California.301 The Louderback case reflected another trend in
Senate trials: a growing dislike of senators for this constitutional obli-
gation. The Louderback trial would last seventy-six days, with one of
the lowest attendance rates.302 In a bipartisan decision, the charges
against Louderback were found to be wanting, and he was acquitted
by a wide margin.303 While some partisanship was evident,304 the
Louderback decision is consistent with the later Senate trials.305
The nonpartisan pattern had one notable exception: Judge Hal-
sted L. Ritter.306 The case against Judge Ritter can be viewed as a par-
298. See BORKIN, supra note 284, at 221. The article of impeachment receiving the greatest
support in the Senate alleged that Archbald and a partner purchased a culm dump from Erie
Railroad while the railroad was a litigant before him. See BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 221.
299. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1830-31.
300. 3 PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE TRIAL AND IMPEACHMENT OF ROBERT W. ARCHBALD, S. DOC.
NO. 62-1140, at 1682 (1913).
301. Louderback was charged with five articles of impeachment. See SELECTED
IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 202, at 184-87.
302. This is a notable point of comparison with the trials in the 1980s under the Senate Rule
XI procedures. The trials of Claiborne, Hastings, and Nixon lasted less than two weeks.
303. The House managers were only able to secure a majority on one article. See
BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 263.
304. As Professor Bushnell notes, one article did appear to reflect some partisanship, with
Democrats making up “84 percent of those senators who favored conviction.” Id.
305. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1832-33.
306. See id. at 1833-34.
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tisan relapse. Ritter was a Republican appointee of Calvin Coolidge
who found himself at risk in a period of intense partisanship. The
Democratic Party controlled both Houses as part of the New Deal
movement. The public blamed the Republicans for the Depression,
and Congress was outraged by the Supreme Court’s invalidation of
key New Deal programs. It was in this highly factionalized environ-
ment that Ritter found himself accused of tax evasion, bankruptcy ir-
regularities, illegal practices, and allowance of excessive fees in a fed-
eral case.307 The House of Representatives impeached Judge Ritter in
1936. The charges against Judge Ritter were sufficiently controversial
that the House Judiciary Committee had resolved not to impeach.308
The House returned to the impeachment question despite the fact
that “[n]early three years had elapsed between the beginning of the
investigation and the decision to impeach.”309 Professor Bushnell ap-
pears to attribute the Ritter impeachment to interbranch politics:
The [Supreme] Court had found unconstitutional several New Deal
measures advanced by Franklin D. Roosevelt and passed by large
majorities in Congress, an apparent thwarting of the popular
will . . . . Because the House of Representatives had already investi-
gated him in 1933, perhaps Judge Ritter’s impeachment emerged as
a ready-made and quick route for showing the judicial branch that
Congress possessed, and would use, power to chasten it. If so, Ritter
became a victim of the politically dramatic moment, a handy target
only because proceedings, if inconclusive, had been instituted
against him before the deadlock between the Court and the execu-
tive and legislative departments reached lethal proportions.310
307. See SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 202, at 199-200.
308. Judge Ritter unsuccessfully challenged his impeachment. See Ritter v. United States,
84 Ct. Cl. 293 (1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1937).
309. BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 270. Ritter was not unique in the reconsideration of im-
peachment. Judge John Watrous of the District of Texas was subject to a House vote of im-
peachment in 1858, but the House rejected articles of impeachment. Motivated in part by the
encouragement of Senator Sam Houston, the House voted four times to secure votes for im-
peachment but repeatedly failed. See Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignation and Removals: A
History of Federal Judicial Service—And Disservice—1789-1992, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 377
(1993). See generally WALACE HAWKINS, THE CASE OF JOHN C. WATROUS, UNITED STATES
JUDGE FOR TEXAS: A POLITICAL STORY OF HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS (1950). Nor
was the delay unique. Such cases can be found extending back to England, where Sir Robert
Berkley of the King’s Bench stood for impeachment for two years before conviction. See
Feerick, supra note 24, at 7.
310. BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 286. But see Van Tassel, supra note 309, at 378 (“The
assertion that the Ritter impeachment is an example of congressional use of the impeachment
power to intimidate a politically uncooperative judiciary is inconclusive.”).
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There is certainly evidence of a partisan environment. However,
there was support for the allegations, which were sufficient, if proven,
to justify removal.311 Moreover, the Democrats overwhelmingly con-
trolled the Senate and could have convicted on all articles on a
straight party vote. Instead, Democrats allowed an exhaustive pres-
entation of witnesses by Judge Ritter. Defections from both parties
are evident in the final vote. Judge Ritter was acquitted on all articles
of impeachment except the final article.312 This final article was an
omnibus charge that was a combination of the allegations in the ear-
lier rejected articles.313 On the close final article, which passed by one
vote, ten Democrats defected to vote to acquit and seven Republi-
cans defected to vote to convict. After removing Judge Ritter, both
parties then voted unanimously not to disqualify him from further
federal office.314
After the Ritter trial, Congress did not impeach a federal judge
until the 1980s. This fifty-year hiatus has been the source of consider-
able interest to academics, though the record may be deceiving.
Many judges were targeted for impeachment but simply resigned be-
fore formal proceedings were commenced. At least twenty-four
judges have resigned under allegations of wrongdoing,315 seven of
311. Even Judge Ritter admitted to errors in judgment, including underreporting income
(which he insisted was de minimis given overpayment in other areas). See BUSHNELL, supra
note 193, at 279.
312. See 80 CONG. REC. 5602-06 (1936).
313. See id. at 5606. However, the Ritter case was not without some support, and the un-
derlying allegations were certainly sufficient to justify, if proven, removal. The conviction of
Ritter was controversial because he was acquitted on the first six articles but convicted on a
seventh omnibus article that consolidated the allegations of the previous articles. This was criti-
cized as undermining the supermajority requirement, since an insufficient number of senators
supported any individual article. There is no requirement, however, for individual articles, de-
spite a compelling fairness argument. More importantly, it is often ignored that in the first arti-
cle, the most serious charge of favoritism and corruption, the House managers only fell one
vote short of conviction. Thus, the omnibus article only produced one additional vote, since
presumably those senators voting to convict on Article 1 were prepared to convict on the same
element in Article 7. See id.
314. See BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 282-83.
315. These judges include: William Stephens (1818), District of Florida; Matthias B. Tall-
madge (1818), District of New York; Thomas Irwin (1859), Western District of Pennsylvania;
Charles Sherman (1873), Northern District of Ohio; Richard Busteed (1874), Middle District of
Alabama; Edward H. Durrell (1874), Eastern District of Louisiana; William Story (1875),
Western District of Arkansas; Peter S. Grosscup (1911), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit; Cornelius H. Hanford (1912), Western District of Washington; Daniel T. Wright
(1914), District of the District of Columbia; John A. Marshall (1915), District of Utah; Kene-
saw M. Landis (1922), Northern District of Illinois; Francis A. Winslow (1929), Southern Dis-
trict of New York; Joseph Buffington (1938), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; Mar-
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them during the interim between the Ritter and Claiborne impeach-
ments.316 Two additional judges, Judge Robert Collins and Judge
Robert Aguilar, resigned after the Claiborne trial.317 This fifty-year
hiatus is misleading not only because of the number of resignations
but also because it creates a somewhat misleading record as to the
view of what constituted removable conduct.318 Judges confronted
with personal scandals appear more likely to resign than to face a
public airing of their intimate affairs.319 Many of these cases dealt not
with issues related to the use of judicial power but with conduct that
brought disrepute upon the office through personal or (non-judicial)
criminal misconduct.320 For example, Judge Herbert Fogel of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania left the bench after he invoked the
Fifth Amendment during grand jury testimony concerning irregular
business activities that preceded his appointment to the bench.321
Likewise, Judge Delahay of the District of Kansas was impeached
tin T. Manton (1939), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Edwin S. Thomas (1939),
District of Connecticut; Albert W. Johnson (1945), Middle District of Pennsylvania; Abe Fortas
(1969), U.S. Supreme Court; Otto Kerner (1974), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit; Herbert A. Fogel (1978), Eastern District of Pennsylvania; Robert Collins (1993), Eastern
District of Louisiana; and Robert Aguilar (1996), Northern District of California. As noted
above, two judges, Mark H. Delahay (1872) and George W. English (1926), resigned after im-
peachment. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1826-27, 1831-32.
316. For a comprehensive and insightful study of these judges, see Van Tassel, supra note
309, at 408. The Borkin study details 55 cases of judicial officers investigated by Congress, in-
cluding 17 resignations, and notes an “undetermined number of judges who resigned upon
mere threat of inquiry.” BORKIN, supra note 284, at 204. Joseph Borkin’s study ends in 1962.
317. Judge Robert Aguilar sat on the District Court of the Northern District of California
and was accused of a variety of criminal conduct including racketeering, disclosure of wiretap
evidence, and attempting to influence a criminal proceeding for a former union official. The
Justice Department pursued Aguilar for seven years. After the first jury deadlocked, the Justice
Department prosecuted him a second time and secured a conviction for obstruction of justice
and disclosing wiretap evidence. He was sentenced to six months in jail, but the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the conviction on the basis of a jury instruc-
tion violation. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 595-97 (1995). Throughout this litiga-
tion, Aguilar retained his title and salary. While both House and Senate members indicated the
likely commencement of impeachment proceedings, no action was taken while the case was on
appeal. In 1996, Judge Aguilar resigned and retained his pension. Although the Court of Ap-
peals was partially reversed by the Supreme Court, see Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 606, the Justice De-
partment agreed to drop further efforts in exchange for the resignation.
318. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1838-44.
319. See id.
320. See id. Such was the case of Judge John Marshall of the United States District Court of
Utah, who resigned in 1915 after he “became enmeshed in a scandal involving the cleaning
woman of his courtroom.” CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY IN UTAH 57
(1988).
321. See Van Tassel, supra note 309, at 385.
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and chose to resign rather than face a Senate trial over “personal
habits.”322 Other judges faced likely impeachment over “habitual
drunkenness” or other embarrassing personal proclivities.323 While
two judges refused to resign even after convictions,324 other federal
judges have resigned shortly before or during impeachment pro-
ceedings.325 For example, Judge Otto Kerner, Jr., of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit resigned before inevitable
impeachment after he was convicted for conduct that preceded his
service.326 These resignations may create the appearance that most
impeachable offenses relate to official misconduct, while in reality
there is evidence of self-selection by judges who resign before im-
peachment proceedings probing personal misconduct.327
Senate trials appear to follow a declining trend of partisanship.
This decline may be due to the fact that the judicial offices are more
professionalized328 and less identified with party agendas.329 Judges
like Pickering had little legal training and did not possess the appro-
priate judicial temperament.330 As law became more professionalized,
322. Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1826-27. This case technically was
terminated in the Senate; by the time the resignation occurred, the case was no longer in the
House.
323. Judge Cornelius Hanford of the Western District of Washington was facing imminent
impeachment when he resigned under allegations that included “being an habitual drunkard”
and “being morally and temperamentally unfit to hold a judicial position.” 6 CLARENCE
CANNON, CANNON’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 526, at 746 (1936).
324. Judge Harry Claiborne continued to accept his judicial salary for two years despite his
incarceration. Likewise, Judge Robert Collins drew his salary for a similar period while in jail.
See Van Tassel, supra note 309, at 337-38.
325. See Jacobus ten Broeck, Partisan Politics and Federal Judgeship Impeachment Since
1903, 23 MINN. L. REV. 185, 185 n.3 (1939); Van Tassel, supra note 309, at 348.
326. Kerner was charged with bribery, fraud, and tax evasion during this term as governor
of Illinois. See United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1131 (7th Cir. 1974).
327. This issue was raised repeatedly during the Clinton trial. The House impeachment de-
bate became a case in point. Confronted with his own personal scandal involving a sexual rela-
tionship, Speaker-designate Bob Livingston announced his intended resignation shortly before
the final vote. It was without question the most dramatic moment of the House proceedings.
Livingston began his speech with a call for President Clinton’s resignation, only to be met with
Democrat members shouting, “You resign!” He then promptly did so and again called upon
President Clinton to do the same. See Robert G. Kaiser, Livingston Resignation Crystallized
Debate, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1998, at A37. President Clinton refused to follow Livingston’s
lead.
328. Many of the early American judges had little formal legal training. John Pickering, for
example, was trained for the ministry rather than the law. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 19,
at 207.
329. For an interesting view on the different perspective of judges from the 1800s, see gen-
erally Presser & Hurley, supra note 189, at 773.
330. Pickering’s background was primarily political and activist. After distinguishing him-
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judges (like lawyers) joined a more professional cadre with stronger
traditions against partisan rulings and conflicts of interest. Moreover,
strong new precedents barred courts from delving into political ques-
tions and encroaching upon First Amendment rights. Perhaps as a re-
sult, modern judicial cases became less controversial and divisive. A
reflection of this change was the creation of Senate Rule XI in 1935,
allowing for trial committees to avoid the need for full Senate trials.331
While challenged as a departure from procedures guaranteeing a full
Senate trial,332 Rule XI reflected a changing Senate with more press-
ing schedules333 and less perceived partisan interest in judicial im-
peachments.334
It would be a mistake, however, to view factional disputes in ju-
dicial impeachments as a matter of historical interest alone. Partisan
interest in judicial impeachments continues in modern cases. In the
1990s, a call for greater use of impeachment for “activist” judges was
heard by Congress in a fashion reminiscent of the Jacksonian Con-
gress.335 While this interest is unlikely to spawn a true trend of parti-
self in the Revolution, he became a leading Federalist in the New Hampshire legislature and
the state ratification convention. He was appointed to the federal bench by George Washington
in 1795.
331. This rule was developed in response to the lack of attendance by senators at these tri-
als. See Fox, supra note 143, at 1275 n.4 (citing 79 CONG. REC. 8309-10 (1935)). Under Rule XI,
the full Senate reviews the findings of the committee.
332. Injunctions were sought to prevent the use of such committees in Hastings v. United
States Senate, Impeachment Trial Comm., 716 F. Supp. 38 (D.D.C. 1989), and in Claiborne v.
United States Senate, No. 86-02780 slip op. (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 1986).
333. See Howell Heflin, The Impeachment Process: Modernizing an Archaic System, 71
JUDICATURE 123, 123-24 (1987). The Senate increasingly viewed impeachments as consuming
precious time with no political return. During the trial of Judge Ritter, only three senators were
at times present at what one manager referred to as “the greatest farce ever presented.” TIME,
Mar. 16, 1936, at 18. In the trial of Judge Louderback, only 20 senators were in attendance on
most occasions. See Rose Auslander, Impeaching the Senate’s Use of Trial Committees, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 68, 78 (1992).
334. Although enacted in 1936, the Senate did not utilize the committee option until the
Claiborne case in 1986. The presentation of evidence and witnesses before the Senate proved
vital in defeating allegations from the House. It is for this reason that the record of Senate trials
after the use of Rule XI committees can be viewed as inimical to the historical role of the Sen-
ate. Before the use of Rule XI, eight trials were held by the Senate. Four impeached officials
were acquitted, representing half of the cases. After the use of Rule XI, three judges were tried,
and all three judges were convicted. Rule XI reduces the personal exposure of senators to the
witnesses and evidence in a way that may facilitate convictions. There is a considerable differ-
ence between seeing a central witness testify and reading an account of the testimony. The use
of the Senate impeachment committee reflects a more routine response to a once intensely par-
tisan role of the Senate.
335. See Peter Baker, Clinton Says Republicans Are ‘Threat’ to Judiciary; Hill GOP Blamed
for ‘Intimidation,’ Delays, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1997, at A6 (discussing calls for impeachment
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san impeachments, there is also continuing evidence of factional is-
sues unrelated to political agendas or party identification. Such was
the case of Judge Alcee Hastings.336 Unlike judges such as Claiborne337
and Collins,338 who continued to receive salaries after they were in-
carcerated,339 Hastings presented the novel issue of a judge who had
been acquitted in a criminal trial.340 After his acquittal, Judge Hast-
ings was subject to a Judicial Conference investigation that led to a
referral for impeachment on the same charges on which he had been
acquitted.341 Judge Hastings was the first federal judge to be subject
to a recommendation for removal by the Conference.342 Judge Hast-
ings argued racist motives in his impeachment, just as he had alleged
such motives during his unsuccessful prosecution.343 He also alleged
of “activist” judges). There was also increased use of “litmus” tests for nominees in the 1980s to
assure greater conservative values on the bench. These litmus tests, however, are still far from
the type of open political entanglements of jurists like Chase.
336. See generally REPORT OF THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMM. ON ARTICLES AGAINST
JUDGE ALCEE L. HASTINGS, S. REP. NO. 101-156 (1989); COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE ALCEE L. HASTINGS, H.R. REP. No. 100-810 (1988).
337. See United States v. Claiborne, 870 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Clai-
borne, 781 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1986).
338. See United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1992).
339. See supra note 334. Collins ultimately resigned when the House indicated that im-
peachment proceedings would begin. In fairness to judges like Collins, these judges have often
argued that they should be entitled to complete their appeals before resignation, a compelling
due process argument. Collins had failed in his appeal when he resigned. See Collins, 972 F.2d
at 1388. Judge Robert Aguilar of the United States District Court for Northern California was
also indicted while on the bench. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 597 (1995).
340. See Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 95 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (affirming the denial of an injunction barring House certification of the Judicial Confer-
ence’s determination that impeachment might be warranted); Hastings v. Judicial Conference
of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (affirming the dismissal of Hastings’s
suit to enjoin an investigation of charges of bribery by the Eleventh Circuit Judicial Confer-
ence).
341. See Alan I. Baron, The Curious Case of Alcee Hastings, 19 NOVA L. REV. 873, 873-75
(1995) (noting that the Judicial Investigating Committee reviewed “approximately 2800 exhib-
its . . . issu[ing] a report which concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that
Hastings had in fact engaged in a corrupt conspiracy with Borders to solicit a bribe”); see also
REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION COMM. TO THE JUDICIAL COUNSEL OF THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT 338-39 (1986).
342. Despite repeated references to the contrary, Hastings was not the first federal judge to
be prosecuted while a sitting judge. Other judges have previously been indicted while in office,
including Judge Martin T. Manton of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit and Judge Albert W. Johnson of the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania in 1939 and 1945, respectively. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note
3, at 1839 n.238.
343. Hastings was the first African-American appointed to the Florida federal bench, and
the racism charges received considerable media attention at the time of his impeachment. See
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that the government was pursuing him for making “decisions adverse
to the government.”344 The Hastings investigation in the House in-
cluded dozens of witnesses during the roughly twenty days for the
presentation of evidence and pretrial motions.345 Ultimately, Judge
Hastings was convicted on eight of the seventeen articles of im-
peachment referred to the Senate.346 The racism charges created fac-
tions within the African-American community;347 however, during the
impeachment and trial, African-American legislators came forward
to call for removal in a critical public showing.348 While Judge Hast-
ings’s allegation of racism proved unconvincing in the Senate, it was
more compelling in the Florida district in which he secured a House
seat after his removal.349
What is interesting about the Hastings case is the importance of
the Senate trial in dealing with the factional dispute over racism in
the prosecution and later impeachment of the judicial officer. Judge
Hastings proved a compelling figure in the Senate trials, and many
Americans believed his claims of racial animus. If Judge Hastings was
to continue on the bench, however, the allegations of criminal acts
Harry T. Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining “Good Behavior” for Federal
Judges, 87 MICH. L. REV. 765, 768 n.24 (1989) (citing various media stories on the racism
charges).
344. Steven W. Gold, Note, Temporary Criminal Immunity for Federal Judges: A Constitu-
tional Requirement, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 699, 701 n.11 (1987).
345. Hastings himself chose not to testify in the House. Hastings was allowed to make an
opening statement without taking questions, but then opted on the advice of counsel not to tes-
tify in the House. See Baron, supra note 341, at 899.
346. See 135 CONG. REC. 25, 330-34 (1989).
347. See, e.g., Michael J. Ybarra, Racism Charged in Trial of U.S. Judge, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
10, 1989, at A4 (noting that Hastings, who belatedly “added the charge of racism to the already
volatile mix” of the case, described the impeachment trial as a “legal lynching”); Jack Bass,
Why the Alcee Hastings Case Is Still Not Settled, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1993, at C4 (noting that
Hastings took the case to the public as “ultimate proof of the selective prosecution of blacks in
this country”).
348. See, e.g., Bill McAllister, Hastings Backers Accuse Senate of Racism in Vote, WASH.
POST, Oct. 21, 1989, at A4 (discussing factional disputes over the racism charges but noting the
effect of Black members like Rep. John Conyers in supporting impeachment).
349. The Hastings impeachment included the omission of disqualification language in the
impeachment articles. While removal and disqualification have been voted on separately, the
failure to seek disqualification with a removal is conceptually difficult to understand. Both re-
moval and disqualification were viewed in the debates as the natural results of conviction. In
the case of Judge Hastings, if a senator believed him to be guilty of the crimes, it is difficult to
see how he would not be viewed as properly disqualified. Absent the express incorporation of
disqualification in the articles of impeachment, an impeached and convicted official can assume
a new office, including (albeit unlikely) the office from which he was impeached. See Waggoner
v. Hastings, 816 F. Supp. 716, 720 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (ruling that Hastings was not barred from
future offices because of his removal upon impeachment).
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had to be addressed in a public forum. If Judge Hastings convinced
his Senate jurors, he would receive a second vote of consent from the
same body that had appointed him. If he was unsuccessful, citizens
supporting Judge Hastings would witness a process in which his de-
fense was considered and the majority view of the citizens expressed.
The trial was a determination, not of his guilt, but of his legitimacy as
a judicial officer, and this legitimacy was determined in the very fac-
tional environment foreseen by the Framers.
The judicial impeachment cases yield a vast variety of actual
crimes or misdeeds tried under an undefined standard of proof.350
These cases reveal an underlying emphasis on issues of legitimacy
rather than a focus simply on the criminal or official acts.351 Legiti-
macy questions are raised most directly in the form of official acts of
misconduct. Congress, however, has also considered the malicious or
abusive tendency of judicial officers. Such cases can be traced from
the impeachment of John Pickering to those of Samuel Chase, James
Peck, George English, and Charles Swayne. Other cases may deal
with conduct unrelated to judicial office, such as tax evasion in the
case of Judge Claiborne,352 or the personal habits of Judge Delahay.353
350. Virtually every Senate trial has seen some debate over the standard of proof, with the
same outcome. The Senate is not required to review evidence under the “beyond the reason-
able doubt” standard, as preferred by impeached officials. This issue was argued, for example,
in the case of Judge Claiborne. See B. REAMS, JR. & C. GRAY, 5 THE CONGRESSIONAL
IMPEACHMENT PROCESS AND THE JUDICIARY: DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS ON THE
REMOVAL OF FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGE HARRY E. CLAIBORNE doc. 41 (1987). The Senate
rejected this argument 17-75, and the House managers correctly advised each member to apply
the standard that they considered the appropriate basis for their vote. See 132 CONG. REC. 29,
152-53 (1986).
351. This point was not lost on some judges who resigned before impeachment. Even
though these judges insisted on their innocence, they often stressed the inability to exercise ju-
dicial authority when questions regarding their legitimacy to hold office lingered. As noted by
Professor Van Tassel, Judge Francis Winslow justified his resignation during his impeachment
inquiry by saying that “‘his usefulness as a member of the judiciary was . . . impaired’” even if
he was not impeached. Van Tassel, supra note 309, at 367 n.121 (quoting 6 CANNON, supra note
323, §550, at 790-93).
352. In his first trial, Claiborne (like Judge Aguilar later) was not convicted owing to a
hung jury. See United States v. Claiborne, 781 F.2d 1327, 1327 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, C.J.,
dissenting from a denial of rehearing en banc). The Justice Department retried the case, and
Claiborne was convicted by a second jury in the United States District Court for the District of
Nevada for filing a false income tax return. See United States v. Claiborne, 870 F.2d 1463, 1464
(9th Cir. 1989). Claiborne was impeached on four articles, all of which concerned the criminal-
ity of such filings. There was no direct connection between Claiborne’s criminal acts and any
judicial function. Ultimately, Claiborne was convicted on three of the four articles and removed
from office. See generally PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN THE
IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF HARRY E. CLAIBORNE, S. DOC. NO. 99-48 (1986).
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Other cases involved conduct that brought disrepute on the courts,
such as the case of Judge Ritter, who was accused of bringing “his
court into scandal and disrepute, to the prejudice of said court and
public confidence in the administration of justice therein, and to the
prejudice of public respect for and confidence in the federal judici-
ary.”354 Yet, other impeachments involved perjury charges that were
collateral to “official” misconduct, such as the case of Judge Walter
Nixon.355 They all, however, reflect controversies that raise funda-
mental questions of legitimacy and conduct that is viewed as incom-
patible or demeaning to judicial office. This point has been repeat-
edly stressed, as it was in the impeachment of Judge George W.
English.356 English’s impeachable offenses ranged from “tyrannical”
use of office to “gross betrayal of public trust.”357 While Judge Eng-
lish resigned before conviction in 1926, the House Report empha-
sized the use of impeachment as a method for public rebuke or cor-
rective measure distinct from indictment:
A civil officer may have behaved in public so as to bring disgrace
upon himself and shame upon the country and he would continue to
do this until his name became a public stench and yet might not be
subject to indictment under any law of the United States, but he cer-
tainly could be impeached. Otherwise the public would in this and
kindred cases be beyond the protection intended by the Constitu-
tion . . . .
The conduct of Judge English has been of such a character that one
must regard it as reprehensible and tending to bring shame and re-
proach upon the administration of justice and destroy the confidence
of the public in our courts if it be allowed to go unrebuked. . . . No
one reading the record in this case can conclude that this man has
353. See supra note 324; see also Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1826-
27.
354. 80 CONG. REC. 5606 (1936).
355. Nixon was indicted on one count of bribery and three counts of perjury. See Nixon v.
United States, 703 F. Supp. 538, 543 (S.D. Miss. 1988). Nixon was impeached on the basis of
perjury and conduct bringing disrepute upon the judiciary. See REPORT OF THE IMPEACHMENT
TRIAL COMM. ON THE ARTICLES AGAINST JUDGE WALTER L. NIXON, JR., S. DOC. NO. 101-
164, at 191-95 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-36, at 16 (1989); 135 CONG. REC. 27, 101-03 (1989).
356. English sat on the District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois. He was impeached
for securing personal loans from banks after using the banks to hold bankruptcy funds and
other acts of favoritism in office. See SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 202, at
164-73.
357. Id. at 172-73. English is the only case in which a motion to adjourn was made after the
accused resigned shortly before the trial. See 68 CONG. REC. 344-48 (1926).
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lived up to the standards of our judiciary, nor is be [sic] the personi-
fication of integrity, high honor, and uprightness, as the evidence
presents the picture of the manner in which he discharged the high
duties and exercised the powers of his great office.358
This legitimacy element is evident in both the Senate trials and the
lesser-known cases in which judges resigned before impeachment
proceedings or final impeachment votes.359 Despite their differences,
all of these cases were argued in terms of conduct that deprived the
judges of legitimacy to fulfill their offices and degraded the authority
of these courts.360
The Hastings trial shows the continued potential for factional
disputes in judicial impeachments. The judicial cases demonstrate
how impeachments tend to reflect the divisions of their time. As
Madison observed, factions are inherent in any free society. Factional
issues are still present in these cases; only the subjects of the disputes
have changed. Where party identification was once the dominant
characteristic, factions may now form over a judge’s race or judicial
philosophy.361 Preference changes do not diminish the value of the
Senate trial, which has repeatedly proven effective under the most
extreme factional conditions. Those conditions are the rule rather
358. SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 202, at 164.
359. In at least one case, removal or resignation was not viewed as sufficient by the House.
The allegations of bribery and corruption against Judge Warren Davis of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit were extremely detailed. The scandal involved allega-
tions that Davis had written and sold decisions under the name of another judge, Senior Judge
Joseph Buffington, who is described as “aging, deaf, and nearly blind,” Van Tassel, supra note
309, at 369, and as “helpless and senile,” BORKIN, supra note 284, at 101. Judge Buffington also
resigned. For a discussion of this case, see id. at 97-137. Despite his resignation, Congress con-
tinued impeachment proceedings until Davis agreed to give up his pension. See id. at 120.
360. This nexus between judicial integrity and removal was reinforced by judicial tribunals
who sought the removal of the three judges impeached in the 1980s. See United States v. Nixon,
816 F.2d 1022, 1023-25 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming a judge’s conviction for perjury before a grand
jury that was investigating bribery charges); Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United
States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1097-99 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (affirming the dismissal of Hastings’s suit to
enjoin an investigation of charges of bribery by the Judicial Conference of the 11th Circuit);
United States v. Claiborne, 765 F.2d 784, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming a judge’s conviction
for underreporting income discovered during a bribery investigation).
361. All three judges tried in the 1990s raised allegations of retaliation based on their rul-
ings against the government in criminal cases. These allegations are given more credence by
members’ calling for increased use of judicial impeachments as punishment for rulings consid-
ered too “liberal” or “activist.” See supra note 335. My colleague Todd Peterson has explored
the institutional tensions produced by the prosecution of judicial officers by the executive
branch. See Todd D. Peterson, The Role of the Executive Branch in the Discipline and Removal
of Federal Judges, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 809.
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than the exception in the final category of cases: presidential im-
peachments.
C. Impeachments of Presidents
In over two hundred years, there have only been two Senate tri-
als of American Presidents: President Andrew Johnson and President
William Jefferson Clinton. Various Presidents, however, have been
subject to impeachment inquires, with President Nixon’s case coming
the closest to a Senate referral. Presidents John Tyler,362 Andrew
Johnson, Grover Cleveland,363 Herbert Hoover,364 Harry Truman,365
362. The charges against Tyler were made by Representative John Botts of Virginia, who
moved for a House investigation. Tyler was accused of nine offenses, including: (1) exercising
improper and illegal conduct over the accounting officers of the Treasury Department; (2)
abusing the appointment and removal power; (3) encouraging states to “disregard and disobey
a law of Congress”; (4) retaining executive officers in office after their appointments had been
rejected by the Senate; (5) withholding assent to laws that were necessary to “the just opera-
tions of government”; (6) “arbitrary, despotic, and corrupt abuse of the veto power”; (7)
“shameless duplicity, equivocation, and falsehood, with his late Cabinet and Congress”; (8) il-
legal and unconstitutional appointment of a commission to investigate the custom house in
New York City; and (9) withholding information on the misdeeds of government agents. CONG.
GLOBE, 27th Cong., 3d Sess. 144 (1843). The House voted and rejected the resolution 127-83,
with no further action taken in the matter. See id. at 146.
363. Cleveland was accused by Alabama Representative Milford on May 23, 1896, of eight
instances of high crimes and misdemeanors. These included allegations that Cleveland: (1)
“sold or directed the sale of bonds without authority of law”; (2) “sold or aided in the sale of
bonds at less than their market value”; (3) “directed the misappropriate of the proceeds of said
bond sales”; (4) “directed the misappropriation of the proceeds of said bond sales”; (5) “di-
rected the Secretary of the Treasury to disregard the law which makes United States notes and
Treasury notes redeemable in coin”; (6) “ignored and refused to have enforced the anti-trust
law”; (7) “sent United States troops into the State of Illinois without authority of law and in
violation of the Constitution”; (8) “corrupted politics through the interference of Federal of-
ficeholders”; and (9) “used the appointment power to influence legislation detrimental to the
welfare of the people.” STEPHEN W. STATHIS & DAVID C. HUCKABEE, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS: CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION ON PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT: A HISTORICAL
OVERVIEW 7-8 (1998). The House failed to take up Milford’s resolution, and no further action
was taken.
364. Hoover was charged on December 13, 1932, by Representative Louis T. McFadden of
Pennsylvania on 11 instances of high crimes and misdemeanors, including: (1) “usurping power
from, and showing disrespect to, the Congress of the United States”; (2) “attempting to impair
a District Court Judge of the validity of war-debt contracts existing between the United States
and foreign nations”; (3) “increasing both unemployment and taxes to the detriment of the
American people”; (4) “unlawfully declaring the so-called Hoover moratorium and unlawfully
initiating and allowing American participation in the international political conference that
took place in London in July 1931”; (5) “attempting to negotiate treaties and agreements ig-
nominious to the United States for the benefit of foreign nations and individuals”; (6) “accept-
ing the resignation of Edmund Pratt as a member of the Federal Reserve Board in September
1930, under circumstances that made it appear that a bribe might have been offered to bring
about Pratt’s resignation”; (7) “unlawfully designating Eugene Meyer governor of the Federal
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Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan,366 and George Bush367 were all sub-
ject to calls for impeachment. Allegations of impeachable misconduct
were often raised when a President faced a House under the control
of the opposing party. Yet, Congress has consistently declined to use
this authority despite often-bitter struggles with the White House.
Reserve Board”; (8) “violating the Constitution by not appointing an individual to fill the va-
cancy on the Federal Reserve Board occasioned by the resignation of Roy A. Young in Sep-
tember 1930”; (9) “unlawfully permitting Eugene Meyer to act as a member and chairman of
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation”; (10) “permitting irregularities in the issuance of
Federal Reserve currency”; and (11) “treating with contumely the Veterans of the World War
who came to Washington in the spring and summer of 1932 to exercise their Constitutional
rights and privileges.” Id. at 8-9. The House voted overwhelmingly, 344-11, to table the
McFadden resolution.
365. Truman was first accused by Illinois Representative Noah M. Mason on April 22, 1952,
after his seizure of steel mills. A formal resolution by Maine Representative Robert Hale was
formally referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary without action. Further calls for
inquiry were made without action. Michigan Representative Paul Shafer formally moved a
resolution listing six charges, including: (1) “authorizing the seizure of the steel plants”; (2) “as-
signing United States Armed Forces to the United Nations Command in Korea in violation of
section 6 of Public Law 264, 79th Congress, which prohibited assignment of United States
Forces to the United Nations without prior approval of Congress”; (3) “removing General of
the Army Douglas MacArthur from his commands in the Far East”; (4) “attempting to disgrace
the Congress of the United States”; (5) “repeatedly withholding information from Congress”;
and (6) “making reckless and inaccurate public statements, which jeopardized the good name,
peace, and security of the United States.” Id. at 10. No action was taken on any of these resolu-
tions.
366. Reagan was subject to two calls for impeachment based on his actions in Grenada and
the Iran-Contra affair. In the Grenada incident, New York Representative Ted Weiss and
seven cosponsors charged Reagan with three charges that in ordering the invasion Reagan was
(1) “in violation of Congress’s war power authority (Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution)”;
(2) “in violation of certain treaty obligations”; and (3) “[unlawfully] prevent[ing] news cover-
age of the invasion.” Id. at 18. The resolution was referred to the House Judiciary Committee
without further action. In the Iran-Contra affair, Texas Representative Henry B. Gonzalez in-
troduced a resolution on March 5, 1987, charging Reagan with six articles, including: (1) “his
approval and acquiescence in shipping arms from Israel in violation of the Arms Export Act, 22
U.S.C. 2753”; (2) “his approval and acquiescence in covert actions conducted by the Central
Intelligence Agency regarding the shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran in violation of 22 U.S.C.
2442”; (3) “his failure to notify Congress of continuing arms sales and covert actions in viola-
tion of the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. 413, and the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C.
2753”; (4) “his approval, acquiescence, or failure to prevent the diversion of proceeds from the
Iran arms sale to the force fighting the Government of Nicaragua, in violation of the Boland
Amendment (P.L. 99-169, sec. 105)”; (5) “his approval or acquiescence in the shipment of 500
U.S.-made TOW missiles form Israel to Iran on or about Oct. 29, 1986, in violation of the pro-
hibition contained in sec. 509 of P.L. 99-399 against arms transfers to nations such as Iran, that
support terrorism”; and (6) “his disregard for the laws of the United States and a pattern of
casual and irresponsible executive decision-making.” Id. at 19. The matter was referred to the
House Judiciary Committee without further action.
367. Bush was accused by Texas Representative Henry Gonzalez for his actions in the Gulf
War as he introduced resolutions on January 16, 1991, and February 21, 1991. These resolu-
tions were viewed as frivolous, and no further action was taken.
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Before addressing the three most serious cases of Johnson, Nixon,
and Clinton, two presidential controversies deserve brief mention.
As noted above, impeachment allegations have often been a vis-
ceral demand by factional groups in Congress. These allegations are
often tabled or ignored by the majority. As will be shown, the John-
son case shows the danger majority factions may pose if the constitu-
tional standards for impeachment are ignored. It is not clear that this
danger is significant given the House’s history of rejecting calls for
inquiries.
This history is often overlooked because of the Johnson case,
where members yielded to the political moment rather than hewing
to their constitutional duties. However, in that single failure by the
House, the Senate trial proved successful in producing political defec-
tions to avoid conviction. A more significant danger lies in impeach-
ment conduct that is ignored by the majority because either the
President or his conduct is popular. Presidents have periodically as-
serted a relativistic view of their authority to claim extraconstitu-
tional powers at times of crisis.368 This danger is particularly acute
during periods of crisis, in which Presidents have proven adherents to
Cicero’s rule of inter arma leges silent—in war the law is silent.369 Such
was the case with President Abraham Lincoln’s wartime actions in-
terfering with the private and public rights of citizens, including the
suspension of habeas corpus. Lincoln was open about this extracon-
stitutional action, asking, “[A]re all the laws but one to go unexe-
cuted, and the government itself go to pieces lest that one be vio-
lated?”370 Lincoln was claiming not a rivaling constitutional
interpretation, but the right to operate outside the Constitution.371
368. This view was articulated by Jefferson, who stressed that “[t]o lose our country by a
scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property
and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means.”
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 9 JEFFERSON, supra note
212, at 279.
369. See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, PRO MILONE 10 (Albert Clark ed., A. M. Hakkert
1967) (speech delivered in 48 B.C.).
370. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), reprinted in 6
THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 297, 309 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds.,
1894). Professor Henry Monaghan would answer this question in the affirmative. See Henry P.
Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28 (1993). As Pro-
fessor Monaghan notes, however, the reaction of Congress was to give a post hoc approval of
Lincoln’s actions at his request. See id. at 28 n.136.
371. The use of interpretative differences as the basis for impeachment was raised correctly
as the central weakness of the Johnson impeachment. Democrats noted at the time that, if a
President could be impeached for refusing to comply with a perceived unconstitutional law,
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Despite the fact that the nation was at war, Lincoln’s act threatened
the very guarantees of a nation of laws and should have been the
subject of inquiry by Congress. At the very least, impeachment pro-
cedures allow Congress to resolve such issues with a full defense and
explanation by the accused. The fact that Lincoln was not subject to
such procedures was an act of congressional acquiescence.372 There is
a common argument, repeated by some academics, that impeach-
ments in wartime are incautious and ill advised.373 Such arguments ig-
nore the strengths of this system or the ability to defend the nation
while preserving the traditions under protection. There is no more
important time to defend our laws and traditions than when citizens
may have to be sacrificed in their defense.374 President Lincoln chose
to act beyond his authority in wartime when such inclinations were at
their zenith. Any illegal acts are subjects for the courts; the claimed
authority itself is a subject for impeachment. Impeachment is a vital
procedure to deter such dangerous relativism or opportunism. More
importantly, when a President blatantly ignores constitutional restric-
tions to the detriment of the rights of citizens, the Senate trial pro-
vides a unique method of consent. Once Lincoln assumed powers not
given to him, he raised a serious issue upon which a Senate trial
would have been warranted. If the public retained Lincoln despite
these actions, he could claim the authority that comes with the con-
sent of the public in a Senate trial. A representative system is
then Congress would simply enact blatantly unconstitutional laws, “and you then [could] im-
peach the President because he wishes to test the constitutionality of your rule.” CONG.
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1337 (1868) (statement of Rep. Brooks).
372. Few citizens suggested the possibility of impeachment for such conduct at a time of
war, leaving impeachment calls to marginalized figures. See Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln,
Vallandigham, and Anti-War Speech in the Civil War, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 105, 114
(1998).
373. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 3, at 235 (testimony of Prof. Susan Low Bloch)
(defending the right of the House to forego impeachment for impeachable conduct under some
circumstances by declaring: “If you doubt that [authority], ask yourself whether you think the
House would be required to impeach a president in the middle of a war”). Professor Bloch is
certainly correct that the House is not required to impeach in the middle of a war, but such a
decision nullifying evidence of impeachable offenses is best made in the Senate, not the House.
Impeachment not only properly defines the conduct as impeachable and may deter future such
conduct, but the decision to retain a President acting outside his authority should be made in
the Senate. By sending the matter to the Senate, the House is establishing that this is conduct
for which the President could lose his office, subject to a decision of the Senate that a President
is guilty and that removal is in the nation’s interest.
374. Randolph noted the need for impeachment as a method of checking executive branch
abuse during times of military or political strife. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 67.
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strengthened by reserving that choice to the citizens, in whose inter-
est the President claims to act.
A Senate trial is also appropriate to judge the legitimacy of a
President for the conduct of subordinates. This is the least discussed
of the various grounds for impeachment. On the spectrum of im-
peachable issues, there are some circumstances in which a President
can be impeached for the conduct of his administration even in the
absence of direct evidence of involvement. An administration may be
so corrupt or abusive that a President loses all authority in the view
of the public to continue in office and becomes a barrier to the recov-
ery of the political system.375 This circumstance has thankfully re-
mained a matter of mere academic interest. However, the threshold
question was raised by the arguments during the investigation of the
Iran-Contra Affair.376 In this case, credible evidence existed that
criminal acts were committed in the transfer of arms to a terrorist na-
tion and that a federal law banning support for a clandestine army
had been violated.377 These alleged illegal acts were further aggra-
vated by acts of perjury and obstruction by high officials, including
cabinet officers.378 Individuals close to the President were convicted
375. The Grant administration raises such a question. While Grant himself was not tied to
the many corruption scandals, his subordinates left the public view of government in tatters. See
supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, Grant had appointed special counsels
and had cooperated with Congress on these matters, including the kickback scandal known as
the St. Louis Whiskey Ring. See Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A View from In-
side, 86 GEO. L.J. 2307, 2311 (1998). The difference with the Iran-Contra case was the appear-
ance of a knowing act of contempt by the White House for constitutional limitations and con-
gressional authority. Impeachment is not a method for simply holding a President to account
for poor management or performance in office, as was the case with Grant.
376. The record in this case is contained in two comprehensive reports. See LAWRENCE S.
WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS (1993);
REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
(WITH SUPPLEMENTAL, MINORITY, AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS), S. REP. NO. 100-216/H.R. REP.
NO. 100-433 (1987).
377. Ironically, one of the laws that Reagan was alleged to have violated was the Neutrality
Act, which was at issue in the first impeachment of Senator Blount. See Sanchez-Espinoza v.
Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (seeking private action for violation of the Neutral-
ity Act); supra note 207. The Neutrality Act prohibits “any military or naval expedition or en-
terprise . . . against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state.” 18 U.S.C. § 960
(1994). A law similar in effect to the Neutrality Act, the Boland Amendment, was specifically
and expressly designed to prevent support for the Contra rebels in Nicaragua by restricting the
type and amount of funding that could be used for the rebels. See Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1837, 1935; Act of Dec. 21, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat.
1833, 1865.
378. The Iran-Contra investigation under Judge Lawrence E. Walsh led to convictions or
plea agreements of 11 people, including close aides to President Reagan.
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as a result of the investigation.379 President Ronald Reagan, however,
was never subject to the impeachment procedures.380 While the Inde-
pendent Counsel believed impeachment proceedings were warranted,
he insisted that the withholding of evidence frustrated his efforts to
support such a case:
[Former Secretary of Defense] Weinberger’s early and deliberate
decision to conceal and withhold extensive contemporaneous notes
of the Iran-contra matter radically altered the official investigations
and possibly forestalled timely impeachment proceedings against
President Reagan and other officials. Weinberger’s notes contain
evidence of a conspiracy among the highest-ranking Reagan admini-
stration officials to lie to Congress and the American public.381
There has been a long debate over President Reagan’s responsi-
bility in this matter and the underlying legality of a President’s solici-
tation of contributions from foreign powers for these purposes.382 This
Article will not revisit that issue. Of greater relevance to this Article,
however, is the oft-repeated argument that impeachment was not se-
riously considered because President Reagan was not shown to have
had personal involvement in the actions of his subordinates. This ar-
gument goes to the function of impeachment as a deterrent of execu-
tive misconduct. This is precisely the type of case that the Framers
identified as appropriate for impeachment and trial.383 James Madison
379. Judge Walsh’s convictions would ultimately be undermined by the congressional im-
munity given to some of the defendants who proceeded to secure reversals based on the prom-
ise of “use or derivative use” immunity protection. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369,
371 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
380. See Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 296 (1998)
(“Many people believed or feared that President Reagan was personally involved in the unlaw-
ful acts. This allegation could have been sufficient to commence impeachment hearings to in-
vestigate those charges.”).
381. Written Statement by Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh, UPI, Dec. 24, 1992; see
also Walter Pincus & George Lardner, Jr., Just Say Yes: Iran-Contra’s Moral for Beleaguered
Presidents, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1994, at C5 (quoting the Independent Counsel as stating that
“Reagan’s impeachment ‘should certainly have been considered’”).
382. The congressional outrage over the Iran-Contra affair can be analogized to Parlia-
ment’s impeachment inquiry into the acts of the Duke of Danby. See Daniel T. Kobil, The
Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569,
587-88 (1991). In that case, Charles II not only acted in opposition to the express desire of Par-
liament to go to war with France but frustrated efforts of impeachment by way of a Crown par-
don. See supra notes 57-59.
383. James Wilson stressed that a chief executive could not avoid impeachment through
such arguments:
The executive power is better to be trusted when it has no screen. Sir, we have a re-
sponsibility in the person of our president; he cannot act improperly, and hide either
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and others insisted that the very basis for giving the President the
authority for removal was to reaffirm his personal accountability for
the actions of his subordinates.384 Madison noted that:
I think it absolutely necessary that the President should have the
power of removing [his subordinates] from office; it will make him,
in a peculiar manner, responsible for their conduct, and subject him
to impeachment himself, if he suffers them to perpetuate with impu-
nity high crimes or misdemeanors against the United States, or ne-
glects to superintend their conduct, so as to check their excesses. On
the constitutionality of the declaration I have no manner of doubt.385
Such allegations are best addressed fully and openly.386 The right
of a chief executive to solicit contributions from foreign powers can
honestly be debated.387 However, Congress chose to avoid the ques-
tions of legitimacy raised by the allegations of a widespread cover-up
at the White House. Instead, it elected to investigate the matter ex-
clusively as a type of oversight function into the conduct of the execu-
tive branch. As a result, criminality was ultimately identified, but the
his negligence or inattention; he cannot roll upon any other person the weight of his
criminality; no appointment can take place without his nomination; and he is respon-
sible for every nomination he makes. We secure vigor. We will know what numerous
executives are. We know there is neither vigor, decision, nor responsibility, in them.
Add to all this, that officer is placed high, and is possessed of power far from being
contemptible; yet not a single privilege is annexed to his character; far from being
above the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character as a citizen, and his
public character by impeachment.
2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 131, at 449.
384. This view of impeachment extended to both the retention of bad officers as well as the
removal of good officers. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 485-86 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)
(statement of Rep. Lawrence) (arguing that a President should be impeachable for “displacing
a worthy and able man, who enjoyed the confidence of the people”).
385. Id. at 372-73. Madison stressed the connection between impeachment and account-
ability for good government. See id. at 379 (statement of Rep. Madison) (“It is one of the most
prominent features of the Constitution, a principle that pervades the whole system, that there
should be the highest possible degree of responsibility in all the Executive officers thereof.”).
386. Public questioning of the President’s involvement increased after the attempted sui-
cide of an aide close to the President, National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane. See
McFarlane Takes Drug Overdose: Iran Probe Figure Hospitalized Shortly Before Testimony
Due, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1987, at A1.
387. Defenders of the President insisted that the Boland Amendment was unconstitutional
and therefore could not be the basis for prosecution. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the Presi-
dent (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J.
1255, 1278 n.103 (1988) (“The [Iran-Contra] Affair’s apologists have argued that most of the
criminal charges stem from congressional attempts ‘to criminalize policy differences between
co-equal branches of government and the Executive’s conduct of foreign affairs.’” (quoting
Oliver North and other supporters of President Reagan)).
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questions about the President’s responsibility and status were left to
linger.388
Impeachment proceedings frame a political question separate
from any underlying criminal acts. An Independent Counsel can ad-
dress individual criminality, but only an open process of inquiry can
address the more fundamental questions of legitimacy raised by such
scandals as Iran-Contra. The allegations of Iran-Contra went to the
heart of a President’s commitment to the enforcement of federal law
and, more importantly, his acceptance of constitutional limitations on
his office. The Framers specifically viewed decisions over armed con-
flict as one of the most important examples of the necessity of the
Constitution’s scheme of shared powers:
Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be
proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, con-
tinued, or concluded. They are barred from the latter functions by a
great principle in free government, analogous to that which sepa-
rates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the
power of enacting laws.389
The Iran-Contra affair was so damaging precisely because it
raised questions of the President’s acceptance of the most fundamen-
tal constitutional guarantees and limitations. Ultimately, the head of
an administration is accountable for such conduct, as well as the re-
sulting international and domestic turmoil.390
388. The Framers made repeated references to “incapacity” in their discussion of the role
of impeachment. This would suggest that there is some evidence that the Framers viewed im-
peachment as a method to remove a President who had become incompetent or incapable in
office. This creates an interesting question as to the need and effect of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment if incapacity was viewed as a possible basis for removal. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS, su-
pra note 5, at 65 (statement of James Madison) (identifying “incapacity, negligence, or perfidy”
as the standard for impeachment); see also Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3, at 762
n.137.
389. JAMES MADISON, LETTERS OF HELVIDIUS, No. 1 (Aug. 24, 1793), reprinted in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 148 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906); see also 1 RECORDS, supra note
5, at 139-40 (quoting George Mason as stressing that the “purse & the sword ought never to get
into the same hand (whether Legislative or Executive)”).
390. Louis Fisher raised the issue of impeachment in Iran-Contra as vital to confining
presidential authority and guaranteeing the faithful execution of federal laws:
If President Reagan had defied the Boland Amendment by seeking financial or other
assistance from foreign countries or private individuals, at a minimum this would
have subjected the United States to ridicule and humiliation. Having been rebuffed
by Congress, the President would go, hat in hand, to foreign governments and private
citizens for assistance in implementing the administration’s foreign policy. Such con-
duct would risk a major collision with Congress, with the President acting in the face
of a congressional policy enacted into law. In such circumstances, I believe a Presi-
TURLEY TO PRINTER 11/30/99 3:15 PM
84 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:1
The historical reluctance of Congress to frame an inquiry in
terms of a President’s impeachable conduct is understandable, par-
ticularly after the Johnson case discussed below. However, when such
questions of legitimacy are acute and obvious, as during a scandal,
legislative avoidance only guarantees that the factional disputes will
remain and fester. This tendency toward avoidance or willful blind-
ness appears to be due in part to the dominant view of impeachment
as a process of removal. Ironically, legislators appear to prefer to use
impeachment only when removal is likely due to bipartisan consen-
sus. Yet, it is when large factional groups are in dispute over ques-
tions of legitimacy that this process can play its most valuable and
transformative role.
1. The Johnson Impeachment. At the time of his impeachment,
President Andrew Johnson may have been the least popular
President of the United States. A Southerner elevated to the office of
President by the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln,
Johnson was attacked as a usurper and Southern apologist.391 The
deep wounds of the Civil War were still fresh, and Johnson
personified the view of a defeated but undeterred Southern cause. He
was described as the “accidental President” by Representative John
Farnsworth of Illinois, who, expressing pervasive anti-Southern
sentiments, described him as an “[u]ngrateful, despicable, besotted,
traitorous man.”392 These sentiments were reinforced by Johnson’s
refusal to allow retaliation against the southern states and his
repeated use of the presidential veto to bar “Radical Republican”
legislation. In continuing Lincoln’s policy of Reconstruction, Johnson
dent would invite, and deserve, impeachment proceedings. He would fail in his con-
stitutional duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed, and he would precipitate
a constitutional crisis by merging the power of the sword with the power of the purse.
Louis Fisher, Distribution of Constitutional Authority: How Tightly Can Congress Draw the
Purse Strings?, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 758, 764 (1989).
391. See GENE SMITH, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: THE IMPEACHMENT AND
TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 192 (1976) (describing the charge of Representative Benjamin
Loan of Missouri that Johnson was “a usurper in the White House who had come to power
through an assassin’s bullet bought by rebel gold”).
392. Id. at 222. Representative John Logan of Illinois described Johnson as “[t]he Great
Patricide, who had ‘dragged, as a demagogue, the robes of his high official position in the pur-
lieus and filth of treason. . . . He has done every act a man can conceive not only calculated to
degrade himself, but to destroy the rights of the American people.’” Id. at 223. Indiana Repre-
sentative John Shanks went so far as to announce, “I am in favor of the official death of An-
drew Johnson. . . . I am not surprised that one who began his Presidential career in drunkenness
should end it in crime.” Id.
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earned the ire of the Radical Republicans, who sought such
retributive measures as negating the state borders of the southern
states and administering the South as five military districts. Johnson
aggressively fought such efforts, which were advanced not only by
Congress but by Radical Republican sympathizers in his own
administration, particularly Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton.
The Radical Republicans, however, cannot be completely dis-
missed as vengeance-seeking radicals. Legitimate disagreements be-
tween the legislative and executive branches emerged after the Civil
War and Johnson’s actions in office were highly controversial. The
Radical Republicans, for example, were vehemently opposed to slav-
ery and sought full citizen rights for freed slaves.393 Johnson slowed
many of these efforts and appeared hostile to expanding the rights of
black citizens.394 He opposed black suffrage (a central issue for Radi-
cal Republicans), declaring the concept to be “worse than the mili-
tary despotism under which [the southern states] . . . are now suffer-
ing.”395 In his State of the Union address, Johnson called blacks
incapable of governing themselves, referred to them as an “inferior”
race, and described them as “corrupt in principle and enemies of free
institutions.”396 Not surprisingly, given such public racist harangues,
Johnson was blamed for such tragedies as the New Orleans massacre
in 1866, during which a large number of black Republicans were
killed or wounded.397 In addition to his opposition to suffrage and
other rights for blacks, Johnson also ignored federal law and under-
mined critical programs like the Freedmen’s Bureau and Confisca-
tion Acts, which were intended to create economic support for freed
slaves.398 The Radical Republicans were deeply concerned about
Johnson’s monetary policies and their effect on the post-war econ-
omy. Johnson’s government advocated the selling of long-term gov-
ernment bonds to buy back the legal-tender notes issued during the
Civil War. This move was viewed as destabilizing for the fragile
393. See BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 10 (“Most Republicans, radical and nonradical, would
have preferred at least the enfranchisement of black Southerners in an effort to enable them to
protect their newly won freedom.”).
394. See id. at 75.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. See id. at 22 (describing the massacre of 40 mainly black Republicans and the wound-
ing of 160 others in dispersing a rally).
398. See id.
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economy and inspired opposition by members of both parties.399 Fi-
nally, Johnson engaged in widespread firings that destabilized the
government to the point that a new armed conflict was feared by
supporters like General Ulysses S. Grant.400 In some public state-
ments, Johnson appeared to threaten another civil war by his refusal
to allow blacks to vote and to participate in government.401 Johnson’s
conduct in refusing to comply with federal law and his disenfran-
chisement of black citizens would be viewed today as legitimate
grounds for an impeachment inquiry.
The Johnson impeachment was the only postcolonial impeach-
ment402 in history in which the underlying grounds were carefully
planned in advance by Congress.403 The Radical Republicans were
well aware of President Johnson’s plan to remove Stanton. In antici-
pation of such a move, Congress enacted over Johnson’s veto the
Tenure of Office Act,404 which prohibited a President from removing
a cabinet officer without the appointment of a successor by the Sen-
ate.405 To make future impeachment even easier for themselves, the
Radical Republicans placed in the legislation a provision stating that
399. See id. at 65.
400. General Grant feared these actions as promoting the danger of open conflict.  Grant
was one of Johnson’s supporters, but even he objected to Johnson’s actions as appearing to be
“an effort to defeat the laws of Congress.” Id. at 58.
401. See id. at 75-76. Specifically, in his State of the Union Address, President Johnson
threatened that such efforts of Congress on behalf of blacks “would be likely to produce violent
collision between the respective adherents of the two branches of the Government. This would
be simply civil war; and civil war must be resorted to only as the last remedy for the worst of
evils.” Id. (quoting 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 568 (James D. Richardson
ed., 1897) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS]).
402. The colonial impeachment of Chief Justice Oliver is an analogous case of a legislative
trap. See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
403. The Radical Republicans actually attempted to impeach Johnson before the dispute
over the Tenure in Office Act, the basis of the Senate trial. See BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 61-
88. The earliest record of an impeachment effort can be traced to December 17, 1866, but later
impeachment allegations stated a variety of misdeeds ranging from corruption in the use of
presidential appointments to “usurpation of power.” BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 135.
404. Johnson correctly viewed the Act as an unconstitutional invasion of executive author-
ity, a point ultimately made by the Supreme Court in 1926 when it found the Act unconstitu-
tional (even after the cabinet provision used against Johnson was repealed). See Meyers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926):
[W]e have no hesitation in holding that . . . the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far
as it attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had
been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid,
and that subsequent legislation of the same effect was equally so.
405. See Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867), amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1869,
ch. 10, 16 Stat. 6, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500.
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any violation of the Act would constitute a “high misdemeanor,” that
is, de facto evidence of impeachable conduct.406 When Johnson
obligingly removed Stanton,407 the vote in the House of Representa-
tives was along strict party lines without a single Republican defec-
tor.408 While the Tenure of Office Act was the foundation for the
charges, the eleven articles of impeachment included such offenses as
trying to bring Congress “into disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt,
and reproach” and making “with a loud voice certain intemperate,
inflammatory, and scandalous harangues . . . .”409 In his presentation
to the Senate, House manager John Logan expressed the view of
President Johnson held by the Radical Republicans:
Almost from the time when the blood of Lincoln was warm on the
floor of Ford’s Theatre, Andrew Johnson was contemplating treason
to all the fresh fruits of the overthrown and crushed rebellion, and
an affiliation with and a practical official and hearty sympathy for
those who had cost hecatombs of slain citizens, billions of treasure,
and an almost ruined country. His great aim and purpose has been
to subvert law, usurp authority, insult and outrage Congress, recon-
struct the rebel States in the interests of treason . . . and deliver all
snatched from wreck and ruin into the hands of unrepentant, but by
him pardoned, traitors.410
The Senate trial of President Johnson began on March 5, 1868,
with the oath administered to the Senate jurors by Chief Justice
Salmon Chase.411 This impeachment and Senate trial is rightfully used
as an example of the abuse of the impeachment process by open par-
tisan forces. The trial, however, was not a one-sided partisan exercise,
nor were the President’s opponents a monolithic mob.412 In fact, Re-
406. See Tenure of Office Act, §6, 14 Stat. at 431 (making any violation punishable with as
much as five years in prison and a $10,000 fine).
407. One of the greatest ironies in this scandal was that one of the most vocal members of
the cabinet opposing the law as unconstitutional was Secretary of War Stanton. The cabinet
unanimously encouraged Johnson to oppose the law. See BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 133.
408. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1616-18 (1868).
409. SELECTED IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 202, at 210-14.
410. BUSHNELL, supra note 193, at 150 (footnote omitted).
411. One of the senators taking the oath, under objections from other members, was the
majority leader Benjamin Wade, who would succeed Johnson if impeached. While Wade re-
frained from voting on matters during the trial, he would ultimately vote to convict the man
standing between him and the presidency. Other objections were raised over Tennessee Sena-
tor David Patterson’s participation in the trial, since he was the President’s son-in-law. See id. at
139.
412. In fact, it has been suggested that some of the Republicans voting against conviction
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publicans supported various defense motions for procedural or
schedule changes. Johnson’s defense wanted a forty-day delay to pre-
pare its case, but reached a compromise of a ten-day delay.413 There
was unanimity on the position that the trial should be a judicial and
not a political proceeding.414 The Senate also reached a bipartisan
resolution over the status of any evidentiary rulings by the Chief Jus-
tice. Initially, the rules allowed Chief Justice Chase to rule on any
such questions subject to override by a majority vote. Some senators,
however, were concerned that the rule would give Chief Justice
Chase too much perceived authority. Accordingly, the Senate
adopted, with bipartisan support, a rule stating that “[t]he presiding
officer may, in the first instance, submit to the Senate, without a divi-
sion, all questions of evidence and incidental questions, but the same
shall, on the demand of one fifth of the members present, be decided
by yeas and nays.”415
Likewise, in a critical vote on the argument over preliminary is-
sues, eleven Republicans supported President Johnson’s Senate al-
lies, who failed by only four votes in their motion demanding more
time.416 This vote was a telling partisan test since Radical Republicans
were motivated in part by their opposition to the ascension of Senate majority leader, Senator
Benjamin Wade, to the presidency. See BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 141 (noting that Senator
George F. Edmunds “decided Johnson was guilty, and later expressed his conviction that had
Wade not been president pro tem of the Senate, Fessenden and others certainly would have
reached the same conclusion”). Since Johnson did not have a Vice President, Wade was the
next in succession. This concern was reportedly shared by Chief Justice Chase, who wanted to
run for President himself. See Ron Smith, Compelled Cost Disclosure of Grass Roots Lobbying
Expenses: Necessary Government Voyeurism or Chilled Political Speech?, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 115, 170 n.37 (1996). But cf. BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 72-73 (“Wade, who would re-
place Johnson if he were removed, had publicly declared his preference for Chase rather than
Grant. . . . With Wade as president, Grant might be denied the nomination.”); id. at 73 (“‘The
impeachment programme had . . . two motives; the first and most important was, of course, to
get Andrew Johnson out of the presidency, and the second and hardly less important was, to
keep General Grant from getting in.’” (quoting JACOB WILLIAM SCHUCKERS, THE LIFE AND
PUBLIC SERVICES OF SALMON P. CHASE, U.S. SENATOR AND GOVERNOR OF OHIO 548
(1874))).
413. See SMITH, supra note 391, at 231-32 (quoting House manager Benjamin Butler ob-
jecting that 40 days was “[a]s long as it took God to destroy the world by a flood!”).
414. See BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 115.
415. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1596 (1868).
416. See BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 117. One of the arguments raised by Johnson’s de-
fenders was the unsupported position that a President could only be impeached for indictable
crimes. See id. at 27. This argument was legitimately rejected. As shown above, some English
cases involved non-indictable conduct and the U.S. Senate had (by the time of the Johnson
trial) already convicted and removed Judge Pickering for non-indictable conduct. See supra
notes 30-36; 256-64 and accompanying text; see also Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra
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believed that they had to move quickly to secure a conviction.417
These members realized that a Senate trial had the ability to trans-
form votes and sought to limit deliberation and debate. Republicans,
however, did not sacrifice the fairness of the proceedings. Instead,
they supported the President’s defenders on a series of critical evi-
dentiary demands viewed as necessary guarantees of a fair trial, de-
spite the direct result of undermining the case of the majority.418
Eleven Republicans defected to mandate a full trial.419 Eleven Re-
publicans also defected to support a close vote on additional wit-
nesses in favor of President Johnson’s defense.420 Some of these sena-
tors, who would ultimately vote for conviction, still maintained the
need for an open and deliberative process. As a result, while a trial of
ten days was sought by the House managers, five weeks were ex-
hausted in preliminary matters before actual testimony was even
heard by the Senate. More than two months passed before any final
vote occurred on the eleven articles of impeachment.
President Johnson was called to appear before the full Senate
and Chief Justice Chase.421 Johnson was inclined to appear,422 but was
persuaded by his lawyers to remain at the White House.423 While he
note 3, at 1821-22.
417. See BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 117:
The original rule from the special committee allowed each side one hour to argue
preliminary and interlocutory questions. . . . Republicans were in a difficult situa-
tion. . . . [S]peed was of the utmost importance. A long period of uncertainty would
allow time for reflection and reaction among conservative Republicans, especially
businessmen interested in stability. On the other hand, Republicans dared not move
so quickly as to compromise the appearance of a fair trial. To a certain degree the
two considerations were contradictory, and therefore more radical senators were in-
clined to favor speed at the expense of impartiality.
(footnote omitted).
418. See id. at 142 (“Despite their conviction that Johnson’s intention to raise a court case,
even if proven, could not vitiate his guilt, they allowed the President’s counsel to present evi-
dence on the subject, evidence that could only bolster the President’s case and weaken the
managers’ before the nation.”).
419. See id. at 117.
420. The defense wanted to call witnesses to venture into an area viewed as collateral by
the House managers. The final vote was 22-26, with Republicans making up half of the vote
against the House managers. See id. at 153. Likewise, nine Republicans supported the effort of
the President’s defense to introduce critical evidence challenging the basis of the articles of im-
peachment. See id. at 155.
421. See SMITH, supra note 391, at 231 (describing the call of the sergeant-at-arms that the
“President of the United States, appear and answer to the articles of impeachment exhibited
against you by the House of Representatives of the United States”).
422. See id. at 233-34.
423. Despite the fact that the Senate was informed of this decision, accounts of the trial
state that, “[a]lthough everyone knew the President was not coming[,] all eyes turned to the
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was not without political aspirations424 or personal controversy,425
Chief Justice Chase was a respected Justice who insisted on order and
decorum. The Chief Justice is correctly portrayed as an opponent of
both Presidents Lincoln426 and Johnson and friend to Radical Repub-
licans. Undeterred by notions of neutrality, Chief Justice Chase was
opposed to the impeachment of President Johnson and made his
views known during the course of the trial.427 The presiding judge,
therefore, was in favor of the President’s acquittal, though opposed
to his politics.428
The Johnson trial was the best example of factional divisions
that were forced to engage in a dialogic process. Witnesses appeared
at a trial that was marked by occasional outbursts of emotion from
the largely anti-Johnson public in the galleries, including hooting and
whistling. The Senate trial, however, slowed the factional impulse for
conviction. The most telling votes during the trial were the defections
of Republicans to defeat repeated efforts by anti-Johnson senators to
curtail the trial. The bipartisan support for requiring a full and fair
trial represents the greatest enforcement of the procedural integrity
of the process. Radical Republicans’ concerns about the transforma-
tive effect of a full trial were realized in the final vote.429 Ultimately,
main door” when he was formally called by the sergeant-at-arms. Id. at 231.
424. Chase was actively courting a presidential nomination. See id. at 240. See generally
FREDERICK BLUE, SALMON P. CHASE, A LIFE IN POLITICS 283-98 (1987).
425. Chase was allegedly guilty of “unsavory financial dealings.” SMITH, supra note 391, at
240.
426. Chase attempted to replace Lincoln in the Republican spot on the 1864 presidential
ticket. Lincoln reportedly described Chase as a “‘bluebottle fly [who] lays his eggs in every rot-
ten spot he can find.’” JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE, A BIOGRAPHY 344 (1995) (footnote
omitted). Despite Chase’s efforts to unseat Lincoln, Lincoln nominated Chase to the Supreme
Court on December 6, 1864, after he had resigned from Lincoln’s cabinet as Secretary of the
Treasury. See BLUE, supra note 424, at 244-45.
427. Chase was not alone in his efforts. His daughter, Kate Chase Sprague, wife of Senator
William Sprague of Rhode Island, reportedly threatened to divorce Sprague if he voted for
conviction. See BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 171; PAGE SMITH, THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL
AMERICA: A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE POST–RECONSTRUCTION ERA 784 (1984).
428. See BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 136-37 (“Despite his professed conviction that the
impeachment proceedings should progress under rules similar to those pertaining to trials in
court, he privately informed correspondents and wavering senators of his belief that the articles
did not warrant conviction, a grave violation of judicial ethics.”) (footnote omitted).
429. Some observers saw this danger from the opening statement Judge Benjamin Robbins
Curtis made in support of President Johnson. Curtis’s arguments were viewed as stirring in both
style and substance. The most breathless account came from J. B. Stillson, a correspondent at-
tached to The World:
Mr. Curtis’s voice as he began was so low that it scarcely filled the Chamber, which,
however, immediately became so still that the second sentence was heard in the re-
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the testimony and debate had a corrosive effect on the Radical Re-
publican block.
As Professor Benedict has observed, “[M]any senators who fi-
nally voted to convict the President were motivated by the same de-
sire for impartial justice as historians and partisans ascribed only to
the recusants.”430 While Senator Edmund Ross is the most celebrated
dissenter,431 seven Republicans refused to convict the unpopular chief
executive, despite the personal and political costs of these votes of
conscience.432 The number of dissenting members is often lost in his-
torical accounts.433 At the time, the seven dissenting Republicans rep-
resented a not-insignificant block of the forty-two Republican mem-
motest corner. . . . Two or three times Mr. Curtis indulged a fervor which gave to his
aspect an inspiring majesty and glow. Then his voice had the tremor of a water-fall.
Then his form shook like a pine; but, as a pine recovers itself after a gust, and stands
erect and stately as before, so, in an instant after these noble outbursts, the speaker
of to-day was seen composed and motionless, as if every hot impulse in his nature
had been thrust back beaten into its lair.
Charles T. Fenn, Note, Supreme Court Justices: Arguing Before the Court After Resigning from
the Bench, 84 GEO. L.J. 2473, 2479 (1996).
430. BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 141.
431. Ross would later become the best-known dissenter as a focus of John F. Kennedy’s
Profiles in Courage. See JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 126-30 (1955). Ross was
not a professional politician. Interestingly, Ross was appointed to the Senate by the governor of
Kansas after his predecessor committed suicide, reportedly due to political attacks related to
his support of President Johnson’s policies. See SMITH, supra note 391, at 253.
432. See id. at 284 (“None of the seven Republicans who voted for acquittal were ever
again elected to the United States Senate. They were compared to Benedict Arnold and Ju-
das.”). But see BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 181:
[H]istorians have recognized that the legend [of retaliation] has been exaggerated. In
fact, considering the stakes involved, Republican anger at the recusants was re-
markably short-lived. Radicals continued to demand the dissidents’ scalps, but Re-
publican nonradicals immediately warned of the dangerous consequences of follow-
ing such a policy with a presidential election approaching and the Democrats
considering the nomination of Chase.
See also Ralph J. Roske, The Seven Martyrs?, 64 AM. HIST. REV. 323, 330 (1959) (challenging
the claim of ruin and retaliation). While the claim of retaliation may be somewhat exaggerated
in the cases of the seven defecting senators, it was not exaggerated in the case of Ross who suf-
fered political, financial, and personal ruin. See KENNEDY, supra note 431, at 141-42.
433. The closeness of the final vote may also be misleading. As in other cases, there was
evidence of strategic voting. It is difficult to gauge how the vote would have gone without
Ross’s vote. While Ross is often portrayed as giving the final vote, he actually voted seventh.
At that point, other Republicans knew that conviction was not likely. It is a long-standing tradi-
tion in Congress for members to watch such votes closely in order to vote according to their
political expediencies unless their vote is critical. While the Republicans were publicly commit-
ted on their final votes, it is possible that a committed vote would have converted if Ross had
not thrown himself (with the other dissenting Republicans) into political jeopardy. At least one
such senator indicated that he would have switched in such a circumstance to bar a conviction.
See BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 142 n.30 (recounting how Senator Waitman T. Willey “had
pledged to vote for acquittal if his vote was needed”).
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bers voting in an intensely factional environment. As will be shown
below, Madisonian procedures are intended to produce precisely this
outcome.434 Although the Johnson case began as an example of the
abusive use of impeachment, it concluded as a strong reaffirmation of
the bicameral procedures created by the Framers. As in the other
cases discussed above, civic virtue did emerge from the factional de-
bate as anticipated by the Framers.
In the aftermath of the trial, the anti-Johnson sentiments were
still present, but his constitutional legitimacy was established and not
seriously questioned. Moreover, the trial had produced a bipartisan
consensus as the basis for the impeachment. At the very beginning of
the Grant administration, Republicans supported the repeal of the
portion of the law used against Johnson.435 While the margin was
hardly generous at Johnson’s trial, the worst of all attacks on the
presidency produced the most lasting example of legislative integ-
rity.436
2. The Nixon Inquiry. The Nixon impeachment introduced a
model for the House of Representatives that was sharply different
from the Johnson model.437 In 1974, President Richard Nixon was
subject to investigations in both the House and the Senate. In
addition to material gathered by congressional committees, a
considerable amount of information was given to Congress by a
special prosecutor. The information indicated a series of criminal acts
434. See infra Part V.
435. See Act of Apr. 5, 1869, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 6 (deleting the section applying to cabinet
members). The entire Act was repealed in 1887. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500.
When the remaining portions of the Act were repealed in 1887, the House report noted:
[T]he reasons for the . . . recommendation are, that by the repeal of [the Tenure of
Office Act], the law will then stand as it stood from the foundation of the Govern-
ment up to 1867, when, in a time of great party excitement, the said legislation was
enacted, which, to say the least, was unusual and tended to embarrass the President
in the exercise of his constitutional prerogative.
H.R. Rep. No. 49-3539 (1887), quoted in Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and the Fed-
eral Deficit: Form, Substance, and Administrative Independence, 75 KY. L.J. 699, 723 n.101
(1986).
436. Perhaps this was one of the reasons President Johnson was willing to run and to secure
a seat in that body after his term as President. Johnson served with both senators who voted for
his conviction and former House managers who joined the Senate after the Senate trial. See
SMITH, supra note 391, at 289-90 (describing Johnson’s chilly reception by these senators upon
his arrival as the newly elected senator from Tennessee).
437. This was a new model for presidential impeachments. The House’s role in judicial im-
peachments has varied between a “grand jury” model with limited investigations and one hav-
ing more robust, trial-like hearings.
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stemming from a break-in at the Democratic National Committee
Headquarters in the Watergate Complex. The Nixon impeachment
proceedings in the House began in a sharply partisan atmosphere.438
In a tactic that would later be adopted by Democratic
Representatives during the Clinton case,439 Republicans took up
“cudgels” in defense of their President and “discounted the need for
evidence at the same time they demanded proof a crime had been
committed.”440 Ultimately, however, in July 1974, some Republican
Judiciary Committee members would defect to approve three articles
of impeachment alleging obstruction of justice,441 abuse of power,442
and defiance of committee subpoenas.443 An article of impeachment
based on tax fraud was rejected.444
438. For a description of the partisan views and backgrounds of the Judiciary Committee,
see HOWARD FIELDS, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 5-25 (1978).
439. See infra notes 501-04 and accompanying text.
440. FIELDS, supra note 438, at 133.
441. The first article charged that President Nixon sought:
to delay, impede, and obstruct the investigation [of the June 17, 1972, unlawful entry
into the Democratic National Committee headquarters by agents of the Committee
for the Re-election of the President for the purpose of securing political intelligence];
to cover-up, conceal and protect those responsible; and to conceal the existence and
scope of other unlawful covert activities.
3 DESCHLER, supra note 37, at 639. This article contained highly generalized allegations such as
“approving, condoning, acquiescing in, and counseling witnesses with respect to the giving of
false or misleading statements” and various abusive uses of federal agencies. Id. This article
passed by a vote of 27-11. See STATHIS & HUCKABEE, supra note 363, at 16.
442. The second article charged that President Nixon had used “the powers of the office of
President . . . in violation of his constitutional [duties]” and had “repeatedly engaged in conduct
violating the constitutional rights of citizens, impairing the due and proper administration of
justice and the conduct of lawful inquiries, or contravening the laws governing agencies of the
executive branch and the purposes of these agencies.” 3 DESCHLER, supra note 37, at 640. This
article passed by 28-10. See STATHIS & HUCKABEE, supra note 363, at 17.
443. The third article charged that President Nixon “failed without lawful cause or excuse
to produce papers and things as directed by duly authorized subpoenas issued by the Commit-
tee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives [as part of its impeachment investiga-
tion] . . . and willfully disobeyed such subpoenas.” 3 DESCHLER, supra note 37, at 641-42. This
was the closest of the articles and passed 21-17. See STATHIS & HUCKABEE, supra note 363, at
18.
444. The basis for this 26-12 rejection appeared to be a mix of objections: a concern that
such conduct did not rise to the level of impeachable offenses, the merits of the case, or a con-
clusion that the other articles of impeachment were sufficient without additional grounds. See
Debate on Articles of Impeachment: Hearings of the Comm. on the Judiciary Pursuant to H. Res.
803, 93rd Cong., at 548-50 (1974). This article became a point of contention during the Clinton
trial when it was offered as proof that the House generally rejected impeachment allegations
unrelated to official power or abuse. See Reply of the United States House of Representatives to
the Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton, reprinted in 145 CONG. REC.
S216 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999).
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The Nixon case is only marginally relevant to this Article since it
was not the subject of any Senate action. Yet, this failure to proceed
with impeachment and a Senate trial is of some interest. It appears to
have been widely assumed after President Nixon’s resignation that
his impeachment would no longer be appropriate. This assumption is
misplaced. Nixon was accused of a variety of criminal acts directed
from the Oval Office that seriously undermined the integrity of the
presidency.445 As has been shown, the Framers did not consider re-
moval to be the sole purpose of impeachment, and they were familiar
with the use of impeachment in cases of former officials such as War-
ren Hastings.446 The Senate had already established precedent for
such cases in the trial of Secretary of War Belknap.447As noted earlier,
House managers (and apparently most of the senators) believed that
conviction of a former official served an important deterrent effect,
such that “other officials through all time might profit by his punish-
ment.”448 The question should have been, therefore, not whether im-
peachment was permissible, but whether it would have been advis-
able. This question places the function of the Senate trial into sharp
relief.
A Nixon trial could have been advocated on the basis of a dis-
qualification penalty. Admittedly, given the remote likelihood that
Nixon would want or be able to secure a later office, disqualification
would likely have served only as a symbolic rather than a substantive
penalty for Nixon.449 However, impeachment trials seek to remedy
445. See generally REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF
RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-1305 (1974).
446. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
447. See supra notes 223-46 and accompanying text.
448. BELKNAP PROCEEDINGS, supra note 237, at 203 (1876) (statement of Rep. Knott).
This point was made by Senate members in the Belknap case with some force:
We know not what is the unpardonable sin which excludes its perpetrator from all
hope of entering the portals of heaven, but this we do know, that a man who stands
convicted of high crimes and misdemeanors committed while in office, and is sen-
tenced by the court of impeachment to perpetual disqualification, is held by public
opinion to be a living, moving infamy, a moral leper, shunned by his fellow-man and
without hope of pardon this side the grave.
And this supreme punishment is, in my judgment, inflicted not only to get rid of a
bad man in office, not only to prevent that man ever being restored to office, but
chiefly, by fearful example, to teach all men that American institutions and the per-
petuation of free government, of the people, by the people, and for the people, de-
mand purity in office.
Broyde & Schapiro, supra note 223, at 489 n.52 (quoting Sen. Maxey).
449. It is worth noting that, within 10 years, almost 40% of the American people would
support Nixon for a public role as ambassador or presidential adviser. See Josh Getlin, Forgive
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political injuries rather than punish wrongdoers. Regardless of the
practical impact on Nixon, the political value of the Senate trial for
the country is, in such cases, the preeminent issue for Congress. A
strong argument can be made for a need to address Nixon’s conduct
in an open and deliberative process in the same way that Edmund
Burke used the trial of Warren Hastings.450 The presidential pardon
of President Nixon only reinforced the potential value of a Senate
trial.451 Instead, the Nixon resignation was wrongly viewed as closing
the door on all constitutional issues, just as Ford’s pardon was simi-
larly viewed as resolving any legal issues for former President Nixon
as an individual.
As would later be the case with President Reagan, there is an
understandable desire to avoid further controversy and to move be-
yond crisis.452 The continuation of impeachment after a resignation
would have been viewed as further destabilizing and traumatizing to
the country. This view has greater place in the English and colonial
systems than in the Madisonian system. When used as part of a dia-
logic political process, impeachment can bring political closure and
stability to the system. Had Nixon been tried, it is likely that the pro-
cess of growing bipartisan consensus that began in the House Judici-
ary Committee would have continued in the Senate. A bipartisan
vote of conviction and disqualification in the Senate would have had
both vertical and horizontal effects beneficial to the system. Verti-
cally, the Senate trial would have shown the public that the President
would be held to account personally for his acts. Rather than end the
matter with a fleeting wave from Marine One on the White House
lawn, the matter would have been settled on the Senate floor with
representatives of all three branches present. While he might have
chosen to refuse, Nixon would have been called to account for his
conduct. In its final verdict, the Senate would have articulated the
judgment of the public as to his conduct. Horizontally, the Senate
trial would also have reinforced the balance of authority with respect
to the executive branch. Future Presidents could not assume that
and Forget?: Polls Show That Outrage over Watergate and Richard Nixon Is Fading. But This
May Say More About the American People Than the Former President, L.A. TIMES, July 17,
1990, at E1.
450. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
451. Initially unpopular with a large section of the American people, it was only in the
1980s that a clear majority favored the pardon. See Getlin, supra note 449, at E1 (“[By] 1986,
54% said in a Newsweek poll that Ford was right to pardon Nixon.”).
452. See supra notes 376-82 and accompanying text.
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mere resignation would avoid a trial of their conduct before the Sen-
ate. The legislative branch should have held a trial on the underlying
conduct as a process of institutional settlement and as a reaffirmation
of the principle that, within this system, “‘no man in no circumstance,
can escape the account, which he owes to the laws of his country.’”453
3. The Clinton Impeachment. The Clinton impeachment stands
as a vivid example of factional disputes in impeachment.454 From the
outset, the impeachment of President Clinton was portrayed by the
White House as a “vast right-wing conspiracy” by extreme political
elements.455 Historians and law professors buttressed this view by
stating that the impeachment was constitutionally invalid456 or solely
the result of a small extreme minority within the Republican party.457
Hamilton’s prediction of intense partisanship458 came true in every
possible respect in the ensuing months. The House Judiciary
Committee delivered four articles of impeachment on a straight
partisan vote. Article One alleged perjury before the federal grand
jury.459 Article Two alleged perjury in a sexual harassment case.460
453. Berger, supra note 125, at 1137 (quoting Edmund Burke).
454. For the purposes of full disclosure, the author testified in favor of the impeachment of
President Clinton. See House Hearings, supra note 3, at 250-314 (testimony of Prof. Jonathan
Turley).
455. Today Show: Interview with First Lady Hillary Clinton (NBC television broadcast, Jan.
27, 1998) (denying any basis for the investigation and allegations against her husband and de-
scribing “a vast right-wing conspiracy . . . trying to bring down the president”).
456. See House Hearings, supra note 3, at 203-11, 218-50 (testimony of Profs. Pollitt and
Tribe).
457. This point was made by such historians as Doris Kearns Goodwin, who opposed im-
peachment. See NBC News Special Report: Swearing in of Senators as Jurors in Impeachment
Trial Against President Bill Clinton (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 7, 1999) (“What still as-
tonishes me about this whole thing having reached a trial, which I never thought it would, is it
shows the passionate minority has more power in our system than we thought.”).
458. See infra notes 587-89 and accompanying text.
459. The first article stated:
In his conduct while President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, in
violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the
United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Consti-
tution of the United States . . . has willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial
process of the United States for his personal gain and exoneration, impeding the ad-
ministration of justice [through his perjury before the grand jury concerning this
prior relationship with an intern and his prior sworn testimony] . . . .
In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity of his of-
fice, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and
has acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury
of the people of the United States.
H.R. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998) (enacted), reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. H11,774 (daily ed.
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Article Three alleged obstruction of justice through witness
tampering.461 Article Four alleged perjury in the President’s answers
to Congress.462 On December 19, 1998, the House approved two of
the four articles of impeachment: perjury before the grand jury463 and
Dec. 18, 1998).
460. Article Two stated:
In his conduct while President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, in
violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the
United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Consti-
tution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and manipulated the judi-
cial process of the United States for his personal gain and exoneration, impeding the
administration of justice [through acts of deception and perjury] . . . .
. . . .
In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity of his office,
has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has
acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of
the people of the United States.
Id., reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. H11,774 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1998).
461. Article Three stated:
In his conduct while President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, in
violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the
United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Consti-
tution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the ad-
ministration of justice, and has to that end engaged personally, and through his sub-
ordinates and agents, in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede,
cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related to a Federal
civil rights action brought against him in a duly instituted judicial proceeding . . . .
In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity of his office,
has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has
acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of
the people of the United States.
Id., reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. H11,774-75 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1998).
462. Article Four stated:
Using the powers and influence of the office of President of the United States,
William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute
the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve,
protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in disregard of his
constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has engaged in
conduct that resulted in misuse and abuse of his high office, impaired the due and
proper administration of justice and the conduct of lawful inquiries, and contravened
the authority of the legislative branch and the truth seeking purpose of a coordinate
investigative proceeding, in that, as President, William Jefferson Clinton refused and
failed to respond to certain written requests for admission and willfully made perju-
rious, false and misleading sworn statements in response to certain written requests
for admission propounded to him as part of the impeachment inquiry . . . .
In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity of his of-
fice, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and
has acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury
of the people of the United States.
Id., reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. H11,774-75 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1998).
463. The first article passed by a vote of 228-206, with five Democrats defecting to vote for
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obstruction of justice.464 Both articles ended with the same conclusion
with respect to both removal and disqualification:
Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants
impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification
to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the
United States.465
In both votes, although Republicans and Democrats crossed
party lines, the final vote remained largely partisan.466 The Senate
trial proved equally partisan, with the added intrahouse politics be-
tween the House managers and a reluctant Senate court.
The House Judiciary Committee faced a fundamental question
regarding the role of the House in establishing the basis for im-
peachment. Because of the Independent Counsel statute,467 the House
Judiciary Committee was given a record far greater in detail and sub-
stance than that provided in any prior impeachment proceeding. In-
dependent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s staff examined President Clinton
and other witnesses before a grand jury.468 Forensic evidence and FBI
impeachment and five Republicans defecting to vote against impeachment. See 144 CONG.
REC. H12,040 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998).
464. Article Three passed by a vote of 221-212, with five Democrats defecting to vote for
impeachment and 12 Republicans defecting to vote against impeachment. See id. at H12,041.
465. See H.R. Res. 611, reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. H11,774 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1998).
466. On Article Two, alleging perjury in the civil deposition, 28 Republicans crossed party
lines to vote against the article, defeating the article 205-229. See 144 CONG. REC. H12,041
(daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998). On Article Four, alleging perjury in the President’s answer to Con-
gress, 81 Republicans crossed party lines in favor of the President for a final vote of 285-148.
One Democrat crossed party lines in favor of Article Four. See id. at H12,042.
467. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601(a), 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-73
(independent counsel provisions codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Ironically, Presi-
dent Clinton would ultimately retain his office while the Independent Counsel Act would be
allowed to lapse, largely due to the unpopular investigation of the President. See Jonathan
Turley, Last Rites for the Independent Counsel Act, CHI. TRIB., June 30, 1999, at 21 (defending
the record of the Act and criticizing the reasons for its demise).
468. The facts of the Clinton scandal are not central to this Article. Briefly, the allegations
against President Clinton originated in the sexual harassment suit brought by Paula Jones, who
alleged that Clinton (while governor of Arkansas) called her to a hotel room while she was a
low-level state employee. Jones alleged that, once in the hotel room, she was physically groped
by Clinton who also exposed himself and demanded sexual relations. Clinton denied these alle-
gations. As a result of the Supreme Court ruling requiring the President to testify in the case,
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), Clinton was deposed. In this deposition, he was asked
about his relationship with former White House intern, Monica Lewinsky. Clinton denied any
sexual relationship and described a critical part of an affidavit (later admitted by Lewinsky to
be false) as “absolutely true.” This deposition resulted in the expansion of the jurisdiction of
Independent Counsel Starr, an eventual grand jury testimony by the President (in which he was
accused of lying under oath again), and his ultimate impeachment for perjury and obstruction.
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investigatory material were also completed before referral to the
House.469 As a result, the House questioned whether it was necessary
to call witnesses and to conduct a further investigation. The Nixon
model indicated the need for such comprehensive hearings, while the
Johnson model suggested a more limited role for the House.470 While
the English House of Commons and the House of Representatives
have a history of comprehensive investigations, the Framers ap-
peared to anticipate that witnesses and testimony would be largely
subjects for the Senate proceedings. The House Judiciary Committee
chose not to call fact witnesses,471 instead adopting a “grand jury”
model for the House role in the impeachment.472
The full record of these allegations is contained in a voluminous collection of testimony and
documents submitted by the Independent Counsel. See REFERRAL FROM INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL KENNETH W. STARR IN CONFORMITY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF TITLE 28,
UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 595(C), H.R. DOC. NO. 105-310 (1998) [hereinafter STARR
REFERRAL]; APPENDICES TO THE REFERRAL TO THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES PURSUANT TO TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 595(C), H.R.
DOC. NO. 105-311 (1998); SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS TO THE REFERRAL TO THE UNITED
STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PURSUANT TO TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE,
SECTION 595(C), H.R. DOC. NO. 105-316 (1998); see also Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s
Prepared Testimony for Delivery Before the House Judiciary Committee, Federal Document
Clearing House, Nov. 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL 801023.
469. See STARR REFERRAL, supra note 468.
470. The author advised the House Judiciary Committee to reexamine the Nixon model
and encouraged a more abbreviated investigation in the Clinton case. See House Hearings, su-
pra note 3, at 263 n.13 (testimony of Prof. Jonathan Turley); see also Jonathan Turley, Rule of
Law: Perjury Isn’t a Political Question, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1998, at A23. This is not to sug-
gest approval with the standard used in the Johnson impeachment, but rather to suggest that
the Nixon proceedings created a certain redundancy between the two houses. In the Johnson
case, Secretary of War Stanton was dismissed on February 21, 1968, and a resolution of im-
peachment was introduced that very day. On February 24, 1968, Johnson was impeached. See
generally MILTON LOMASK, ANDREW JOHNSON: PRESIDENT ON TRIAL 269-74 (1960). The
members considered the issue to be obvious in the Johnson case since the President had openly
violated a statute that expressly defined violations as “high misdemeanors.” See supra note 406
and accompanying text. The abusive character of the proceedings make the Johnson model of
questionable value. However, as noted earlier, the House routinely performed more limited
investigations and hearings in judicial impeachments.
471. During the House hearings, the White House was given authority to call any fact or
legal witnesses that it viewed relevant. The White House decided not to call fact witnesses in
favor of expert witnesses. This became a point of contention on the Senate floor when the
White House insisted that the House Judiciary Committee would not allow witnesses to be
called. Compare 145 CONG. REC. S1003 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999) (statement of David Kendall,
counsel to the President) (criticizing the absence of fact witnesses in the House), with 145
CONG. REC. S1009 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999) (statement of House manager Henry Hyde)
(stressing that the White House chose not to call fact witnesses in the House and stating that
the White House lawyers “have a positive allergy to fact witnesses”).
472. For a discussion of this model, see House Hearings, supra note 3, at 250-76 (testimony
of Prof. Jonathan Turley). The grand jury model was described in both the House debates and
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The Clinton impeachment unleashed a long-needed debate over
the purpose of impeachment and the underlying standards and pro-
cedures. In the House hearings on the “Background and History of
Impeachment,” nineteen witnesses were called to present historical
and legal theories of the meaning of “high crimes and misdemean-
ors.”473 This unique hearing placed the different academic views in
sharp relief. Emerging from this hearing was an “executive function”
theory474 limiting “high crimes and misdemeanors” to misconduct re-
lated to the office of the President or misuse of official power. While
supporters of the executive function theory recognized that this the-
ory was not absolute and that some private conduct can be impeach-
able, it was argued that Clinton’s conduct was personal and outside
the realm of “other high crimes and misdemeanors.” This theory has
been criticized in other articles.475 This threshold argument, however,
would appear again in the Senate trial. Notably, the defenders of the
President would argue that the standard of “high crimes and misde-
meanors” should be treated differently for judicial, as opposed to
presidential, officers.476 This argument was compelled by the fact that
the Senate exhibition by the House managers. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note
3, at 774-77 (citing various statements by advocates and academics during the impeachment
proceedings).
473. See House Hearings, supra note 3, at 237-76 (testimony of Prof. Jonathan Turley).
These witnesses included 17 academics, a former United States Attorney General, and a for-
mer Justice Department official.
474. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3, at 745-59; Turley, Executive Func-
tion Theory, supra note 3, at 1797-1804.
475. See, e.g., Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3; Turley, The Executive Function
Theory, supra note 3; Turley, Murder, Misdemeanors, and Madison, supra note 3.
476. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 3, at 88 (testimony of Prof. Cass Sunstein) (“My
basic conclusion is that the standard for impeaching the President has been much higher [than
the standard for impeaching judges than the standard for impeaching judges, and properly
so.”); id. at 235 (testimony of Prof. Susan Low Bloch) (“I would caution you not to equate what
is an impeachable offense for a president with what is impeachable conduct for a judge.”).
Various academics challenged the concept of a different standard for judicial and presidential
officers. Professor William Van Alstyne addressed this issue at length in his testimony:
Pleas suggesting somehow that the President is “different” (i.e., meaning “not as an-
swerable” in the same way, or to the same offenses, or to the same degree as others
subject to impeachment under the Constitution), ought not be readily entertained in
this Congress. The President is not different, whether as to what constitutes an im-
peachable offense or as to whether it is to be passed over; nor does the distinction
that he is elected (rather than appointed), grant him a latitude to engage in acts of
perjury or other federal crimes, such as they may be, in proceedings pending in our
courts of law.
Id. at 241 (testimony of Prof. William Van Alstyne).
The effort to distinguish the roles of the President and judges to support an argument for
a different standard is problematic. First, the common argument that the impeachment of a
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the Senate had previously removed Judge Claiborne for perjury be-
fore a grand jury and removed Judge Hastings, who had actually been
acquitted on perjury charges by a court.477
The Senate trial of President Clinton began on January 7, 1999,
with Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist taking the oath.478 At the
outset of the Senate trial, many senators argued for a vote on
whether the two articles of impeachment against President Clinton
constituted “high crimes and misdemeanors.”479 The vote would have
judge will not reverse a popular election (as it would a President) ignores the fact that im-
peachment does not reverse an election, since the Vice President replaces the President in suc-
cession. The suggestion that this process is in any way analogous to a parliamentary system,
where a government is replaced, is meritless. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3,
at 745 n.60, 749 n.79. Second, comparisons to the other branches is not always to the benefit of
the President. For example, some of the delegates appeared to favor impeachment to guaran-
tee the removal of a President because of his special powers as compared to those of Congress.
Madison noted that impeachment was necessary in cases of “incapacity, negligence or perfidy”
because a President guilty of such acts could not be relied upon to lead a government or foreign
affairs. 2 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 65-66. Madison noted this makes the President more dan-
gerous than legislative officers with the same failings:
The case of the Executive Magistracy was very distinguishable, from that of the Leg-
islative or of any other public body, holding offices of limited duration. It could not
be presumed that all or even a majority of the members of an Assembly would either
lose their capacity for discharging, or be bribed to betray, their trust. Besides the re-
straints of their personal integrity & honor, the difficulty of acting in concert for pur-
poses of corruption was a security to the public. And if one or a few members only
should be seduced, the soundness of the remaining members, would maintain the in-
tegrity and fidelity of the body. In the case of the Executive Magistracy which was to
be administrated by a single man, loss of capacity or corruption was more within the
compass of probable events, and either of them might be fatal to the Republic.
Id. at 66.
477. This argument was particularly poignant for some of the senators who actually voted
on these cases for conviction, a point that the House managers brought to their attention during
their argument. See 145 CONG. REC. S281, S290 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999).
478. Like Chief Justice Chase in the Johnson trial, Chief Justice Rehnquist was initially
viewed as inimical to the President’s policies. Rehnquist, however, may have been the best-
prepared presiding officer in any impeachment trial given his personal interest in impeachment
history and procedures. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC
IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992); Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist, The Impeachment Clause: A Wild Card in the Constitution, 85 NW. U. L.
REV. 903, 915-16 (1991). Rehnquist performed his duties with far greater attention to judicial
ethics than did his predecessor, Salmon Chase. Awarded by the members of the Senate with a
special plaque with a golden gavel, Rehnquist was widely viewed as fair and apolitical in his
rulings and conduct in the trial. See The Senate Verdict; Rehnquist Says Senate Stint Was ‘Cul-
ture Shock’; Chief Justice: Nation’s Top Jurist, Who Presided Over Trial, Compliments Law-
makers on Tenor of Their Debate Before Leaving Chambers, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1999, at A25
(quoting Trent Lott, Senate Majority Leader, as thanking Rehnquist for “a gentle dignity and
an unfailing sense of purpose and sometimes a sense of humor”).
479. Richard A. Serrano & James Gerstenzang, White House Won’t Delay State of Union
Address, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1999, at A12:
The abbreviated trial plan calls for the House managers and the White House to pre-
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been a Senate decision on the executive function theory. This thresh-
old vote would have constituted a re-voting of the House impeach-
ment decision, a redundant and unfounded vote. The Senate has
never dismissed articles of impeachment. As noted earlier, the Senate
had dismissed one case on jurisdictional grounds, the case against
William Blount.480 This was the first impeachment case and the criti-
cal decision as to the scope of officers subject to impeachment. Inter-
estingly, the Blount decision was not a determination of whether the
underlying conduct constituted impeachable offenses. Quite to the
contrary, the vast majority of the Senate was on record as to his
guilt.481 Rather, the Senate decided as a case of first impression that
legislative figures are outside the meaning of “civil officers.”482 The
Senate Democrats in the Clinton case presented a different question
in both kind and merit. The primary claim was that Clinton’s conduct,
even if constituting perjury and obstruction, did not fall under the
definition of high crimes and misdemeanors because this standard
was restricted to conduct related to his office. White House lawyers
argued that this conduct would not be indictable in a conventional
case due to technical definitions of perjury and obstruction.483 His-
torically, a similar argument had been raised in the Johnson trial.484
This claim was part of a motion to dismiss, which was defeated along
nearly straight party lines, with the notable defection of a single
Democrat opposing dismissal.485
Various other threshold arguments were made in the Clinton
case, including the use of censure as an alternative to impeachment,486
sent their cases over two days. Senators would ask questions on a third day, followed
by a final day in which the Senate would vote on whether the charges against
Clinton—even if proved—meet the constitutional standard of high crimes and mis-
demeanors required from removal from office.
480. See supra Part IV.A.1.
481. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
482. See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
483. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S810 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999) (statement of Gregory Craig,
Counsel to President Clinton).
484. Johnson’s defenders argued both that an offense must be indictable and that it must be
related to the office. Interestingly, during the Clinton hearings, one of the hypotheticals most
discussed was a case of murder unrelated to any executive function. See, e.g., House Hearings,
supra note 3, at 101, 220, 227 (testimony of Profs. Schlesinger and Tribe). This hypothetical was
also raised during the Johnson impeachment. See Benedict, supra note 18, at 79 (noting that
“the report had stated that murder would not be an impeachable offense, since it did not relate
directly to officeholding”).
485. See 145 CONG. REC. S1017 (daily ed. January 27, 1999).
486. Censure had been used by Congress against Andrew Jackson, as well as against eight
judges. See BORKIN, supra note 284, at 204. Censure is a shaming device that was never men-
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the legitimacy of indictments written in general terms,487 and the abil-
ity of a “lame duck” Congress to impeach a President.488 The White
tioned, let alone endorsed, by the Framers. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3, at
783-86; Jonathan Turley, Checking the Executive Pulse, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1998, at A11.
When Jackson was censured on March 29, 1834, the vote was quite close (26-20) and the cen-
sure was ultimately rescinded by a later Congress, and its lasting effect can be deduced by the
figure on the $20 bill. At the time, however, the dispute over the Bank of the United States was
viewed by Clay as nothing short of tyranny. Clay warned that Jackson’s actions placed the na-
tion “in the midst of a revolution, hitherto bloodless, but rapidly tending towards a total change
of the pure republican character of the Government, and to the concentration of all power in
the hands of one man.” 10 CONG. DEB. 59 (1833). Jackson was no less certain that the act of
censure threatened the core of the Constitution. Jackson insisted that the “only modes in which
the President of the United States is to be held liable for his official conduct” are to be found in
private actions against him by any injured citizen. 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 401, at
71-72, cited in R. Brent Walton, Paula Jones v. William Jefferson Clinton, 71 TUL. L. REV. 897,
909 (1997).
487. The White House argued that the articles of impeachment were fatally flawed because
they were written generally and did not specifically identify each alleged incident of perjury
and obstruction. This argument was based on a broad due process claim forbidding vague in-
dictments. See Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton, reprinted in 145
CONG. REC. S212 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999) (“Under the relevant case law, the two exhibited
Articles present paradigmatic examples of charges drafted too vaguely to enable the accused to
meet the accusations fairly.”). This argument, however, ignored the fact that prior articles of
impeachment were written in general terms, including the articles of impeachment in the Nixon
case. Moreover, there is no constitutional requirement that applies to the drafting of articles of
impeachment. Justice Story distinguished between articles of impeachment and indictments:
The articles . . . need not, and indeed do not, pursue the strict form and accuracy of
an indictment. They are sometimes quite general in the form of the allegations; but
always contain, or ought to contain, so much certainty, as to enable the party to put
himself upon the proper defense, and also, in case of an acquittal, to avail himself of
it, as a bar to another impeachment.
2 STORY, supra note 36, at 274. In its hearings concerning President Nixon, the Senate Rules
Committee specifically declined to treat Senate trials as criminal trials for the purposes of stan-
dards of proof and procedural rules. See Senate Rules and Precedents Applicable to Impeach-
ment Trials: Executive Session Hearings Before the Comm. on Rules and Administration and Its
Subcomm. on Standing Rules of the Senate, 93rd Cong. (1974).
Finally, if articles of impeachment are drafted generally, the accused has the right to ask
for a bill of particulars before the Senate trial. It is true that some articles have been quite de-
tailed, such as false statement allegations against Judge Alcee Hastings, but this remains a mat-
ter of discretion for the House. The incorporation of judicial rulings from criminal cases offers
little more than arguments for fairness rather than direct or binding precedent.
488. This point was made by Professor Bruce Ackerman, who further insisted that the elec-
toral losses of the Republicans in the prior election only demonstrated the abuse of such a
move. See Impeachment Inquiry: William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States: Pres-
entation on Behalf of the President: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 37-38 (1998) (testimony of Prof. Bruce Ackerman). This was an interesting historical
point to raise given the fact that the Johnson impeachment also occurred at a time when the
Radical Republicans were losing electoral support. See BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 70-71
(noting that after the Radical Republicans’ defeat in 1867, “they knew it would be more diffi-
cult . . . to win the majority needed to bring the impeachment before the Senate. . . . [C]entrists,
who might have favored impeachment had the elections demonstrated radical strength, now
TURLEY TO PRINTER 11/30/99 3:15 PM
104 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:1
House also argued that the perjury article was fatally flawed because
it allowed senators to divide on the specific instance of perjury. Thus,
less than two-thirds of the Senate could agree on any individual act of
perjury but still convict on the final article.489 This argument had been
raised and rejected in prior impeachments.490 Raising a variety of such
issues, the White House argued for a dismissal of articles of im-
peachment. The motion failed, consistent with such motions in prior
trials.491
After considerable initial skirmishing and partisanship, the Sen-
ate adopted a set of novel Senate rules adopted by unanimous vote.
These rules raised fundamental problems for the use of the Senate
trial as a Madisonian device. The rules specifically required the
House managers to prove their case for witnesses and imposed a wit-
ness-by-witness Senate vote on the House managers.492 While the
divided, most of them opposing impeachment”). The constitutional case for such an objection,
however, is highly questionable. Past impeachments have occurred in such circumstances, and
the adoption of such a view ignores obvious constitutional problems. While there may be com-
pelling reasons to allow a new Congress to act in some circumstances, there are other circum-
stances that would make delay impracticable or even dangerous. To suggest that this is any-
thing other than a discretionary choice is without support in either the constitutional text or its
history. On a practical level, the change in Congress would not have saved the President from
impeachment, assuming a party-line vote. Only one article dealing with obstruction was passed
with less than five votes (the new Congress would have five less Republicans). See Ruth Mar-
cus, Clinton Team Considers Legal Fight Against Trial, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1998, at A1.
489. The House managers argued that this “divisibility issue” was partially addressed by
Rule XXIII. See 145 CONG. REC. S869 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1999). Added in 1986, this rule dis-
courages dividing articles of impeachment for a final vote. See S. Res. 479, 99th Cong. (1986)
(enacted) (“An article of impeachment shall not be divisible for the purpose of voting thereon
at any time during the trial.”).
490. Judge Walter Nixon raised this objection when he faced 14 allegations of false state-
ments. Judge Nixon argued that in such articles the Senate should find every statement to be
false before conviction. The Senate rejected this challenge 34-63. As House manager Benjamin
L. Cardin stated, “This is by no means unfair to Judge Nixon, for even if you might differ on
which particular statements are lies, the bottom line is that two-thirds of you will have agreed
that he concealed information, rendering him unfit for office. That is what the Constitution re-
quires.” 135 CONG. REC. 26,751 (1989) (statement of House manager Benjamin L. Cardin).
491. Articles of impeachment have been stricken in only one case, and this was done at the
request of the House managers to simplify the trial. In the case of Judge Halsted Ritter, the
House managers moved to strike two counts of one of the articles for which Judge Ritter was
convicted. See 80 CONG. REC. 4898-99 (1936).
492. Under the unanimously enacted Senate Resolution 16, the Senate rules not only re-
quired a vote from the Senate on whether to depose any witnesses demanded by the House
managers, but required:
If the Senate agrees to allow either the House or the President to call witnesses, the
witnesses shall first be deposed and the Senate shall decide after deposition which
witnesses shall testify, pursuant to the impeachment rules. Further, the time for
depositions shall be agreed to by both leaders.
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Senate has always been recognized as having complete authority over
the procedures of Senate trials, it has never had such a degree of con-
trol over the exhibition of the House case against an impeached offi-
cial. Ultimately, the Senate would only approve three witnesses, de-
scribed by House manager and Judiciary Committee Chairman
Henry Hyde as “a pitiful three.”493 The tension between the two
houses was more than evident on the Senate floor as House managers
objected to the degree of control exercised by the Senate.494
The Clinton trial also saw a variation of a method used in the
trial of Judge Pickering.495 Various senators argued for a bifurcated or
divided vote. Senate Republicans advocated an initial vote on a
finding of fact as to the underlying criminal conduct.496 They would
then vote on the articles of impeachment. This was a variation of the
use of censure as an alternative to removal. The use of censure and
factfinding reflect a legislative desire to craft an alternative to the
limited choices given by the Framers. Once in the impeachment pro-
145 CONG. REC. S50 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 1999).
493. 145 CONG. REC. S1009 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999) (statement of House manager Henry
Hyde).
494. One defining issue was the decision of the House managers to meet with former White
House intern Monica Lewinsky before the Senate had voted on whether to depose witnesses. In
order to compel this meeting over the objections of Lewinsky’s lawyers, the House managers
asked Independent Counsel Starr to request a judicial order requiring the meeting under the
existing immunity agreement with Ms. Lewinsky. This led to claims that the Independent
Counsel was the “fourteenth House manager” and that the meeting was a violation of the Sen-
ate procedures. See 145 CONG. REC. E213, E214 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Brady); 145 CONG. REC. S991, S1002 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999) (statement of David Kendall,
counsel to the President); Peter Baker, Starr Tries to Force Lewinsky Interview; House ‘Manag-
ers’ Want to Talk to Her, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1999, at A1 (quoting Senator Daschle as saying
that Starr had been enlisted as the “fourteenth House Manager”); Joyce Howard Price, Sena-
tors Warm to a Finding of Fact, Acquittal, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1999, at A1 (quoting Senator
Dodd accusing Starr of attempting to become the “fourteenth House Manager”).
The Senate objections reflect a common misunderstanding that the House managers are
agents of the Senate as opposed to representatives of an equal and independent House with
different institutional interests and prerogatives. The Senate does not exercise control over the
House managers in the development of their case or interviews outside of the Senate process.
The Senate can bar testimony and evidence from the Senate floor, but the suggestion of control
over the managers in interviews with prospective witnesses only illustrated the continuing un-
certainty as to the respective roles of the two houses in these proceedings.
495. The proposal was an interesting variation of the bifurcated vote in the Pickering case.
When the Senate finally moved to vote on Judge Pickering’s removal, it divided the vote into
two parts. The initial vote was to determine if Pickering was “guilty as charged,” as opposed to
whether he had committed impeachable offenses under the articles of impeachment. See
GERHARDT, supra note 243, at 5.
496. See Eric Pianin & Guy Gugliotta, Senate’s Fiercest Partisan Battle Possible over ‘Find-
ings of Fact’, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1999, at A7.
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cess, legislators often discover that not only is the standard high but
the penalty is equally high. This creates a political risk that removal
may be perceived as too harsh a response to the underlying offense.
The use of extraconstitutional elements is inherently destabilizing for
a system with few, but immutable, static characteristics. Nevertheless,
there is no constitutional barrier to the Senate’s voting on prelimi-
nary findings of fact before voting on the articles of impeachment.
While it is highly questionable whether the Senate can “convict” but
not remove a President, the Senate is unquestionably able to vote on
preliminary issues such as findings of fact. Such measures are not re-
viewable by the courts and can be compelled over any negative ruling
of the Chief Justice by a simple majority vote—a major distinction
between their roles as jurors and triers in impeachment cases.497
No case has placed the role of the Senate trial into sharper focus.
After forty-four Democrats voted for dismissal, the White House in-
sisted that there was no value in continuing with the presentation of
witnesses since the outcome of the trial was all but certain.498 Any
continuation of the trial was portrayed as nothing more than a “show
trial.”499 The control over witnesses in the Clinton case illustrates the
sharp difference in the interests of the two houses.500 Senators intent
497. During the Senate trial, Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) objected to the use of the term
“jurors” by House manager Bob Barr to describe senators in an impeachment trial. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist ruled in his favor: “The chair is of the view that the objection of the Senator
from Iowa is well taken, that the Senate is not simply a jury; it is a court in this case. Therefore,
counsel should refrain from referring to the Senators as jurors.” 145 CONG. REC. S279 (daily
ed. Jan. 15, 1999) (statement of Chief Justice William Rehnquist). The Chief Justice’s ruling
was curious as a bench order on nomenclature, particularly on a term that has been used in
many prior trials. Clearly, senators are not conventional jurors, but the point is a precious one
and the term itself is not wholly inaccurate. Senators, including a number of senators during the
Clinton trial, have long used the term to reflect their primary function in reaching a verdict. See
Edwin Chen, Gore Weighs in on Senate Trial, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1998, at A1 (quoting West
Virginia Senator Robert Byrd, Jr., warning about presidential efforts “to tamper with this
jury”).
498. See Helen Dewar, Democrats Step Up Push for Censure; Senators in Both Parties Seek
to Open Final Deliberations, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1999, at A1.
499. Id.
500. In the House proceedings, the Democratic members were given the authority to call
fact witnesses but chose (as did the majority) to call expert witnesses. The only other witnesses
in the House hearings were Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr and two convicted perjurers.
See Consequences of Perjury and Related Crimes: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 105th Cong. (1998). The issue of fact witnesses, and particularly testimony from the
accused official, has been debated in past House impeachments. In the proceedings related to
Judge Charles T. Sherman in 1873, for example, the House members debated the need to post-
pone impeachment for additional testimony of the accused judge:
[The motion for a final impeachment vote] caused an issue to be joined as to whether
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on voting for acquittal not only opposed witnesses but also any video-
taping of potential witnesses for public review. In attempting to bar
the public review of testimony by critical witnesses, these senators
demonstrated the danger of the Senate’s exercising a high degree of
control over the presentation of witnesses. In the trial of Warren
Hastings, Edmund Burke defended the value of presenting the full
case to the public regardless of the commitment of Hastings’s sup-
porters to acquittal.501 When a partisan block promises to prevent
conviction, it may be more important for the full evidence in the case
to be presented.502 Senators can then insist on a lack of evidence that
might have been made public in a trial. In this way, there may be
Presidents who are so popular that they would be forgiven for almost
any crime.503 Conversely, some individuals may be so unpopular that
crimes committed against them are forgiven. Finally, a President’s
party may be in complete control of the Senate and guarantee an ac-
quittal. In any of these circumstances, the insistence that the trial is
meaningless ignores the importance of the legal process in disclosing
or not an officer ought to be impeached without an opportunity to be heard. It was
explained that Judge Sherman had appeared before the Ways and Means Committee
only as a witness, to answer such questions as were asked, and without power to ex-
plain or adduce evidence in his own belief.
Those who favored delay to permit Judge Sherman to be heard seemed generally to
consider that his conduct merited impeachment . . . .
Mr. Butler said that in the cases of Judges Pickering and Chase the opportunity to be
heard was not given, but it had been conceded in “the case of Judge Watrous, in the
case of Judge Peck, in the case even of Andrew Johnson.”
3 HINDS, supra note 143, § 2512, at 1020.
501. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
502. The Clinton trial also demonstrated the impact of television on impeachment pro-
ceedings. When the Framers crafted a representative system, they envisioned a Senate pro-
tected from the direct influence of factional impulse. The advent of live television and Senate
coverage has made senators far more vulnerable to factional influence. Notably, senators in the
Clinton trial moved to allow televised coverage of their deliberations, not just the arguments of
the House managers and White House lawyers. See Dewar, supra note 498, at A1. Absent pub-
lic testimony of witnesses, television may degrade the dialogic value of these procedures, while
obviously advancing participatory political values.
503. This certainly seems to be relevant to the Clinton trial on some level. See Jonathan
Turley, Perspective on the Presidency; Is He Too Popular to Impeach?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9,
1998, at A15 [hereinafter Turley, Too Popular]. Polls taken during the Senate trial uniformly
showed that the vast majority of Americans did not believe the President and had concluded
that he committed crimes in office. See, e.g., Richard Benedetto, Most in Poll Stand by Their
President, USA TODAY, Jan. 12, 1999, at 5A (citing polls in which “a remarkable 79% say they
already believe that Clinton committed perjury before a federal grand jury and a majority of
53% agree that he obstructed justice in the Paula Jones lawsuit”). Yet, a similar percentage
favored his retention in office. See id.
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evidence to the public and calling both a President and his Senate tri-
ers to account.
The degree of senatorial control exercised over the House man-
agers in the Clinton trial produced immediate factional and partisan
results.504 In past cases, the Senate treated the House managers as
largely in control of the exhibition of the case. For that reason, parti-
san voting was kept to a minimum, with the exception of marginal
limitations imposed by the Senate on such matters as scheduling and
the number of witnesses. Once the Senate assumed greater opera-
tional control, particularly under the glare of television lights, each
incremental issue in the Clinton trial became a partisan test of loy-
alty. With the first assertion of control, the Senate found itself micro-
managing the House presentation on every issue, from the ability to
depose witnesses, to how long a deposition would be allowed to run,
to the presence of a video camera in depositions. Ironically, the result
was to prolong the trial in a mire of minutiae.505 The result was a
sharp curtailment of the evidence presented against the President,
with virtually no public presentation of witness testimony in a case
turning in part on credibility issues. Due to the Senate management
of the House case, it will never be known if the presentation of a full
public case with witnesses would have led to greater defections on ei-
ther side or a change in public opinion as to the President’s conduct.
The Clinton trial may indicate the continued factionalism inher-
ent in presidential impeachments, as opposed to the decline of such
interests in judicial impeachments. It is more likely, however, a re-
flection of the importance of Senate trial rules in advancing political
values other than removal. Once the Senate assumed control over the
progress of the trial, every procedural issue and witness became a
partisan issue. As a result, the House managers were prevented from
putting on what they considered to be their strongest case. The Sen-
ate’s assertion of control will likely be an irresistible temptation in fu-
504. At least one senator insisted that the failure to call witnesses prevented him from con-
victing the President despite his view that the President was probably guilty of the crimes al-
leged. Thus, Senator Arlen Specter insisted on voting “not proven” rather than guilty or not
guilty, borrowing the phrase from Scottish law. See Eric Pianin, Public Confusion over Secret
Deliberations; Senators Are Unsure What They Can Say, and When and Where They Can Say It,
WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1999, at A16 (“Under Scottish law, there are three possible verdicts:
guilty, not guilty and not proved, and I intend to vote not proved as to both articles. That is not
to say that the president is not guilty, but to specifically say that the charges, in my judgment,
have not been proved.”).
505. The House managers had initially proposed a two- to three-week trial with witnesses.
The Senate rules prolonged the trial while reducing the actual presentation of witnesses.
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ture trials. The Clinton rules allowed senators to claim that a case
could not be made, even as they were simultaneously preventing the
House managers from proving the contrary.
Regardless of one’s view of the evidence and allegations, the sig-
nificant shift of operative control over the presentation of evidence
should be troubling. The Clinton rules are likely to be an irresistible
temptation for future Senate courts of impeachment. Once this
authority has been exercised over the House exhibition of evidence,
it will be tempting for senators to fashion cases to meet their political
interests and not necessarily the interests of an open deliberative
process.506 The result will be a factional contest without the open de-
bate needed to marshal consensus over the questions of legitimacy.
As will be shown below, this will only serve to preserve divisive fac-
tional issues that could be tempered, if not eliminated, under a full
trial and final vote on the evidence.
IV. IMPEACHMENT AS A MADISONIAN DEVICE
A. Factions and the Madisonian Democracy
One of the unique elements of the Madisonian democracy is the
recognition of, and response to, factional divisions. The greatest sin-
gle instability of past governmental systems was the failure to address
the inevitable development of factions. The Athenian model of direct
democracy was rejected by Madison precisely because it “admits of
no cure for the mischiefs of faction.”507 Rather than following the past
506. In such cases, House managers have to determine whether they should continue in a
process under such senatorial intrusion. The question of the propriety or option of resignation
was in fact raised with the author by one House manager in the Clinton case seeking constitu-
tional or historical background to support such an act. Faced with limitations preventing the
exhibition of their strongest possible case, this House manager was concerned that their obliga-
tion was to resign rather than to present an artificially weak case. Although this was avoided in
the Clinton trial, a future confrontation between the two houses could erupt under these rules,
with the refusal of House managers to present a weak case to a body presumably committed to
acquittal.
507. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). This
concern of direct democratic impulse is worthy of contemporary review given the influence of
television on legislative deliberation, which is now shown on live television. During the Clinton
trial, senators argued for the elimination of the historical rule against public viewing of delib-
eration and debate by the senators. With such calls for greater openness, the Madisonian de-
vices designed to separate senators from direct public influence will be obviously affected. Like
all issues of participatory politics, this brings both benefits and possible liabilities to the legisla-
tive process.
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practice of emphasizing collective aspirational goals in a constitution,
Madison realized that the failure of past government was due in no
small part to the failure to recognize the divisions that attend any po-
litical system.508
Madison had no delusions about the natural tendencies of men
in power509 or the government as a whole.510 “If men were angels,”
Madison instructed, “no government would be necessary. If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on gov-
ernment would be necessary.”511 Even in the most homogenous na-
tions, factions proved the destabilizing element in their political sys-
tems, largely due to the absence of static or structural procedures to
deal with divisions. Madison was faced with the most pluralistic na-
tion on earth and its promise of religious, economic, political, and ra-
cial factions.512 Unless factions could be anticipated and controlled in
some fashion, they would remain below the surface, where they
would fester and eventually appear in the streets to the collective
508. Many Framers had little faith in the ability of the public to exercise judgment in direct
elections and national affairs:
The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally
this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are tur-
bulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Given therefore to the
first class a distinct, permanent share in the government. They will check the un-
steadiness of the second . . . . Nothing but a permanent body can check the impru-
dence of democracy.
1 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 299 (quoting Alexander Hamilton); see also id. at 48 (warning that
the public immediately “should have as little to do as may be about the Government . . . [be-
cause t]hey want information and are constantly liable to be misled”).
509. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 507, at 80 (predicting that “[e]nlightened
statesmen will not always be at the helm” of government). Alexander Hamilton appeared to
share this view when he warned that “men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 6, at 54 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
510. Madison’s most noted comment is worth repeating in this context:
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great dif-
ficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and
in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt,
the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the ne-
cessity of auxiliary precautions.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
511. Id.
512. While the United States presented greater chances for factionalism, Madison also
noted that the unique characteristics and the size of the new nation could help reduce these
dangers since “society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens,
that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combi-
nations of the majority. . . . The degree of security . . . will depend on the number of interests
and sects.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 510, at 324.
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danger of the system and all within it.513 Madison concluded that “the
causes of faction cannot be removed and that relief is only to be
sought in the means of controlling its effects.”514 The Madisonian sys-
tem was built to survive tremendous internal pressures through a
process of constitutional implosion in which factional interests were
directed into a core of legislative activity. This method of regulating
factional interests helped to shape the separation-of-powers doctrine
and the system of checks and balances in the Constitution.515 Madison
defined factions broadly:
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting
to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated
by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the
rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests
of the community.516
The Framers were well aware of the presence of factions in the
United States from their colonial experiences. The colonies were rid-
dled with often violent factional interests fueled by political and re-
ligious divisions. The Framers were also aware of the periodic explo-
sion of violence under both the English and colonial systems that
could be attributed in large part to the absence of any structural
methods for resolving or addressing such interests.517 Nevertheless, as
Madison strove to deal with factions, the delegates divided sharply
between Federalists favoring representative procedures and anti-
Federalists favoring more direct democratic procedures. The Feder-
alists believed that pure democratic systems were inherently unstable
and that the solution to factional threats could be found in a repre-
sentative system containing separation of powers and a system of
checks and balances. This Federalist vision is central to understand-
ing the role of the Senate in impeachment trials.
The Framers sought to address the inevitable formation of fac-
tions in a free government without simultaneously suppressing liberty
513. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 67 (noting Benjamin Franklin’s belief that impeach-
ment could be used as a method of avoiding open conflict or assassination).
514. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 507, at 80.
515. See Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 2, at 44 (discussing the use of checks and bal-
ances to counteract factional pressures).
516. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 507, at 78.
517. Both the Johnson and (to a lesser extent) the Clinton impeachments saw some violent
clashes of citizens. In the Johnson case, these emotions were particularly high due to the recent
civil war and a widespread rumor that “rebel sympathizers had secreted nitroglycerin in build-
ings all over [the Capitol].” SMITH, supra note 391, at 231.
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itself.518 Madison sought to balance these two interests, noting that
“[t]o secure the public good and private rights against the danger of
such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the
form of popular government, is then the great object to which our in-
quiries are directed.”519 The Madisonian solution was for
“[a]mbition . . . to counteract ambition.”520 Under this system, fac-
tional interests and preferences were coaxed to the surface of a leg-
islative process in which such interests could be realized in whole or
in part only by majoritarian agreement. In order to secure such
agreement, compromise would be required in both houses of Con-
gress, with an appeal to values or interests broader than those of any
particular narrow interest group. In such a process, civic virtue is
hardly guaranteed or uniformly achieved. It is, however, a dialogic
process yielding some level of informed consent in a representative
system.521
The factional interests evident in impeachment controversies
(particularly presidential impeachments) easily fulfill the expecta-
tions of the Framers. Impeachment often presents what Hamilton de-
scribed as “sudden bree[zes] of passion” and “transient impulse[s]
which the people . . . receive from the arts of men, who flatter their
prejudices to betray their interests.”522 As the last part indicated, im-
peachment often begins with sharp factional interests and polarized
public views of the accused. Over the course of the process, however,
civic virtue has often emerged to trump factional interests: even in
the most factional fights over judicial impeachments, the Senate has
seen critical defections from members based on principle.523 Gradu-
ally, the Senate trials of impeached judges became more nonpartisan.
Likewise, in the case of President Johnson, seven Republicans aban-
518. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 507, at 78:
Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an ailment without which it instantly expires.
But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life,
because it nourishes faction than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is
essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
519. Id. at 80.
520. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 510, at 322.
521. The greatest threat to this concept in modern legislation is the presence of tremendous
information barriers to the pubic and hidden dealmaking. These problems have been identified
with considerable success by the public-choice school and legisprudence scholars. For a descrip-
tion of the effect of these barriers on modern legislation, see Jonathan Turley, Transnational
Discrimination and the Economics of Extraterritorial Regulation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 339, 354-70
(1990) (describing various theories of legisprudence and public-choice scholarship).
522. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, at 432 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
523. See supra notes 217, 246, 275, 300, 303, 313-14, 430-34, 441 and accompanying text.
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doned their party (and their personal interests) to acquit the Presi-
dent.524 This included defections on critical procedural votes—such as
the presentation of witnesses—by senators who would vote to con-
vict, but who also supported the procedural integrity of the process.525
Where factionalism has reigned in impeachment trials, such as the
trial of President Clinton, it is notable that Senate trial rules were
significantly altered to reduce open deliberation and debate.526 While
such deliberation may not have transformed the tenor of the trial,
there is evidence that the reduction in deliberation sustained, or even
fueled, hard-line partisan voting.
The role of impeachment in addressing factional disputes is
largely ignored in discussions of impeachment. There is an irresistible
temptation for academics and legislators to stress the popularity of a
President in opposing his impeachment.527 Some academics tie such
arguments to a misuse of Hamilton’s famous description of the im-
peachment process as “political.”528 As the “proper guardians of the
public weal,”529 this is used to suggest somehow that popular opinion
must dictate a conclusion or heavily influence a senatorial vote.530
With some exceptions in the anti-Federalist ranks, the Framers were
an unlikely group to endorse a theory of simply voting the political
judgment of the electorate during impeachment proceedings or dur-
ing any legislative function. The Framers repeatedly stressed that
senators were expected to ignore popular will on some occasions
since, as Madison stated, “it may well happen that the public voice,
pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more conso-
nant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves,
524. See supra notes 430-34 and accompanying text.
525. See BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 142 (“Despite their conviction that Johnson’s inten-
tion to raise a court case, even if proven, could not vitiate his guilt, they allowed the President’s
counsel to present evidence on the subject, evidence that could only bolster the President’s case
and weaken the managers’ before the nation.”). During the Clinton trial, this principled stand
was taken by a single Democratic senator, Russell Feingold of Wisconsin, who defected from
his party to support the calling of witnesses and to oppose dismissal. Even though Feingold in-
dicated a likely vote of acquittal, he objected to the abbreviated trial procedures suggested by
his party. See Sen. Feingold Is Lone Defector; Democrat Broke Ranks on Both Votes, WASH.
POST, Jan. 28, 1999, at A18. This position was roundly condemned in Feingold’s state. See id.
526. See supra notes 328-34, 499-506 and accompanying text.
527. See Turley, Too Popular?, supra note 503.
528. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 1, at 396; see also Turley, Executive Function
Theory, supra note 3, at 1808-11.
529. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 507, at 82.
530. See infra note 598 and accompanying text.
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convened for the purpose.”531 Moreover, the Framers hoped that the
bicameral system and the system of checks and balances would in-
spire civic virtue, not sustain factional voting.532 Finally, Madison was
primarily concerned with majority, not minority, factions. It is hardly
necessary to create such procedures to avoid minority factions since
“[i]f a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the
republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister
views by regular vote.”533 Impeachment assures the public of their
continuing authority to remove a President,534 while still allowing
senators to resist majoritarian impulses for unwarranted conviction
or acquittal. Arguing that the majority is opposed to an impeachment
as the basis for terminating a proceeding is a reckless argument if one
believes that impeachment procedures address factional disputes and
encourage civic virtue.
The factionalism inherent in the impeachment process offers a
unique context for the rivaling republican and pluralist theories that
exploded with the “Republican Revival.” In the last two decades,
academics have been sharply divided over their visions of the politi-
cal system. The pluralist view emphasizes private interests formed
not in the political system, but exogenously. Under this view, the po-
litical system becomes a process in which private preferences are ad-
vanced as factional interests or expressions. The republican view
stressed the deliberative character of the Madisonian system and its
ability to transform factional interests into collective judgments.
Academics like Frank Michelman,535 Cass Sunstein,536 and others537
531. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 507 at 82; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, su-
pra note 522, at 432:
When occasions present themselves in which the interests of the people are at vari-
ance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed
to be the guardians of those interests to withstand the temporary delusion in order to
give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection.
532. See infra notes 592-97 and accompanying text.
533. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 507, at 80.
534. Abraham Baldwin reflected the view that impeachment allowed for an element of di-
rect popular will in the removal of a president:
The Constitution provides for – what? That no bad man should come into office. . . .
But suppose that one such could be got in, he can be got out again in despite of the
President. We can impeach him, and drag him from his place . . . .
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 558 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
535. See Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Frank Michelman,
Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Foreword].
536. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988)
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have rejected purely pluralist conceptions of politics and advanced a
“deliberative democratic” model.538 Under this model, private prefer-
ences and factional interests are merely an original state in the politi-
cal process, but the public may, with debate and deliberation, “en-
gage in a form of deliberation without domination through the
influence of factions.”539
In modern politics, it is often forgotten that the Madisonian de-
mocracy was designed to force factional interests into an open legisla-
tive process. Congress, particularly the House, is often criticized as
openly “partisan.” The change in nomenclature from concerns over
“factional” to “partisan” interests reflects the emergence of organ-
ized parties and political organizations.540 Today, “partisanism” is
used generally to refer to the two major parties, while regional, eco-
nomic, or other interests are generally referred to as “special inter-
ests.” Such distinctions were less evident in the eighteenth century
before the full development of dominant political parties and sys-
tems. While party affiliation was viewed darkly by many of the Fram-
ers,541 particularly Washington,542 Madison viewed their creation as in-
evitable, if regrettable, in a free system.543
[hereinafter Sunstein, Republican Revival]; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 2.
537. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J.
453 (1989); Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013 (1984); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
538. Sunstein has argued against the view of interest-group politics as being part of the tra-
ditions of American constitutionalism, and he rejects “naked preference” theories as merely
allowing “the distribution of resources or opportunities to one group rather than another solely
on the ground that those favored have exercised the raw political power to obtain what they
want.” Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689,
1689 (1984).
539. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 20 (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN,
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION].
540. One of the first references to the often bitter rivalry of the Republican and Federalist
parties can be traced to a letter from Jefferson to Washington in which Jefferson describes his
faction as “the Republicans” and his intention to organize against the “monarchical Federal-
ists” associated with Hamilton and Adams. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Parties’ Origins, in OF
THE PEOPLE—THE YEAR OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 14 (Murray Fisher ed., 1992); see also
Morton Horwitz & Orlando do Campo, When and How the Supreme Court Found Democ-
racy—A Computer Study, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 24 (1994).
541. Professor Steven Calabresi described the distrust of party factions that was prevalent
in the colonial and postcolonial periods:
[T]he idea of parties conjured up for the Framers a political world in which the
“parts” of the nation were literally at war with one another and with the interests of
the “whole.” The memory of the English struggle between religious and feudal class-
based factions and parties must have left Washington and Madison in fear of some-
thing not unlike what we see unfolding today in Bosnia . . . .
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The establishment of two violently opposed political parties only
magnified the importance of forced dialogue in the legislative process
as a vital political forum. Political factions quickly severed lines of
communications, such that, as Jefferson observed, “[m]en who have
been intimate all their lives, cross the street to avoid meeting, and
turn their heads another way lest they should be obliged to touch
their hats.”544 The bicameral system forced communications in the in-
terests of the parties and took conflicts from the streets into a legisla-
tive process. This dialogic process is particularly important in im-
peachment cases, where factional views tend to be passionate and
tend to compromise faith in the legitimacy of leadership.
In applying Madisonian concepts to impeachment, it is important
to reemphasize that Madison did not advocate a bicameral system for
impeachment. Madison opposed the Senate as the trier of impeach-
ments. Madison’s preference for the federal courts as triers of im-
peachment is evident in his support of the Virginia Plan,545 his pro-
Colonial Americans were united in their violent distaste for what they thought was
the extreme corruption and venality of eighteenth-century English politics. The de-
sire to escape English-style corruption contributed to the drive for Independence,
and it was linked in the popular imagination with the various corrupt cabals and
“juntos” that swirled around the so-called English Court party and the Country
Party.
Steven G. Calabresi, Mediating Institutions: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction: Political
Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1479, 1487 (1994).
542. Political parties only emerged toward the end of Washington’s second term, against his
strong views that such organizations were detrimental to the public good:
It serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration.
It agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the
animosity of one part against another; foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It
opens the door to foreign influence and corruption . . . .
In those [governments] of the popular character, in governments purely elective, it is
a spirit not be encouraged. . . . A Fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform
vigilance to prevent its bursting into flame, lest instead of warming, it should con-
sume.
George Washington, Farewell Address, reprinted in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 401,
at 219. Nevertheless, parties soon formed around the views of Jefferson (the Republicans) and
Hamilton (the Federalists). Madison was a reluctant but active participant in the emerging
party wing of Jefferson.
543. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM 26 (1969); Calabresi, su-
pra note 541, at 1488.
544. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Rutledge (June 24, 1798), in 2 THE LIFE OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 24 (George Tucker ed., 1873), quoted in Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal
Common Law (pt. 1), 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1024 (1985).
545. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. It is important to note that the original im-
peachment proposal was a mere five-word clause included in a 15-section proposal by
Randolph. See 1 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 20. This proposal covered a wide range of issues,
including some curious devices such as a provision allowing for veto authority to be exercised
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posal to strike the words “by the Senate” in the final debate,546 and
the vote of the Virginia delegation (joined only by the Pennsylvania
delegation) against approval of the impeachment provisions.547 Madi-
son’s later view of these procedures will remain shrouded in uncer-
tainty.548 While it is clear that Madison and the other delegates were
concerned with factions in fashioning the impeachment process, the
application of Madisonian concepts relating to bicameralism and fac-
tionalism to Senate trials cannot be attributed to any originalist the-
ory.549 The suggested transformative value of the Senate trial as a
Madisonian device is based on Madison’s vision of the bicameral leg-
islative process, not on his initial views of the best impeachment pro-
cess.
B. Senate Trials and Legitimacy Questions in the Impeachment
Process
Factionalism in the impeachment process is often inevitable
when legitimacy questions are raised about the continuation of a
by “the Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, [who] ought to compose
a council of revision with authority to examine every act of the National Legislature before it
shall operate.” Id. at 21. The Randolph proposal on May 29, 1787, supported by Madison and
written in his own handwriting, reflects an early stage of debate over the tripartite system and
the bicameral legislative process.
546. On September 8, 1787, Madison voted in favor of the standard of “high crimes and
misdemeanors,” but then moved to strike the words “by the Senate” from the impeachment
clause:
Mr. Madison, objected to a trial of the President by the Senate, especially as he was
to be impeached by the other branch of the Legislature and for any act which might
be called a misdemesnor [sic]. The President under these circumstances was made
improperly dependent. He would prefer the supreme Court for the trial of impeach-
ments, or rather a tribunal of which that should form a part.
2 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 551. Pinckney agreed with Madison’s concerns, while Sherman
and Williamson objected to the change in venue for impeachment trials. The vote rejecting
Madison’s proposal was 9-2, with Virginia and Pennsylvania in the minority. See id.
547. See id. at 550-51.
548. It is not clear how Madison’s views may have changed over time. Ironically, while
Madison was the principal architect of a system that had the ability to transform factions’ views
through open and deliberative process, it is rarely considered that Madison’s views may have
changed after the Constitutional Convention. Hamilton also produced an alternative plan but
came to view the Senate as the optimal trier of impeachments. Madison would correspond on
the subject of impeachment cases but never expressed any lingering discontentment over the
bicameral impeachment process. See supra note 212 (discussing correspondence between Madi-
son and Jefferson).
549. Moreover, impeachments in the colonial and postcolonial periods were not especially
open proceedings, to the degree favored in this Article. While trials were public, most legisla-
tive proceedings were not. The Madisonian system sought to achieve dialogue among represen-
tatives in the bicameral system, not a dialogue with the represented.
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popularly elected President. Factional pressures will be at their apex
when one party, as is often the case, seeks the possible removal of the
titular head of the other party. There is no greater danger or greater
test for a democratic system. The brilliance of Madison was his rec-
ognition that factions and divisions within a nation can, if left unre-
solved, fester into open conflict or “convulse the society.”550 Madison
saw the natural inclination of citizens to divide on issues of impor-
tance to a democratic system. As he said, “[t]he latent causes of fac-
tion are . . . sown in the nature of man.”551 Rather than emphasize
only aspirational collective values,552 Madison emphasized the impor-
tance of recognizing factional divisions and the need to force such di-
visions into the open for a majoritarian result.553 The bicameral sys-
tem was a result of this deliberative democratic concept. As Professor
Cass Sunstein has discussed:
[T]he principle of political deliberation . . . is part and parcel of the
original Madisonian conception of politics. It resonates in our gov-
ernmental institutions, including national representation, checks and
balances, federalism, and judicial review. It is connected with the
American belief that disagreement and heterogeneity are creative
forces, indispensable to a well-functioning republic.554
Through the Madisonian bicameral process, factional interests can
evolve through the catalyst of debate and deliberation into majori-
tarian resolutions. Certainly, this is the “deliberative ideal,”555 albeit a
sometimes unrealized ideal.
While consensus has largely been achieved in judicial impeach-
ment cases, there has been little consensus in presidential impeach-
ments. Nevertheless, impeachment trials often lead to significant
preference transformation as a result of the deliberative processes.
With open and full trials, this transformation can occur for both leg-
550. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 507, at 80.
551. Id. at 79.
552. Madison criticized previous philosophers for their assumptions about human interests
and behavior. See id. at 81 (“Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of govern-
ment, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their politi-
cal rights, they would at the same time be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their posses-
sions, their opinions, and their passions.”).
553. See id. at 80 (“The inference to which we are brought is that the causes of faction can-
not be removed and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.”).
554. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 539, at 135.
555. Id. at 20.
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islators and the public at large.556 While the public-choice critique
raises serious questions over the achievement of consensus or true
preference transformation in modern legislation, impeachment is an
area in which the open and deliberative process has yielded consen-
sus and notable reductions of factional interests. Impeachment de-
bates often invoke values beyond the immediate case that run to con-
stitutional, social, and political traditions. At its ideal, an
impeachment trial can involve many of the aspects of Michelman’s
description of “paideia,” or the “process of collective enlightenment
of [a community’s] members through their reflections on their shared
cultural inheritance, and their way of living well through engagement
in that process.”557 Impeachment trials force participants to state their
interests, not as naked preferences, but in terms of a greater civic vir-
tue or societal need.558
With the opening of the Senate proceedings to television, this
deliberative process not only influences the views of individual repre-
sentatives, but also individual citizens to an extent never contem-
plated by the Framers. Where impeachment proceedings were once
closed to the public, they are now largely open to allow the public to
review the evidence and the final determination in such cases. The
impeachment trial will often bring to the surface the very factions
found in society, as well as their claims of partisan vengeance and
partisan protection. These claims are then subjected to the test of
evidence and to a full trial, with at least the promise of a transforma-
tive effect on the community as a whole. It is precisely the moment of
556. The trial has historically proven a powerful vehicle for transformative justice in the
United States due to its unique structure and rituals. See Jonathan Turley, Trials and Social
Discourse (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); see also Jonathan Turley, Trial of
the Century, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 27, 1999, at 27 (discussing the findings of the academic study
on the most significant trials of the twentieth century). Impeachment trials contain many of the
most important transformative elements in which core principles are presented within the con-
text of a concrete dispute. In such trials, the most difficult concepts or theories can be made
accessible to a wider audience, to a degree unsurpassed by any formal educational program. See
id.
557. Michelman, Foreword, supra note 535, at 13 n.44.
558. Civic virtue is often the focus of impeachment debates as it is the goal of many repub-
lican theories:
[C]ivic virtue should play a role in political life. There is no mystery to this claim; it
refers simply to the understanding that in their capacity as political actors, citizens
and representatives are not supposed to ask only what is in their private interest, but
also what will best serve the community in general . . . .
Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 536, at 1550.
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constitutional implosion of factional interests that distinguishes the
Madisonian system from its constitutional predecessors.
In modern politics, factional views on impeachment are often
translated into party affiliations. Even in the Johnson impeachment,
strong regional and racial divisions led to divisions along party
lines.559 In modern impeachments, it is political factionalism, or parti-
sanism, that has generally emerged in these cases. Nevertheless,
within the Democratic and Republican parties, religious, racial, and
gender factions are still evident. Such was the case in the Clinton cri-
sis, where minority and women’s groups were heavily supportive of
Clinton but Christian groups often were highly critical.560
Ironically, when such partisanship is evident, it is quickly de-
nounced as dangerous and inimical to the constitutional system.561
During the Clinton crisis, various politicians and academics objected
to partisanship in any impeachment process, arguing that it deprives
the process of legitimacy. In the House, it was maintained that im-
peachment should occur only on a bipartisan basis.562 The insistence
on a bipartisan basis for impeachment ignores the value of a Senate
trial to address factional views of legitimacy. It also ignores the trans-
formative dimension of impeachment trials, in which factional views
can be changed and even reversed over the course of testimony and
argument. Articles of impeachment bring factional views to the sur-
face, where they may be addressed openly in the Senate.563
559. See supra notes 392-99 and accompanying text.
560. See, e.g., Major Garrett, Impeachment Politics, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 5,
1998, at 20 (detailing group polling results).
561. See infra notes 565-76 and accompanying text.
562. This curious position was maintained despite obvious practical problems. It can hardly
be argued that, if a determined minority uniformly supported a guilty president, impeachment
by the majority would be ill advised or questionable. During the Clinton hearings, former Rep-
resentatives Elizabeth Holtzman and Robert Drinan testified that they insisted on bipartisan
support as the basis for impeaching President Nixon. See House Hearings, supra note 3, at 120
(testimony of Elizabeth Holtzman, former Congresswoman) (“Unless this committee and the
House act on a bipartisan basis and reach out for the common ground . . . you should not, you
must not vote to impeach.”); id. at 183 (testimony of Father Robert Drinan, former Congress-
man) (rejecting the idea of partisan impeachment, stating that “[the Democrats impeaching
Nixon] wouldn’t do that; there was something wrong with our judgment if some Republicans
can’t agree with us”). Despite this testimony, it is highly doubtful that Democrats would have
terminated impeachment proceedings if all of the Republican members remained committed to
their party’s president.
563. This is not to question the value of bipartisanship as an important demonstration of the
seriousness of allegations against a president. Bipartisanship is sought in any legislative or po-
litical process, but it was hardly expected by people like Madison.
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Madison sought to craft a system equipped to deal with tremen-
dous pressures when consensus was elusive. Such a process could
transform factional interests into majoritarian compromise. Biparti-
san impeachments were not the central concern of the Framers, and
they were certainly not the structuring model for the constitutional
provisions. Impeachments that are supported on a bipartisan basis do
not represent serious threats to the system, since removal would be
secured with the general acceptance of the public. The most danger-
ous impeachment crisis arises when one majority faction favors im-
peachment and a large minority faction opposes it. Partisan im-
peachments obviously increase the likelihood of the acquittal and
retention of a President. The value of the Senate trial is at its apex in
these partisan cases. By forcing the factional disputes into the open,
the Senate trial creates a process of dialogue and redress. Otherwise,
majority factional questions of legitimacy remain below the surface,
unresolved and festering. Condemning partisan impeachments as fa-
cially abusive ignores the value of impeachment as a dynamic politi-
cal process, as opposed to simply a method of removal.
The concern over partisanship is less compelling in the House
than the Senate. A vote of impeachment often reflects factionalized
uncertainty about the legitimacy of a President. When a question of
legitimacy is shared by a majority faction under the “high crimes and
misdemeanor” standard, the Senate trial is an essential political re-
sponse in a representative system. Conversely, the removal of a
President by the Senate on a partisan basis represents a failure in the
process to reconcile or moderate competing views. In such cases, a
partisan removal vote can cause significant political unrest, a concern
that may inform the judgment of individual senators in voting for ac-
quittal. Thus, if it is not the case, as stated by Professor Sunstein, that
“[t]he framers of the U.S. Constitution were terrified of a partisan
impeachment process,”564 they at least expected partisan impeach-
ment disputes. What they feared and what they sought to avoid was a
partisan conclusion to an impeachment process. Nevertheless, Pro-
fessor Schlesinger has echoed the view of many academics:565 “The
564. Cass R. Sunstein, Playing with Politics; This Is Not Exactly What the Framers Had in
Mind, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 16, 1998, at 27.
565. In opposing the impeachment of President Clinton, one academic stated that “a vote
for impeachment based on a party line vote or near party line vote is a signal that something is
wrong with the case and that the case may not be worth pursuing.” House Hearings, supra note
3, at 321 (testimony of Prof. Ronald Noble). This statement encapsulates the view of impeach-
ment as being simply about removal. Impeachment by majority factions does “signal that some-
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domination of the impeachment process by ‘faction’ would in the
view of the Framers deny the process legitimacy. The [Clinton] im-
peachment proceedings, judging by the strictly partisan vote in the
House of Representatives, fails the legitimacy test.”566
The suggestion that partisan impeachments “deny the process
legitimacy” can hardly be attributed to the view of the Framers, as
Schlesinger suggests. Certainly, there is no suggestion in the constitu-
tional or ratification debates that a majority faction was facially ille-
gitimate. Moreover, what gives the process legitimacy is how fac-
tional interests are allowed to be expressed within a political system
designed to produce majoritarian conclusions. If the aim of the
Framers had been to prevent majority factions from pursuing im-
peachments, they would have required a supermajority vote. Instead,
they directed majority factional interests into a Senate forum, where
they could be resolved in a dynamic political process.567 What would
be facially illegitimate is a system in which the majority could view a
President as having committed impeachable offenses worthy of re-
moval but fail to address those views in a Senate trial. It was Madi-
thing is wrong,” but not with the case. They signal that something is fundamentally wrong in the
perceived illegitimacy of the President to hold office. It is “worth pursuing” precisely because it
is a signal of a fundamental political crisis that is not resolved by an insistence on bipartisan
impeachment. As noted earlier, Senate trials are most important in cases of impeachment by
majority factions.
566. House Hearings, supra note 3, at 101 (testimony of Prof. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.).
567. The view of impeachment as primarily about removal can create a simple test of prob-
ability for House members convinced of impeachable acts but equally convinced of a low prob-
ability of conviction. Former Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman also stressed this point in
her testimony calling for the termination of the Clinton impeachment proceedings in part be-
cause of a lack of Senate votes:
No indictment would be sought by a prosecutor where there is no chance for convic-
tion. And it is almost universally conceded that there are not enough votes in the
Senate to convict President Clinton and remove him from office. 
Impeachment should not be voted by the House unless these is a strong likelihood of
conviction in the Senate.
House Hearings, supra note 3, at 120 (testimony of Elizabeth Holtzman). Ms. Holtzman then
expressly connected this probability argument to the view that “[i]mpeachment is a tool to re-
move a president from office. It is a last resort to preserve our democracy.” Id. This construct is
certainly appealing in its clarity. If impeachment is simply about removal, any low-probability
case becomes questionable. If, however, impeachment is a political process addressing majority
factional views, this argument is wholly misplaced. Moreover, the argument (advanced by Ms.
Holtzman and others) that no prosecutor would pursue a case where conviction is unlikely is
far too sweeping. See Turley, Too Popular, supra note 503, at A15. Even when a conviction is
sought in a criminal case, a prosecutor may anticipate a jury sympathetic to a popular defen-
dant or prejudiced against a victim, but still insist on holding the defendant to account in a sys-
tem of justice. See id.
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son’s concern about majority factions that led to the creation of a bi-
cameral system to regulate and, ideally, to transform such factional
preferences in legislation. Subjected to the same factional pressures,
the impeachment process is best understood in this legislative, rather
than a judicial, context. This view is undeniably proceduralist. The
objective of impeachment is not removal or retention but, to use the
concept of Hart and Sacks, a type of “institutional settlement.” In
framing their principle of institutional settlement in the legislative
process, Hart and Sacks tied proceduralism to the resolution of fac-
tional disputes in a way reminiscent of Franklin’s description568 of the
impeachment process:
Implicit in every such system of procedures is the central ideal of
law—an idea which can be described as the principle of institutional
settlement . . . . The alternative to disintegrating resort to violence is
the establishment of regularized and peaceable methods of decision.
The principle of institutional settlement expresses the judgment that
decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly established
procedures of this kind ought to be accepted as binding on the whole
society unless and until they are duly changed.569
The use of a bicameral system for impeachment shapes the rela-
tive roles of the two houses.570 It is impossible to understand the role
of one house in isolation.571 In earlier articles, the unique role of the
House of Representatives was explored.572 These articles suggested
two distinct functions of the House in performing its impeachment
568. See infra notes 635-36 and accompanying text.
569. HART & SACKS, supra note 55, at 4.
570. Hamilton stressed the value of bicameralism in the impeachment process:
The powers relating to impeachments are . . . an essential check in the hands of that
body upon the encroachments of the executive. The division of them between the
two branches of the legislature, assigning to one the right of accusing, to the other
the right of judging, avoids the inconvenience of making the same persons both ac-
cusers and judges; and guards against the danger of persecution, from the prevalency
of a factious spirit in either of those branches. As the concurrence of two-thirds of the
Senate will be requisite to a condemnation, the security to innocence, from this addi-
tion circumstance, will be as complete as itself can desire.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
571. The value of the bicameral system in legislation is precisely that it “would not only
provide a double review of proposed legislation, but also would assure two distinct perspec-
tives.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice The-
ory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 280 (1988). Similarly, the Framers ap-
peared to anticipate that the two houses would perform different but co-dependent functions in
impeachment.
572. Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3; Turley, Executive Function Theory, su-
pra note 3.
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duties. First, impeachment was crafted as a check on both executive
and judicial officers. The House plays its most significant role as a
check and balance when it detects and refers impeachable conduct.573
While the House has used the extraconstitutional vehicle of censure
when impeachment efforts have failed,574 impeachment presents a
more significant public act of denunciation with a greater deliberative
value in addressing the underlying allegations of legitimacy.575 The act
of referral creates a deterrent effect on all civil officers, including the
President.576 In this sense, the House role supports the structural in-
tegrity of the system as a check on the President as an individual of-
ficeholder. Even when the Senate does not remove an impeached of-
ficial, the act of impeachment creates uncertainty as to possible
removal for similar conduct in the future. Second, in the act of im-
peachment, the House identifies legitimacy concerns and moves
those concerns into an open process of deliberation.577 When such
concerns meet the standard of “high crimes and misdemeanors” in
the view of a majority, the House vote funnels these legitimacy issues
into the Senate for resolution under the specific procedural restric-
tions established by the Framers.
Because it is “the People’s House,” the populace’s majority view
that high crimes and misdemeanors have been committed represents
a serious political crisis that demands legislative redress. A common
argument by academics in the Clinton impeachment was that, absent
573. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3.
574. Such was the case with Judge Harry B. Anderson of the District of Tennessee in 1930.
Notably, the use of this extraconstitutional device occurred in a case in which the impeachment
was criticized as a raw political act of intimidation to force Anderson to reverse his rulings. See
Van Tassel, supra note 309, at 381. After the House refused to impeach, Anderson was cen-
sured. See id. at 382.
575. See id.
576. The value of impeachment as a check was recognized by early legal commentators:
The importance of the impeaching power consists, not in its effects upon subordinate
ministerial officers, but in the check which it places upon the President and the
judges. They must be clothed with an ample discretion; the danger to be appre-
hended is from an abuse of this discretion. But at this very point where the danger
exists, and where the protection should be certain, the President and the judiciary are
beyond the reach of Congressional legislation. Congress cannot, by any laws penal or
otherwise, interfere with the exercise of a discretion conferred by the Constitu-
tion. . . . If the offense for which the proceeding may be instituted must be made in-
dictable by statute, impeachment thus becomes absolutely nugatory against those of-
ficers in those cases where it is most needed as a restraint upon violations of public
duty.
JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 491-92 (1870), cited in BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 35.
577. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3, at 777.
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majority support for removal, impeachment would produce signifi-
cant costs with little expected benefit.578 However, when seventy per-
cent of a country believes that a President committed crimes in of-
fice,579 the termination of an impeachment inquiry preserves rather
than resolves conflict. This is precisely what Madison sought to avoid:
powerful and passionate factional views that are not addressed ade-
quately in the legislature. The mere fact that a President is called to
account, with his office in the balance, assures large factional groups
that their views are represented in the political system. The standard
of “high crimes and misdemeanors” serves to reserve this process to
misconduct of a high order and to exclude trials resulting from mere
unpopularity or political judgments. If a majority believes that a
President has committed high crimes and misdemeanors, the act of
impeachment by the House vents these pressures into a body best de-
signed to handle and, ideally, to reduce them through an open trial.
Under the bicameral structure, the Senate was viewed as the
body that was best suited to resist, as Hamilton described, the
“bree[zes] of passion.”580 This may have been due in part to the fact
that, until the Seventeenth Amendment, senators were elected by the
state legislators and not directly elected by the public. Nevertheless,
even with the direct election of senators, the Senate trial is structured
to permit considerable discretion and considerable freedom to use
that discretion. While impeachment defines conduct as sufficient for
a President to be removed, the Senate vote can rest on a host of vari-
ables other than guilt.581 “[T]he nature of the senatorial trust . . . re-
quire[s] [a] greater extent of information and stability of character.”582
The Framers intentionally left the process broadly defined and with-
out specific procedures. Hamilton noted that impeachment trials
578. See supra notes 562-66 and accompanying text.
579. See Benedetto, supra note 503, at 5A (reporting the results of a USA To-
day/CNN/Gallup poll, one month before the final Senate vote, showing that “a remarkable
79% say they already believe that Clinton committed perjury before a federal grand jury and a
majority of 53% agree he obstructed justice in the Paula Jones lawsuit”).
580. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, supra note 522, at 432.
581. There is a commonly held view of the House as the more political body in impeach-
ments. This may be due to the largely factional voting patterns and more open debate in that
body. The House role and history, however, suggests that this perception is misleading and in-
accurate. The results of most House impeachments are highly defensible on legal grounds, and
they cannot be entirely attributed to partisan voting. See generally, Turley, Congress as Grand
Jury, supra note 3.
582. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 376 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see id.
at 378 (“[A] senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly distinct from and dividing
the power with a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government.”).
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cannot be “tied down by . . . strict rules, either in the delineation of
the offense by the prosecutors or in the construction of it by the
judges . . . .”583
The static structural limitations in the Constitution primarily
force compromise and deliberation among factional groups rather
than engineer the course or substance of the debate. This dialogic
process exposes allegations to the test of prolonged and informed de-
bate. The result is a political debate in the Senate within a quasi-
judicial framework, a unique deliberative forum. Moreover, im-
peachment deliberations involve values that go beyond immediate
factional interests or partisan passions. Just as trials can inform juries
of values outside their initial prejudices or impulses, impeachment
trials often educate the public as to the gravity of a presidential of-
fense or the countervailing gravity of the removal of a President. For
advocates of a deliberative democratic model, the impeachment trial
should represent the greatest constitutional moment for the resolu-
tion of moral and political disputes.584
It is the function of the Senate trial to resolve questions of le-
gitimacy that properly characterizes the proceeding as political. Be-
yond simple questions of guilt, the Framers foresaw the need to ad-
dress such questions in a quasi-judicial forum that could balance the
continued viability of a President in office and the dangers in re-
moving that President. The Senate trial, therefore, contains both ju-
dicial and political elements. Hamilton noted that the Senate must sit
in “judicial character as a court for the trial of impeachments.”585
While often given an alternative meaning,586 Hamilton’s description
of the Senate trial emphasized the political element in performing its
quasi-judicial function:
The subjects [of Senate] jurisdiction [in an impeachment trial] are
those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or,
583. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 1, at 398.
584. See, e.g., JAMES S. FISHIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION 81-82 (1991) (arguing
that periodic deliberative opinion polls should be used to select presidential candidates); CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 19 (1993) [hereinafter
SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH] (observing that a well-functioning system of free expression is criti-
cal to the deliberative process because it facilitates discussion among the citizenry generally
and between representatives and their constituents); SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, su-
pra note 539, at 162 (exploring the foundations of the commitment to deliberative democracy).
585. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 1, at 396.
586. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3 at 1809-10 (discussing Hamilton’s
view in The Federalist No. 65).
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in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust.
They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denomi-
nated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immedi-
ately to the society itself. The prosecution of them, for this reason,
will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and
to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the ac-
cused. In many cases it will connect itself with the pre-existing fac-
tions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and
interest on one side or on the other; and in such cases there will al-
ways be the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more
by the comparative strength of parties than by the real demonstra-
tions of innocence or guilt.587
Hamilton links the “political” element of the Senate trial to the
fact that the Senate must adjudicate injuries to the state.588 The sub-
ject matter was political and volatile because the underlying miscon-
duct would be viewed as a violation of the public trust in either the
appointment of an official or, most seriously, in the election of a
President or Vice President. Such allegations would invariably pro-
duce social and political schisms. For that reason, Hamilton ex-
plained that a political body with the unique characteristics of the
Senate was required, since “[no] other body would be likely to feel
confidence enough in its own situation, to preserve, unawed and unin-
fluenced, the necessary impartiality between an individual accused
and the representatives of the people, his accusers.”589 The political
elements of the Senate trial were not the injuries, but the verdict and
the need to address a legitimacy question. For that reason, the courts
were ill suited to deal with the powerful political undercurrents, “and
it is still more to be doubted, whether they would possess the degree
of credit and authority” to resolve the matter with finality in the pub-
lic’s view:
The necessity of a numerous court for the trial of impeachments
is . . . dictated by the nature of the proceeding. . . . The awful discre-
tion which a court of impeachments must necessarily have to doom
to honor or to infamy the most confidential and the most distin-
587. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 1, at 396-97.
588. This has been used to suggest that injuries to the state restrict impeachable offenses to
official misconduct, but an alternative meaning is evident in the passage when read as a whole.
See Turley, The Executive Function Theory, supra note 3.
589. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 1, at 398.
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guished characters of the community forbids the commitment of the
trust to a small number of persons.590
The Senate was given this role precisely because of its ability to
balance interests other than guilt against the interests of the nation. It
is the ultimate application of what Madison described as “refin[ing]
and enlarg[ing] the public views by passing them through the medium
of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true
interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will
be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”591
Senators were imagined as a Burkean image of legislators—cognizant
of, but not controlled by, popular opinion.592 In a republican system,
“debate and discussion help to reveal that some values are superior
to others.”593 If civic virtue is the “animating principle” of the republi-
can system, deliberative debate is the method of achieving civic vir-
tue from the raw impulse of factional interest.594 In the context of im-
peachments, the Senate trial is essential to achieving this animating
principle.595 Absent a trial, the Senate is more likely to vote so as to
promote factional interests or to reaffirm public sentiment. Trials
tend to force senators to confront the evidence, or the lack of evi-
dence, in a public case of impeachment.
Hamilton’s description of the Senate trial as “political” was not a
license for opportunistic or factional voting, but was rather a recogni-
tion that a fundamental political decision would be made in im-
peachment verdicts.596 At the heart of the Senate trial is a question of
true consent. When faced with allegations of misconduct, an official
must continue in office with the legitimacy of consent by the people
through their representatives. This element of true consent is absent
in past academic discussions of Senate trials.
590. Id.
591. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 507, at 82; see also 1 PHILIP B. KURLAND &
RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 59 (1987) (arguing the need for representa-
tive government to “temper [the public’s] authority in legislation with the maturer counsels of
the one and the few”).
592. 2 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE 89, 95 (Boston, Little,
Brown, 9th ed. 1889) (“Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment;
and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”).
593. SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 584, at 32.
594. See id. at 31; Michelman, Foreword, supra note 535, at 18.
595. See Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part) (arguing that the impeachment process militates in favor of full
Senate trials).
596. See Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 3, at 1808-10.
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While academics often acknowledge that Senate trials are
unique, these trials are largely presented as univocal proceedings fo-
cused on the question of removal. Academics have criticized im-
peachments where removal was unlikely precisely because they view
Senate trials as properly performing this sole function.597 Where con-
viction is unlikely, impeachments have been presented as actually
harmful or abusive. What is missing is the element of true consent in
the retention of an impeached official. Alexander Bickel’s view of the
centrality of consent in a democratic system is particularly apt for
Senate trials:
[T]he heart of democratic government, and the morality which dis-
tinguishes it from everything else, is that it rests on consent. And the
secret of consent is only in part a matter of control, of the reserve
power of a majority to rise up against decisions that displease it. It is,
perhaps more importantly, the sense shared by all that their interests
were spoken for in the decision-making process, no matter how the
result turned out. Government by consent requires that no segment
of society should feel alienated from the institutions that govern.
This means that the institutions must not merely represent a numeri-
cal majority . . . but must reflect the people in all their diversity, so
that all the people may feel that their particular interests and even
prejudices, that all their diverse characteristics, were brought to bear
on the decision-making process.598
The issue of consent drives both judicial and presidential im-
peachments. When a judge is first appointed, the confirmation of the
Senate gives the judicial officer the legitimacy that comes from true
consent under a representative democracy. It is this element of con-
sent (and not the coercive authority of the court) that gives the judi-
cial officer the authority to rule in matters concerning other citizens.
When that officer has been impeached, the act of impeachment raises
a legitimacy question that must be resolved by the same body that
gave its consent to the original appointment. If retained, the judicial
597. See House Hearings, supra note 3, at 233 (testimony of Prof. Susan Low Bloch) (“I can
recommend that even if you believe that some of the allegations come close to being impeach-
able offenses or even are impeachable, that you exercise your discretion in this case to decide
to terminate this proceeding without voting out any articles of impeachment.”); Adam Pert-
man, Intent of Vote Questioned, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 19, 1998, at A9 (interviewing Professor
Stephen Carter, who criticized the House majority for impeaching a President who was unlikely
to be removed).
598. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 184 (1965).
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officer regains a degree of legitimacy lost in the controversy leading
to impeachment.
This element of true consent is more significant with respect to
an impeached President. When a President is impeached, “the Peo-
ple’s House” has rendered a decision not on guilt, but on the need for
a trial. The President in such a case will often be viewed by a signifi-
cant percentage of the population as unworthy of his office or pre-
sumptively guilty of the offenses. Such views may linger after a trial,
but the significance of a verdict to retain a President cannot be lost
on even the most ardent critic. While an individual may harbor le-
gitimacy questions, the President regains political legitimacy through
the act of consent by the representatives of the public.
Any value of the Senate trial as a Madisonian device, however, is
largely determined by the Senate rules governing the trial. The accep-
tance of the result of an impeachment process is not unlike that of
the legislative process. Hart and Sacks observed that “the best crite-
rion of sound legislation is the test of whether it is the product of a
sound process of enactment.”599 This self-legitimizing process requires
not simply a result, but “reasoned elaboration” through an informed
and deliberative process.600 For citizens to view a Senate trial as an act
of true or informed consent, they must see the central allegations
fully addressed. It is the faith in the process, and not its conclusion,
that stabilizes the political system. Thus, even if a citizen favors con-
viction, there cannot be any question as to the final judgment in the
face of the strongest case for removal. Through this process, both an
impeached President and his Senate jurors are held accountable in a
representative system.601 During the course of a trial, the public is ex-
posed to the evidence against a President by House managers with an
incentive to present the strongest possible case.602
599. HART & SACKS, supra note 55, at 695.
600. Id. at 3-4.
601. With the direct election of senators and greater public access to deliberations, the
value of the Senate trial as a method of factional resolution and deliberation has only in-
creased. The Senate trial is vital to an open and deliberative process by which the public is
given the entire record and evidence upon which to render a judgment. The Senate was given
this facilitating role because the Framers believed that the most effective “inquisitors for the
nation [are] the representatives of the nation themselves . . . .” THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra
note 1, at 397.
602. It is noteworthy that House managers have sought summary decisions without a trial.
See supra notes 208, 417-20 and accompanying text.
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This institutional interest of the House managers may put them
at odds with their juror counterparts in the Senate.603 Senators intent
on partisan acquittal may be less than eager to have the full eviden-
tiary case presented against a President.604 The value of such a process
is realized not only in its transformative effect on citizens but in its
effect on senators. Absent rules allowing for full disclosure and de-
bate, senators are more likely to vote raw partisan interests untested
over the course of a trial.605 For these reasons, it is essential that
House managers are given discretion in the presentation of evidence
and witnesses in their constitutional “case-in-chief.” The Clinton
rules were the most significant abridgment of this discretionary
authority. While the Senate clearly has the authority to determine the
manner in which a President is tried, it historically gave the House
managers discretion in the presentation of their case.606 While the
Senate has periodically imposed modest limits on witnesses (largely
to restrict the presentation of defendants), House managers have
been allowed to present their strongest case before a final vote of the
Senate has occurred.607 This creates a full (and accountable) record
upon which senators may cast their votes. As noted earlier, House
managers have periodically attempted to engineer abbreviated trials
or to limit witnesses to avoid public scrutiny or changes in public
603. In one case, it was the Senate that appeared to want some presentation of evidence
against the wishes of the House managers. In the case of Judge Claiborne, the House managers
moved for a summary judgment decision based on the argument that the Judge had already
been convicted. The Senate Impeachment Trial Committee balked and required presentation
of evidence. This was the only such effort by House managers, and it represented a serious
challenge to the dialogic use of the Senate trial for purposes other than removal. See S. REP.
NO. 99-48, at 22.
604. The Senate has in fact demonstrated the opposite interest in judicial cases headed for
conviction. In the trial of Judge Claiborne, the full Senate refused to allow the testimony of
witnesses in support of the impeached judge. See 132 CONG. REC. S15,557 (daily ed. Oct. 8,
1986).
605. Hart and Sacks emphasized the value of proceduralism in the quality of the legislative
product. See HART & SACKS, supra note 55, at 695 (explaining that the legislative procedure
“ought to be an informed process, in the sense that key decisions are not made until relevant
information has been acquired,” and that “it ought to be a deliberative process, in the sense that
key decision are not made until there has been a full interchange of view and arguments among
those making the decisions”).
606. Procedural conflicts with those House managers were largely due to attempts at cur-
tailing defense presentations and abbreviated trials. See supra notes 417-20 and accompanying
text.
607. There have been cases in which no witnesses have been presented or summary votes
were sought upon referral. See supra notes 208, 417-29 and accompanying text. These abbrevi-
ated trials were sought by the House managers, and the Senate has in fact required witnesses
where summary decisions were sought.
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opinion.608 Such efforts were made in the trial of President Johnson to
limit defections that could emerge from disagreements over evi-
dence.609 Similarly, senatorial restrictions on the presentation of evi-
dence by House managers can be abused. Senators intent upon ac-
quittal can easily engineer an abbreviated trial to reduce the public
backlash against their intended vote. More importantly, the full pres-
entation of evidence and witnesses deprives the process of credibility
among those citizens who remain in the minority view with respect to
agreement with the verdict. As was the case in the Clinton trial, sena-
tors will often determine witnesses according to their “need” in
reaching a verdict.610 This reflects the view of the impeachment trial
as a quasi-judicial process in which evidence is necessary only to the
degree required for a fair verdict. Where the verdict or culpability is
considered clearly known or preordained, senators have rejected the
need for witnesses or evidence in the trial.611 The exhibition of wit-
nesses and evidence, however, is central to a legislative or political
function. The presentation of the House managers creates the dia-
logic context of Senate trials. It is through the presentation of wit-
nesses and evidence that legitimacy issues are resolved in a political,
rather than legal, sense.
608. See supra notes 439-41.
609. See supra note 417 and accompanying text.
610. This point was raised most directly in the Clinton trial, where the Senate debated the
need for testimony of witnesses. The public had never seen the testimony of critical witnesses
like Lewinsky, except, for some citizens, in excerpted transcripts available on the Internet and
in government reports. This testimony, however, was not provided as part of the impeachment
proceedings and was not subject to cross-examination. Yet, some senators rejected the need for
testimony as unnecessary to their individual decisions as constitutional jurors. Senator Joseph
Lieberman framed the question on witnesses simply: “[D]o we need live witnesses to be able to
reach a judgment here?” Stakeout with Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND), Senator Joseph Lieber-
man (D-CT), and Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), FED. NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 13, 1999.
611. See, e.g., Press Conference with Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), FED. NEWS SERVICE,
Jan. 27, 1999 (“[I]f you have . . . some 44 members that want this trial to end now and don’t feel
the necessity for any new witnesses, then the issue of impeachment has, for all intents and pur-
poses, ended.”); Media Stakeout with Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) Following Question and An-
swer Session with the Senators in Impeachment Trial of President Clinton, FED. NEWS SERVICE,
Jan. 22, 1999 (rejecting the need for any witnesses since “[t]he marginal value it might have, if
any, is outweighed by the length of time it would take and the delays that would be produced”).
Senator Robert Torricelli has also expressed this viewpoint, stating:
The . . . critical moment of this case is when it is demonstrated that there are in ex-
cess of 34 members of the Senate who will vote to dismiss this case. It will then be
clear that no matter what witnesses are called, even if their facts are accepted as true,
people simply are not going to remove the president from office.
Stakeout Remarks by Senator Robert G. Torricelli (D-NJ), FED. NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 16, 1999.
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By forcing a full presentation of evidence, the Senate allows the
public to judge the legitimacy of an impeached official to continue in
office. This allows factional divisions to be aired openly and fully in
anticipation of a final vote. Limitations on the presentation of evi-
dence by House managers or senators defeats the finality sought by
the Framers in Senate trials. The Framers, like Franklin, were con-
cerned about the public view of such trials as an honest alternative to
more direct and dangerous methods of expression. Edmund
Randolph viewed the impeachment process as a vital pressure valve
when a nation was most susceptible to upheaval and executive abuse.
Randolph warned:
The Executive will have great opportunities of abusing his power;
particularly in time of war when the military force, and in some re-
spects the public money, will be in his hands. Should no regular
punishment be provided, it will be irregularly inflicted by tumults &
insurrections.612
Under this view, an acquittal based on tailored evidence is as danger-
ous as a conviction secured on such a basis. In both circumstances,
lingering factional questions will persist as to both the guilt of the
impeached official and the legitimacy of the process by which he was
judged. The process is remarkably demanding and at times demean-
ing. The process, however, is vital to the preservation of public
trust.613
A countervailing argument stressed the destabilizing effect of
impeachment on the balance of power and the specific weakening of
the presidency caused by Senate trials. Professor Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr.,614 and other academics have argued that Senate trials weaken the
presidency and should be avoided absent overwhelming evidence and
bipartisan support. Increased use of impeachment has been criticized
as introducing a form of “parliamentary” or “quasi-parliamentary”
system.615 Specifically, Professor Schlesinger maintained that even the
612. 2 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 67.
613. This is often the cost of public office since, as one court noted, “those appointed to
high public office hold a special public trust; they cannot properly complain if they are the ob-
jects of special scrutiny.” Benoit v. Gardner, 351 F.2d 846, 849 (1st Cir. 1965).
614. See House Hearings, supra note 3, at 99 (testimony of Prof. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.);
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., How History Will Judge Him, TIME, Feb. 22, 1999, at 44.
615. Professor Tribe was particularly alarmed about the prospects of a Clinton impeach-
ment for the tripartite system. See House Hearings, supra note 3, at 224 (testimony of Prof.
Laurence Tribe) (“If it is a parliamentary system people want, or something closer to such a
system than we have had for two centuries, then amending the Constitution to achieve such a
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attempted removal of Johnson materially changed the presidency for
years:
President Johnson was rescued in 1868, but even the failed im-
peachment had serious consequences for the presidency. The after-
math bound and confined the President for the rest of the century. A
brilliant young political scientist at Johns Hopkins, Woodrow Wil-
son, concluded the Congress had become, as he said, the central and
predominant power of the system, and he called his influential book
of 1885 “Congressional Government.”
Between Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt in 1901, no President ex-
erted strong executive leadership.616
Schlesinger’s argument617 is flawed both historically and concep-
tually. As an initial matter, Wilson did not characterize the Johnson
impeachment as inaugurating a period of congressional government.
Rather, Wilson viewed the first century of American government as
system or an approximation thereto is the only constitutionally proper course.”); id. at 228 (“To
suggest that, having deliberately rejected parliamentary supremacy at the founding of our re-
public, we should now embrace a theory that would make the President the most vulnerable of
all federal officials to the drastic remedy of impeachment and removal—truly the political
equivalent of capital punishment—is preposterous.”). Professor Tribe describes impeachment
as “empowering the Congress essentially to decapitate the Executive Branch in a single stroke”
and constituting “the uniquely solemn act of having one branch essentially overthrow another.”
Id. Such descriptions are hardly accurate. Impeachment hardly overthrows another branch,
which remains in the control of the same administration. Further, Article II, Section 1, Clause 6
of the Constitution, as well as the 25th Amendment, make hopes for decapitation a rather
ephemeral objective. One of the most central differences between the American system and a
parliamentary one is precisely that there is no hope of “overthrow[ing]” an administration out-
side the electoral process. Nevertheless, Professor Tribe was not alone in such dire warnings to
Congress about the potential consequences of impeachment in the Clinton case. See, e.g., House
Hearings, supra note 3, at 231 (testimony of Prof. Susan Low Bloch) (“I cannot stress enough
the fact . . . that if we lower the bar of what constitutes and warrants impeachment, we will be
moving unconstitutionally toward a parliamentary system.”).
616. House Hearings, supra note 3, at 99 (testimony of Prof. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.).
617. Professor Bruce Ackerman also advances this argument in his testimony. Professor
Ackerman opposed the impeachment of President Clinton and predicted that a strong tendency
toward impeachment as a political tool would result:
The result would be a massive shift toward a British-style system of parliamentary
government. This is what happened in the aftermath of the impeachment of Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson in 1868. Though this impeachment effort barely failed to gain
two-thirds support in the Senate, it drained effective power from the Presidency—to
the point where Woodrow Wilson, writing in 1885, could describe our system as
“congressional government.” And it could readily happen again.
Impeachment Inquiry Pursuant to H. Res. 581: Presentation on Behalf of the President Before
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 46 (1998) (testimony of Prof. Bruce Acker-
man).
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an example of congressional government resulting from structural
flaws in the system.618 Schlesinger’s use of Wilson’s academic work is
rather ironic given Schlesinger’s coupling of this historical account
with a warning that this trend threatens a “quasi-parliamentary” sys-
tem.619 In Congressional Government, Wilson did not simply call for a
quasi-parliamentary system; he called for an actual parliamentary
system.620 Moreover, it is difficult to find a historical basis for attrib-
uting perceived weakness in eight administrations to the Johnson
trial. If these Presidents were indeed weak, the cause would more
likely be found in the economic, social, and political conditions of the
period. It is hard to believe that President Benjamin Harrison was
materially altered in his outlook by recurring mental images of the
Johnson trial. Moreover, this argument appears to suggest that there
was a material change due to the trial. Yet, it is difficult to submit
Martin Van Buren, John Tyler, Millard Fillmore, Franklin Piece, and
James Buchanan as examples of robust executives in the pre-Johnson
world. Finally, Schlesinger’s historical account is supported neither
by other historians nor by his own survey of historians on the relative
strengths of Presidents before and after the Johnson trial. Post-
Johnson and pre-Roosevelt Presidents Grover Cleveland and Wil-
liam McKinley were consistently rated as above-average in both
Schlesinger’s study and that of the Intercollegiate Studies Institute
(“ISI”).621 Conversely, pre-Johnson Presidents Van Buren, Tyler,
Taylor, Fillmore, Pierce, and Buchanan were listed as below-average
by historians in both studies.622 Professor Schlesinger’s suggested
cause and effect is simply insupportable. The strength of American
Presidents may be better attributed to the growth in the American
economy and greater international interests, as well as change in the
role of party politics.
618. See WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 48-56 (Johns Hopkins Paperbacks ed., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1981) (1885).
619. See House Hearings, supra note 3, at 100 (testimony of Prof. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.).
620. See WILSON, supra note 618, passim.
621. Both Cleveland and McKinley were ranked as “high average” in both the Schlesinger
and ISI polls. See James Piereson, Historians and the Reagan Legacy, WEEKLY STANDARD,
Sept. 29, 1997, at 22 (comparing the results of the Schlesinger poll and the ISI poll).
622. President Van Buren was ranked as “low average” in both polls. Presidents Tyler and
Fillmore were ranked as “below average” in both polls, while President Taylor was ranked as
“below average” in the Schlesinger poll (but not ranked in the ISI poll). Presidents Pierce and
Buchanan were ranked as failures in both polls. Due to their abbreviated tenures, neither Wil-
liam Henry Harrison nor James Garfield was ranked by either poll. See id.
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Putting aside the factual basis of Schlesinger’s historical claim,
his conceptual argument that impeachment trials weaken Presidents
should be addressed. As noted earlier, Framers like Madison were
clearly concerned about the effect of impeachment authority on the
executive branch vis-à-vis the legislative branch. Presumably, this
concern contributed to the Framers’ rejection of the Sherman “at-
will” impeachment proposal,623 their adoption of the standard of
“high crimes and misdemeanors,” and their imposition of a super-
majority and other procedural requirements for removal. Even with
these accommodations by the Framers, however, Schlesinger main-
tains that impeachments, like President Clinton’s, serve to weaken
the presidency. This, in turn, is based on a distinct and debatable view
of presidential authority. Professor Schlesinger and others appear to
fear a transfer of power to the legislative branch resulting from a
chilling effect of the threat of impeachment. This comes down to a
case of looking through a glass darkly. What is a chilling effect to
some is a deterrent effect to others. Impeachment was often dis-
cussed by the Framers in terms of a check or a deterrent on presiden-
tial misconduct. As noted earlier, the statements of the Framers can
be viewed as anticipating that impeachment would play a more active
role than has been the case in our history.624 Some of the delegates
clearly shared the view of Williamson, who—when Madison argued
that by trying impeachments, the Senate would threaten the Presi-
dent’s independence—observed that “there was more danger of too
much lenity than of too much rigour towards the President.”625 Like-
wise, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts “urged the necessity of im-
peachments” on the basis that “a good magistrate will not fear them
[, but a] bad one ought to be kept in fear of them.”626 James Iredell
also emphasized the deterrent value of impeachment and noted that
“although he may be a man of no principle, the very terror of punish-
ment will perhaps deter him.”627 Moreover, while Madison would have
given the Supreme Court all or part of the function of trying im-
peachments, he did view impeachment as a critical counterbalance to
the powers of the presidency.628
623. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
624. See Turley, Congress as Grand Jury, supra note 3, at 766-69.
625. 2 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 551.
626. Id. at 66.
627. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 131, at 32.
628. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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The Schlesinger argument also fails to consider the countervail-
ing weakness of retaining, without a trial on the merits, a President
who is viewed by the majority of the House as guilty of high crimes
and misdemeanors. In a Senate trial, an impeached President is either
removed or retained. In either case, it is not clear that the presidency
is weakened as a result. When removed, a President has already lost
the perceived legitimacy to govern. When retained, a President can
claim a second act of consent for his continuation in office. The
strength of any President, and the presidency as a whole, rests on the
acceptance of his legitimacy to govern. A President must have both
legal and political legitimacy to lead a democratic nation. In times of
crisis, a President must have sufficient legitimacy to demand the
greatest sacrifice of citizens, since a President cannot coerce a free
nation. A President who is viewed as being without legitimacy suffers
from a dangerous form of disability. The Framers foresaw controver-
sies in which “an officer . . . had rendered himself justly criminal in
the eyes of a majority.”629 The Framers created a process in which
such questions of legitimacy could be resolved in an open and delib-
erative fashion. Alexander Hamilton described impeachment as “a
method of NATIONAL INQUEST into the conduct of public
men.”630 It is a public process to reach a public determination about
the conduct of public officials.631 As James Iredell noted, it is a proc-
629. 1 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 86 (quoting James Madison and Robert Wilson).
630. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 1, at 397; see also JOHN R. LABOVITZ,
PRESIDENTIAL MISCONDUCT 199 (1978) (“The major purpose of impeachment, however, is to
rid the government of a chief executive whose past misconduct demonstrates his unfitness to
continue in office. Impeachment is a prospective remedy for the benefit of the people, not a
retributive sanction against the offending officer.”); 2 STORY, supra note 36, at 233-34:
The offences, to which the power of impeachment has been, and is ordinarily ap-
plied, as a remedy, are of a political character. Not but that crimes of a strictly legal
character fall within the scope of the power, (for, as we shall presently see, treason,
bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanours are expressly within it;) but that it
has a more enlarged operation, and reaches, what are aptly termed, political of-
fences, growing out of personal misconduct, or gross neglect, or usurpation, or habit-
ual disregard of the public interests, in the discharge of the duties of political office.
631. This view of impeachment as addressing legitimacy issues is certainly present in mod-
ern impeachment trials, in which Congress has often sought removal based on such articles as
raising “substantial doubt as to [one’s] judicial integrity, undermin[ing] confidence in the integ-
rity and impartiality of the judiciary, betray[ing] the trust of the people of the United States,
disobey[ing] the laws of the United States, and bring[ing] disrepute on the Federal courts and
the administration of justice by the Federal courts.” ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST
JUDGE WALTER L. NIXON, JR., AS AMENDED, S. DOC NO. 101-17, at 23 (1987) (quoting Arti-
cle III of impeachment); see also REPORT OF THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMITTEE ON THE
ARTICLES AGAINST JUDGE ALCEE L. HASTINGS, S. REP. NO. 101-156, at 2 (1989) (including
Article XVII for “betray[ing] the trust of the people of the United States”); H.R. Res. 461, 99th
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ess guaranteeing that “if a man be a villain, and willfully abuse his
trust, he is to be held up as a public offender.”632
“High crimes and misdemeanors” is a standard directed at con-
duct by a President that is so serious as to undermine his political and
legal legitimacy to govern.633 Madison noted that there are times
when the public should not have to wait for the termination of a term
to remove a person unfit for the office. Madison explained:
[It is] indispensable that some provision should be made for de-
fending the Community ag[ain]st the incapacity, negligence or per-
fidy of the chief Magistrate. The limitation of the period of his serv-
ice, was not a sufficient security. He might lose his capacity after his
appointment. He might pervert his administration into a scheme of
peculation or oppression. . . . In the case of the Executive Magistracy
which was to be administered by a single man, loss of capacity or
corruption was more within the compass of probable events, and ei-
ther of them might be fatal to the Republic.634
While there may be a variety of disabilities that were not viewed
in the 1700s as falling within “the compass of probable events,” the
impeachment process was available to the public to avoid the paraly-
sis of a President with the title but not the legitimacy to govern. This
public inquiry into “the conduct of public men” allows a free people
to respond to questions of illegitimacy rather than leave the system
paralyzed or retarded by scandal. Benjamin Franklin referred to this
function in his view of the impeachment process:
What was the practice before this in cases where the chief Magis-
trate rendered himself obnoxious? Why recourse was had to assassi-
nation in [which] he was not only deprived of his life but of the op-
portunity of vindicating his character. It [would] be the best way
therefore to provide in the Constitution for the regular punishment
Cong. (1986) (enacted) (outlining articles of impeachment against Judge Harry E. Claiborne,
including “betray[ing] the trust of the people of the United States and reduc[ing] confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, thereby bringing disrepute on the Federal courts
and the administration of justice by the courts”).
632. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 131, at 126.
633. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 39-40 (1974):
I think we can say that “high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” in the constitutional sense,
ought to be held to be those offenses which are rather obviously wrong, whether or
not “criminal,” and which so seriously threaten the order of political society as to
make pestilent and dangerous the continuance in power of their perpetrator.
634. 2 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 65-66.
TURLEY TO PRINTER 11/30/99 3:15 PM
1999] IMPEACHMENT AS A MADISONIAN DEVICE 139
of the Executive when his misconduct should deserve it, and for his
honorable acquittal when he should be unjustly accused.635
Franklin’s words reflect a view of impeachment that is poten-
tially redemptive.636 If a President stands before the Senate and an-
swers allegations under oath, he can regain the legitimacy that he lost
in the eyes of many Americans. If a President is justly accused, the
Framers viewed the loss of legitimacy to be a permanent condition
and specifically mandated that conviction would be accompanied
with “disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or
Profit under the United States.”637 Both Franklin and Randolph em-
phasized the need for the public to view the process as responding to
questions of fitness in order to avoid “irregular” responses.638 The
Framers created a system by which such powerful pressures could be
directed to allow some release within the legislative branch, rather
than resisted to the point of social explosion.
There is no more dangerous or divisive a question in a demo-
cratic system than the legitimacy of a President to govern. Perhaps
for that reason, most past impeachments of judicial and presidential
officers have been framed in legitimacy rather than criminality
terms.639 The test of the system was to create a process that could
635. Id. at 65.
636. Franklin’s linkage of impeachment and assassination was no idle comparison. In the
case of the Duke of Buckingham, the decision of Charles I to disband Parliament before his
impeachment left Buckingham to the devices of an assassin, who brought about a more perma-
nent removal from office. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
637. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
638. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 67-68 (statement of Benjamin Franklin) (noting that
absent a system of impeachment, citizens can resort to violent action); id. at 67 (statement of
Edmund Randolph) (“The propriety of impeachments was a favorite principle with him; Guilt
wherever found out to be punished. The Executive will have great opportunitys of abusing his
power . . . . Should no regular punishment be provided, it will be irregularly inflicted by tumults
& insurrections.”).
639. This point was made by the House Judiciary Committee in the impeachment of Presi-
dent Nixon:
In drawing up articles of impeachment, the House has placed little emphasis on
criminal conduct. . . .
. . . .
Much more common in the articles are allegations that the officer has violated his
duties or his oath or seriously undermined public confidence in his ability to perform
his official functions. Recitals that a judge has brought his court or the judicial system
into disrepute are commonplace. In the impeachment of President Johnson, nine of
the articles alleged that he acted “unmindful of the high duties of his office and of his
oath of office,” and several specifically refer to his constitutional duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed.
3 DESCHLER, supra note 37, at 723.
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handle such intense pressures while protecting against majoritarian
abuse. Impeachment provides a public forum to address these con-
cerns and, when appropriate, to subject a chief executive to a new
vote of legitimacy. The bicameral structure of impeachment allows
for serious questions about the legitimacy of the chief executive to be
raised in an open and deliberative fashion.640 It was a process by
which illegitimacy could be remedied by removal and legitimacy
could be redeemed by acquittal.
Certainly not every article of impeachment in American history
contained a legitimate basis for removal. In the articles of impeach-
ment against President Richard Nixon,641 the House tied each specific
act to the charge that the President’s conduct was “contrary to his
trust as President and subversive of constitutional government, to the
great prejudice of the cause of law and justice and to the manifest
injury of the people of the United States.”642 The use of impeachment
to address legitimacy issues was made by the New York bar during
the Nixon hearings:
It is our conclusion, in summary, that the grounds for impeachment
are not limited to or synonymous with crimes (indeed, acts consti-
tuting a crime may not be sufficient for the impeachment of an of-
ficeholder in all circumstances). Rather, we believe that acts which
undermine the integrity of government are appropriate grounds
whether or not they happen to constitute offenses under the general
criminal law. In our view, the essential nexus to damaging the integ-
rity of government may be found in acts which constitute corruption
in, or flagrant abuse of the powers of, official position. It may also be
found in acts which, without directly affecting governmental proc-
esses, undermine that degree of public confidence in the probity of
executive and judicial officers that is essential to the effectiveness of
government in a free society. . . . At the heart of the matter is the de-
termination—committed by the Constitution to the sound judgment
640. Certainly in the judicial impeachments, the notion of illegitimacy brought on by im-
proper or offensive conduct was readily accepted under the Constitution in the 18th century.
This illegitimacy basis for impeachment continued throughout our history, with judges often
charged with bringing “disrepute” upon their offices. See, e.g., 80 CONG. REC. 5602-08 (1936)
(debate concerning impeachment of Halsted L. Ritter); see also Wrisley Brown, The Impeach-
ment of the Federal Judiciary, 26 HARV. L. REV. 684, 692 (1913) (noting that impeachment was
appropriate for “an official dereliction of commission or omission, a serious breach of moral
obligation, or other gross impropriety of personal conduct which, in its natural consequences,
tends to bring an office into contempt and disrepute”).
641. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1613-42 (1868) (recounting the debate con-
cerning the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson).
642. 3 DESCHLER, supra note 37, at 638; see also id. at 638-43 (outlining Articles I-III).
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of the two Houses of Congress—that the officeholder has demon-
strated by his actions that he is unfit to continue in the office in
question.643
While there is considerable debate over the relevance of judicial
impeachment decisions to presidential impeachment cases,644 one as-
pect of the judicial impeachments is certainly probative. After the
ratification of the Constitution, judicial impeachments were com-
menced during the lifetime of many of the delegates. From these
early cases to the present time, the House has included legitimacy ar-
ticles that charged judicial officers with bringing disrepute upon their
offices. There was no outcry concerning this noncriminal basis for
impeachment nor the right of the public to review conduct that is so
offensive as to be viewed as incompatible with an office.645 Although
legitimacy questions are more destabilizing in presidential cases, the
resolution of such questions in an open process is often vital in judi-
cial cases. The impeachment and trial of Judge Hastings is a modern
case in point. Due to his acquittal at his criminal trial, Judge Hastings
insisted that his impeachment and removal reflected a racist standard
in the treatment of African-American judges.646 This was an explosive
charge that divided the nation and troubled some members of Con-
gress.647 Over the course of a long impeachment process and Senate
trial, however, Congress achieved a bipartisan agreement on the need
for removal, while at the same time it presented the strength of the
evidence to the public. Much of the Hastings trial appeared to be a
process in which the public could review the basis of the allegations
and countervailing racist allegations. Ultimately, Judge Hastings was
impeached by a vote of 413-3 in the House648 and 69-26 in the Senate.
The Senate vote reflected the fact that the Hastings case grew more
controversial over the course of the process.649 The Senate trial played
643. COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL LEGISLATION OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 18-19 (1974).
644. See supra note 476 and accompanying text.
645. For example, recent impeachments of judicial officers include Judge Harry Claiborne
(income tax evasion) and Judge Walter Nixon (perjury). See GERHARDT, supra note 243, at 4
n.11.
646. See supra notes 343, 347-48 and accompanying text.
647. As noted earlier, judicial impeachment cases occasionally raise such charges of politi-
cal or retaliatory impeachment. Judges Nixon and Claiborne also raised such questions as to
the motivation of impeachment in reference to their prior rulings against the government. See
supra notes 360-61 and accompanying text.
648. See H.R. Res. 499, 100th Cong. (1988) (enacted).
649. This vote was only five votes above the required “supermajority” level. Four senators
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a central role in the public dialogue over the case, and the outcome
may have reflected the fact that Judge Hastings’s conduct would con-
tinue to deprive him of any legitimacy as a judicial officer in criminal
and civil cases. If Judge Hastings had been acquitted on a clear dem-
onstration of proper conduct, his acquittal might have cleared away
clouds of doubt by presenting the evidence in his defense. However,
the fact that Judge Hastings was tried on grounds widely considered
compelling (and that his alleged co-conspirator was convicted650) de-
manded a Senate trial on his retention and a second vote of consent.
When viewed as a process for dealing with factional disputes
over legitimacy, the true importance of the Senate trial becomes
clear. From the early use of impeachment in the English system, im-
peachments were quintessentially public acts.651 When a President is
accused, the Senate must resolve these questions in a trial specifically
created for such review with representatives of all three branches.
The President’s conduct is reviewed by legislative figures designated
by the Framers on account of their length of term and special institu-
tional characteristics. If an official leaves such a body with his office
intact, he can claim a form of political legitimacy that was gained by
exposing himself to removal by will of the public. At the heart of this
process is the element of consent; at the heart of consent is the ele-
ment of full disclosure.652
did not vote. Three senators recused themselves due to the fact that they had voted as House
members in the impeachment of Judge Hastings before joining the Senate. One senator was in
California due to an earthquake. The supermajority requirement, therefore, was 64 votes for
conviction. Ultimately, the 69 votes cast for conviction would have satisfied the standard for the
full Senate. See Baron, supra note 341, at 877, 901.
650. See id. at 902.
651. Jefferson noted that British impeachments followed the practice of swearing in wit-
nesses in open proceedings. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY
PRACTICE § L3 (2d ed. 1812), cited in Auslander, supra note 333, at 85-86 n.119.
652. There are obviously some acts that do not raise serious questions of the legitimacy of a
President as a person of “good virtue” or veracity. However, there are many criminal or non-
criminal acts that seriously undermine such legitimacy in a person who must “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. In a prior article, the relative signifi-
cance of criminal versus noncriminal conduct was explored. See Turley, Congress as Grand
Jury, supra note 3, at 759-62; cf. GERHARDT, supra note 243, at 88 (“The answer seems to be
that someone who holds office also holds the people’s trust, and an officeholder who violates
that trust effectively loses the confidence of the people and, consequently, must forfeit the of-
fice.”).
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CONCLUSION
Articles I through III of the Constitution reflect the genius of the
Madisonian democracy to direct unstable factional forces into the
core of a deliberative process for resolution. Historically, some of the
most dangerous and destabilizing factional conflicts have centered on
the removal or retention of public officials. Impeachment was first
widely used in this country as a powerful weapon of factional politics.
Long ago, factional leaders learned that no political grievance was
more compelling than a personified grievance. For that reason, im-
peachments have often risen with the tide of political discord. Pas-
sions can be equally high where the grievance can be attributed to the
misconduct of the individual officer. When a constitutional officer
engages in impeachable conduct, the controversy creates instability in
a system based on consent rather than coercion. Rather than have
such issues go unanswered, the Framers created a process by which
an official would be called to defend his conduct and to submit to the
will of the Senate as representatives of the citizens. This process is
political and potentially redemptive. This is why it is often more im-
portant how we reach a decision in a Madisonian system than what
we decide. When the Senate allows for a full presentation of evi-
dence, factional views are given expression in the political system,
and, regardless of the outcome, the verdict represents the will of a
representative democracy. A retained judge or President may not re-
gain personal respect from this process, but he can regain the political
legitimacy needed to carry out constitutional functions.
The political function of impeachment is most evident in the
cases of presidential impeachment. There is no greater political crisis
in a democratic system than an allegation that the chief executive,
sworn to enforce the law, has committed criminal acts in office. It is
often stated that the crisis of presidential impeachment is due to the
great harm that a President can commit and the “great injury” that
can be done to the citizens. This great injury, however, is not the ac-
tual criminal acts, which may threaten few citizens or achieve little in
their commission. Rather, the great injury is to the body politic: alle-
gations that a chief executive is himself a threat to the rule of law
may have traumatizing and destabilizing effects. Injury occurs also
with the loss of legitimacy in a system demanding that a President
have the full faith of the citizenry. The Framers understood both the
danger of paralysis that can result from such allegations and the need
to address any appearance that the President stands outside of the
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system of laws. This was precisely the concern of Framers like
George Mason when he argued for the necessity of impeachment by
asking a rhetorical question: “Shall any man be above Justice? Above
all shall that man be above it, who can commit the most extensive
injustice?”653 The Senate trial is a public act, a “calling . . . to ac-
count”654 to resolve all questions as to the legitimacy of the one offi-
cer whose lawful conduct must be beyond question. The circumven-
tion or abridgment of a Senate trial creates the appearance of special
extrajudicial status in the President and undermines the legitimacy of
prosecution of average citizens by the executive branch.
Therefore, the Senate trial does not weaken the presidency or
the judiciary, but rather guarantees that officials govern without lin-
gering factional doubts about their legitimacy due to the commission
of alleged high crimes and misdemeanors. The Senate trial also plays
a significant role for the Senate as an institution, the individual Sen-
ate members, and the public at large. For individual senators, the trial
can encourage—as it has encouraged in the past—civic virtue to pre-
vail over factional interests in final votes.655 For the public, the Senate
trial allows individual constituents to judge not only the conduct of
an official but the conduct of individual senators. It is in this sense
that the Senate trial is a vital vehicle of deliberative democratic proc-
ess. It is through the deliberations of the Senate trial, now played out
before a national audience, that a final vote of consent is established
with finality and legitimacy.
The view of the Senate trial presented in this Article is heavily
divorced from the simple procedural function of removal. Rather, the
653. 2 RECORDS, supra note 5, at 65; see also 2 STORY, supra note 36, at 279 (noting that
impeachment “holds out a deep and immediate responsibility, as a check upon arbitrary power;
and compels the chief magistrate, as well as the humblest citizen, to bend to the majesty of the
laws”).
654. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 572 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). Given the President’s oath to faith-
fully execute the laws, John Vining stressed the use of impeachment trials as a public means of
addressing such allegations as distinct from a later election:
The President. What are his duties? To see the laws faithfully executed; if he does
not do this effectually, he is responsible. To whom? To the people. Have they the
means of calling him to account, and punishing him for neglect? They have secured it
in the Constitution, by impeachment, to be presented by their immediate representa-
tives; if they fail here, they have another check when the time of election comes
round.
Id.
655. In casting his famous dissenting vote against the conviction of President Johnson, Kan-
sas Senator Edmund Ross was reportedly motivated by a fear of congressional autocracy that
would “create partisan rule whereby a majority would brutally stifle all opposition as a matter
of course.” SMITH, supra note 391, at 279.
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Senate trial has a critical political function as a measure of consent.
When a President is impeached, the resulting legitimacy question is
based partly on the fact that critical information about a President’s
conduct or character was disclosed after he was elected. Likewise, a
judge accused of such conduct reveals information not known at the
time of his appointment. This creates the analogy to consent based on
misrepresentation. It is essential that a Senate trial result in full dis-
closure, regardless of the outcome. If full disclosure results in re-
moval, the impeached President could not have continued in office
with the authority needed to lead a nation. If full disclosure results in
retention, the vote to retain the President is based on a second act of
consent by the public through their representatives. Regardless of
how citizens may view the conduct or character of the President,
there is no question that the President was retained with the full con-
sent of a democratic nation.
In a Madisonian system, it is not factional or partisan disputes
that are threats to stability, but unaddressed factional or partisan dis-
putes. Ironically, the bicameral system crafted by Madison is the most
effective government system in resolving factional disputes. Yet, in
the most intense and dangerous factional controversy of presidential
impeachment, the value of the Madisonian process has been largely
ignored. Impeachments are treated as insular and unique events, as
opposed to extreme forms of factional dispute. Senate trials are
viewed as potentially destructive rather than potentially transforma-
tive in the political system. As a result, the impeachment process re-
mains the one bicameral function that is treated as exogenous to the
bicameral system. Deprived of its underpinnings, impeachment is re-
duced to a univocal process with little purpose beyond its conclusion.
Impeachment is best understood as a legislative rather than a ju-
dicial process. When viewed as part of the legislative system for re-
solving factional disputes, impeachment is given a contextual and
procedural meaning. It is the most extreme and rarest form of politi-
cal discord left for resolution in the legislative branch. As with legis-
lation, the validity of the final decision of the Senate depends on an
informed and deliberative process.656 When the threshold of “high
crimes and misdemeanors” has been met in the House, the full pres-
entation of evidence and debate in the Senate trial are essential to
the retention of legitimacy not only by the officeholder but for the
political process itself. It is the perceived legitimacy of the process,
656. HART & SACKS, supra note 55, at 2-4, 695.
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and not the outcome of that process, that maintains the faith of the
governed and ultimately the authority of the government. If a system
is best understood or defined at its extremes, the final call of a Senate
impeachment vote is the quintessential Madisonian moment. It is the
moment in which a pluralistic nation, fractured by division, is joined
by a common faith. Far from a moment of weakness, it may be our
strongest moment as a people.
